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Summary
This thesis consists of four independent chapters: two on vertical contracts
and two on platforms.1
The first chapter extends the existing literature on naked exclusion by
allowing both the dominant manufacturer and its rival to use exclusive con-
tracts, so that the dominant manufacturer no longer enjoys any first-mover
advantage. Despite the lack of a first-mover advantage, the chapter shows
that the dominant manufacturer is still able to use exclusive contracts with
retailers to foreclose its rival. Due to a contracting externality among retail-
ers, indeed there is an equilibrium in which either manufacturer forecloses the
other. However, the dominant firm, with a supra-demand advantage, monop-
olizes at a lower cost and within a wider range. Exclusion is easier to sustain
as upstream competition becomes stronger and as the number of competing
retailers decreases.
The existing literature on two-sided markets either focuses on symmetric
market structures or asymmetric structures, but not the link between these
two. In a two-sided market model where sellers directly charge buyers, the sec-
ond chapter shows that when network effects are strong, there exist asymmetric
1The second chapter is co-authored with Assistant Professor Chiu Yu Ko, while the third
chapter is co-authored with my supervisor, Professor Julian Wright.
viii
equilibria where market dominance arises. Whenever multiple equilibria exist,
only asymmetric equilibria or monopoly equilibria are stable and they are also
welfare-dominant. Moreover, the set of stable equilibria changes continuously
from the unique symmetric equilibrium to asymmetric equilibria, and finally
to monopoly equilibria, as network effects become stronger.
Price coherence is a constraint imposed by intermediaries to prevent sellers
from charging more to buyers who come through the intermediaries. Such
price restriction is studied in the previous literature on payment cards. The
third chapter generalizes this literature to markets with intermediaries who
have better information about sellers’ products and thus act as information
gatekeepers. This chapter shows that an intermediary which provides match-
ing information for buyers will always want to restrict sellers from charging
higher prices for buyers who purchase through the intermediary. Such price
restrictions allow the intermediary to charge a high fee to sellers which is
passed through back to buyers, and thereby results in lower consumer surplus.
However, intermediation always increases consumer surplus as buyers expected
gain from information acquisition and intensified seller competition dominates
the potential loss from inflated prices.
The fourth chapter further extends the naked exclusion literature by al-
lowing manufacturers to offer exclusive deals in terms of loyalty discounts
ix
instead of lump-sum payments. Following the first chapter where both man-
ufacturers are assumed to use exclusive contracts, this chapter shows that a
dominant manufacturer with a cost advantage is able use exclusive deals in
terms of loyalty discounts with retailers to foreclose its rival. Though loyalty
discounts have a similar foreclosure effect as lump-sum payments, exclusion
through loyalty discounts involves no cost. Moreover, costless exclusion by the
dominant manufacturer is the unique outcome if its cost efficiency is large and
downstream competition is sufficiently strong.
x
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Exclusive contracts are often used by vertically related firms as a practice to
anti-competitively exclude or foreclose other competitors. A dominant firm’s
ability to use exclusive contracts with its buyers to foreclose rival firms has
been a controversial issue in antitrust history. Most of the existing literature
on exclusive dealing focuses on naked exclusion, the case in which exclusion
arises even though there are no efficiency gains associated with it. These
papers rely on a crucial assumption that there is an incumbent who enjoys
a first-mover advantage. The incumbent uses exclusive contracts to sign up
all buyers (or competing downstream distributors), so that a more efficient
entrant is foreclosed from entry.
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Many real world antitrust cases on exclusive dealing do not fit this assump-
tion. On the contrary, when a dominant manufacturer is making exclusive of-
fers to downstream distributors, smaller rivals are typically already present in
the market and can make similar exclusive offers as well. For example, in 2009
it was alleged that Intel offered exclusive contracts to lock up OEMs (Origi-
nal Equipment Manufacturers, such as Dell, Hewlitt Packard, NEC, Acer and
Lenovo), so that it was able to exclude its major rival AMD. AMD accused
Intel of using unfair practices to sign exclusive contracts with some of OEMs
and Intel finally agreed to pay AMD $1.25 billion as part of the settlement ap-
proved by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Clearly, when the dominant
firm (Intel) was making exclusive offers, the smaller rival (AMD) was already
in the market and had the ability to make similar offers.1 Exclusion that arises
in such a scenario can therefore not be fully explained by the existing literature
in which one firm is assumed to enter later and thus cannot make exclusive
offers. This paper aims to study exclusive dealing in a framework where such a
situation occurs. I seek to address the following questions: whether exclusion
1There are some other recent exclusive dealing cases in which major rivals were already
present. For instance, McWane foreclosed the main competitor Star and Sigma Corpora-
tion (Sigma) from expansion through exclusive deals, in the market of ductile iron pipe
fittings (DIPF) (January 2012). IDEXX was accused of achieving and maintaining its dom-
inant market position through exclusive contracts with distributors whose combined sales
of manufacturing point-of-care (POC) diagnostic products in the US accounted for 85% of
the market (December 2012). Graco also used exclusive distribution contracts and loyalty
discount programmes in the market for fast-set equipment (FSE) products (April 2013).
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occurs when two manufacturers are both present in the market and able to
use exclusive contracts with competing retailers? If exclusion does occur, does
the dominant manufacturer enjoy any advantages in foreclosing the rival? Is
it also possible for the small manufacturer to exclude the rival using exclusive
contracts in such a setting?
In a model with two competing manufacturers selling differentiated prod-
ucts through downstream retailers, I show that exclusion occurs even when
both manufacturers can use exclusive contracts with retailers. Under linear
pricing contracts, equilibria with exclusion arise in which one of the manu-
facturers monopolizes the market when upstream competition is sufficiently
strong and the dominant manufacturer’s demand advantage is sufficiently
small. Due to substitutability of the products of the two rivals, retailers will
want to carry only one of the rival’s products under perfect downstream com-
petition. Therefore, there exists a contracting externality among retailers: a
retailer prefers to be the sole seller of one manufacturer’s products whenever
it receives similar exclusive offers from both manufacturers. In order to fully
exclude the rival and to maintain a monopoly position, the manufacturer who
aims to monopolize must make a sufficiently high compensation with its ex-
clusive offers to all retailers, providing them enough rents and attracting them
to sign exclusively. Given sufficiently high offers from one manufacturer, the
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rival is not able to profitably compete by signing up any of the retailers. Thus,
exclusion occurs where one manufacturer is foreclosed from the upstream mar-
ket.
As the dominant manufacturer’s demand advantage becomes sufficiently
strong, exclusion only occurs where the small manufacturer is foreclosed. Due
to a supra-demand advantage, the dominant manufacturer is able to monop-
olize at a lower cost and within a wider range. These results can thus explain
many exclusive dealing cases in antitrust history, where competing manufac-
turers are present in the market and have the ability to use exclusive contracts
with retailers.
The above exclusion mechanism is robust to several extensions. If manufac-
turers are able to make discriminatory exclusive offers to retailers, the equilib-
rium results still hold as the contracting externality among retailers remains.
In order to monopolize the market and foreclose the rival, a manufacturer must
sign up all retailers through exclusive offers. As the rival is always ready to
target the retailer who receives the lowest offer, the manufacturer who intends
to monopolize the market should make the lowest offer high enough so that no
retailer would profitably reject. For a given fixed budget, a manufacturer who
monopolizes optimally makes the same exclusive offers to all retailers. There-
fore, discriminatory exclusive offers never change the manufacturer’s incentive
4
and cannot increase the manufacturer’s profit in equilibrium. Without affect-
ing the main exclusion mechanism, Nash bargaining between the contracting
manufacturer and retailer slightly changes the equilibria conditions by solving
the double-marginalization problem. With more than two competing retailers,
exclusion still arises if upstream competition is sufficiently strong. However,
as the number of retailers increases, exclusion becomes harder since the manu-
facturer needs to leave more rents to cater to all retailers, while it receives the
same amount of monopoly profit. Nevertheless, the qualitative results from
the model with two retailers still hold for any given number of retailers.
Multiple monopoly equilibria arise due to the contracting externality among
retailers and competition between manufacturers who have no first-mover ad-
vantage. This exclusion mechanism changes if the two manufacturers sequen-
tially make exclusive offers or if they can offer two-part tariff contracts to
retailers. When they move sequentially in making exclusive offers, the manu-
facturer who makes offers first has the first-mover advantage. Although this
first-mover advantage is different from the one discussed in the existing litera-
ture on naked exclusion which ignores the chance of the second mover making
exclusive offers, such an advantage still artificially favors the first mover. Mul-
tiple equilibria are now eliminated since the first mover is ready to sign up all
retailers whenever it is profitable. The first mover always monopolizes (when-
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ever possible), even if it is the manufacturer facing lower demand. Such a result
is consistent with the existing literature, though the exclusion mechanism is
different. When manufacturers can offer two-part tariff contracts, multiple
equilibria are eliminated since the contracting externality among retailers no
longer exists. As a manufacturer can always extract all surplus from sellers
(gross of the exclusive compensations), sellers’ signing decisions no longer de-
pend on the rivals’ choice. Thus, two manufacturers compete directly using
exclusive offers in the first place. The dominant manufacturer, who earns a
higher monopoly profit, is able to sign up all retailers and thus exclude the
rival.
There is a large literature on exclusive dealing. The Chicago School (Pos-
ner, 1976; Bork, 1978) claims that exclusive contracts can never be anticom-
petitive, as rational firms would not engage in the practice of using exclusive
contracts if the joint profit of the contracting parties does not increase. This ar-
gument is challenged by the naked exclusion literature, where exclusion arises
even though there are no efficiency gains associated with it. Rasmusen, Ram-
seyer and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) argue that exclusive
contracts can inefficiently deter entry in the presence of scale economies and
multiple buyers. Exclusion arises because of a coordination failure among buy-
ers. Chen and Shaffer (2014) consider exclusive contracts with minimum-share
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requirements and they find that similar exclusion results hold even though
there is no coordination failure among buyers. These articles typically focus
on exclusive contracts that are with buyers who are independent final con-
sumers.
Later studies relax the assumption that buyers do not compete by studying
exclusive contracts between manufacturers and downstream competing retail-
ers. Fumagalli and Motta (2006) show that when buyers are homogeneous
Bertrand competitors, there always exists a single free buyer who wants to
buy from an efficient entrant at a lower price, which makes entry deterrence
harder. Therefore they conclude that downstream competition ensures that
exclusion never arises. However, in the case where manufacturers can use two-
part tariffs, Wright (2009) corrects their analysis and shows that exclusion
might still arise when scale economics are important or when the entrant’s ef-
ficiency advantage is not too large. Others extend these studies to frameworks
with imperfect competition either at the upstream or downstream level. Simp-
son and Wickelgren (2007), Abito and Wright (2008), and Kitamura (2010)
study naked exclusion under imperfect downstream competition. Gratz and
Reisinger (2013) further show that exclusive dealing can be pro-competitive
when downstream competition is imperfect and downstream buyers can breach
the contracts. Wright (2008) analyzes the entry deterrence decision of an in-
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cumbent under imperfect upstream competition. However, since these models
are based on the assumption that only the incumbent is able to offer exclusive
contracts, they cannot explain how exclusion occurs when competing firms are
present in the market in the first place, and can make similar exclusive offers.
Exclusive contracts used by firms with any first-mover advantage have been
studied in two recent papers. In a reduced form model, Spector (2011) shows
that inefficient exclusion of an existing firm is possible even if a coordination
failure among buyers is ruled out, although it is less likely than in the case of an
incumbent with a first-mover advantage (i.e. in case of entry deterrence). The
exclusion mechanism works in a setting in which buyers are independent, which
clearly fits the situation where buyers are final consumers or local monopolists.
In contrast, this paper focuses on a situation where buyers compete because
they are downstream distributors engaging in competition, which better fits
most of the antitrust cases in which exclusive dealing takes place.
This paper is closely related to a recent article by DeGraba (2013), which
formally models exclusive dealing under competition between a dominant in-
put supplier and a small rival. In a model with inelastic market demand
and homogenous competing downstream firms, DeGraba shows that a dom-
inant supplier can sign up downstream firms, so that it maintains a supra-
competitive input price. Moreover, exclusive dealing need not exclude the
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rival completely and it might only result in partial exclusion. However, the
exclusion mechanism in DeGraba’s article depends on the ability of input sup-
pliers to price discriminate between distributors, conditional on the different
segments of final consumers they attract. It remains an open question whether
upstream firms are able to set different prices to distributors contingent on the
final consumers who are likely to make the purchase. This paper shows such
price discrimination is not necessary for exclusion to be viable. Moreover, ex-
clusion results are valid in a more general demand structure with imperfect
upstream competition. On the other hand, unlike DeGraba, partial exclusion
is not explained in this paper.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 presents the base-
line model. Section 1.3 analyzes the results under linear wholesale pricing.
A linear demand example is used to further illustrate the main equilibrium
results. Section 1.4 considers several extensions: discriminatory exclusive of-
fers to retailers, sequential moves by manufacturers, Nash bargaining between




In the baseline model, there are two upstream firms (or manufacturers), de-
noted by M1 and M2, which are present in the market. The two manufacturers
produce differentiated (substitute) products with the same marginal cost of
production c. The demand structures for the manufacturers are asymmetric,
with M1 being the dominant manufacturer. The demand dominance of M1
means that M1 enjoys a (weakly) larger demand when the prices of both prod-
ucts are the same.2 Both manufacturers need to sell their products through
two downstream competing firms (or retailers), denoted by R1 and R2, and
then to final consumers. The two retailers are identical and engage in Bertrand
competition. Unlike the existing literature on naked exclusion where only the
incumbent firm is able to make exclusive offers to retailers, both manufactur-
ers can make exclusive offers to retailers in exchange for their commitments of
not purchasing from the rival manufacturer.
Consider a five-stage game. In the first stage, both manufacturers simulta-
neously make exclusive offers to the retailers. The exclusive offers are assumed
to be non-discriminatory, meaning both retailers receive the same offer from
the same manufacturer.3 Following the existing literature, the exclusive offer
2This model also covers the special case where two manufacturers are exactly symmetric.
This case will also be studied in Section 1.3.
3This assumption is relaxed in Section 1.4.
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from Mi involves a fixed compensation (i.e., a lump-sum payment) xi. Here
exclusivity implies that if a retailer accepts an exclusive offer from one man-
ufacturer, it commits to buying products only from the signed manufacturer
at a later stage. If a retailer does not accept any exclusive offers, it is free to
buy products from either manufacturer.
In the second stage, given the exclusive offers from the manufacturers,
retailers simultaneously decide whether to accept an offer (if any). If they do,
by the property of exclusivity, they can at most accept one offer.
In the third stage, after retailers’ signing decisions are made public, the
two manufacturers offer pricing contracts to the retailer(s). In the baseline
model, manufacturers offer linear pricing contracts to retailers.4 The pricing
contracts are assumed to be private so that a retailer does not observe the
pricing contracts offered to the rival retailer. Private pricing contracts seem
more realistic and reflect that these contracts can be easily changed.
In the fourth stage, both retailers decide which pricing contract(s) to ac-
cept (if any). For a free retailer, it can accept the pricing contracts offered
by both manufacturers, if profitable. Following Abito and Wright (2008), I
assume that retailers hold symmetric beliefs about the pricing contracts of-
fered to the rival: whenever a retailer receives an off-equilibrium offer from a
4Section 1.4 also considers other types of contracts.
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manufacturer, it believes the rival retailer also receives the same offer from the
same manufacturer.
In the final stage, both retailers set retail prices simultaneously and the
market clears. The payoffs for all parties are realized.
To implicitly characterize upstream competition in this model, I make some
general assumptions on demand functions and firms’ profits. Let the demand
for Mi’s products be Di(pi, pj), where pi and pj are the prices of Mi and
Mj ’s products respectively. Reflecting the possible demand asymmetry, M1
faces a (weakly) higher demand when prices of the two products are identical,
D1(p, p) ≥ D2(p, p). The demand is strictly higher for M1 when the two
manufacturers are not exactly identical. The demand functions are assumed
to be parameterized by γ between 0 and 1, where γ measures the upstream
competition level or the inverse of product differentiation between the two
products. A higher γ implies stronger upstream competition or a lower degree
of product differentiation. When γ → 1, upstream firms become Bertrand
competitors (the two products are perfect substitutes), while when γ → 0
upstream firms become local monopolists (the two products are independent
goods).
If Mi ends up as a monopolist, it charges a monopoly price p
M
i and enjoys a
monopoly profit of ΠMi = (p
M
i − c)Di(pMi ,∞). If each manufacturer only sells
12
products through one retailer and duopoly competition occurs, it is assumed
that Mi earns a profit of Πi while the retailer who purchases from Mi earns a











Figure 1.1: Firms’ profits under duopoly competition (a) and monopoly (b)
Clearly, all firms’ profits depend on the upstream competition level, man-
ufacturers’ demand asymmetry, as well as the pricing contracts between re-
tailers and manufacturers. Following the definition of γ, I further make two
assumptions on these profits:
A1: The monopoly profits ΠMi (i=1,2) do not depend on γ.
A2: When duopoly competition occurs, firms’ profits Πi and πi (i=1,2) are
continuous and decreasing in γ.
A1 says that when a manufacturer becomes a monopolist, the demand
for its products in the absence of the rival’s products is independent of the
degree of product differentiation. Thus the monopoly profit does not depend
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on γ. A2 says that when both manufacturers are in the market and competing
with each other head-to-head through a single retailer, stronger inter-brand
competition (or less product differentiation) will drive prices down and thus
lower profits for all firms in equilibrium. These two assumptions hold for
standard classes of general demand functions, such as linear, Hotelling, and
CES demand functions.
Due to demand asymmetry, the profit earned by the dominant manufac-
turer (and its respective retailer) in each of these two scenarios is (weakly)
higher than its rival,
ΠM1 ≥ ΠM2 , Π1 ≥ Π2, π1 ≥ π2,
and the inequality holds strictly if the two manufacturers are not identical.
All the profits are assumed to be positive.5
To avoid open-set problems in defining equilibria, I use the tie-breaking
rule that when retailers are indifferent between signing an exclusive contract
and remaining free, they will sign. Moreover, when retailers are indifferent
between signing with either manufacturer, the retailers’ choice that makes the
equilibrium well-defined will be selected.
5I therefore do not consider the uninteresting case in which demand asymmetry is so
strong that the small manufacturer cannot profitably make sales under competition even in
the absence of exclusive contracts.
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1.3 Linear Wholesale Prices
First consider the baseline model in which both manufacturers offer linear
pricing contracts to the retailers. Clearly, the equilibrium outcome depends on
retailers’ decisions of accepting or rejecting any exclusive offers. The following
lemma shows retailers’ choice in equilibrium.6
Lemma 1.1. In any equilibrium, both retailers will accept an exclusive offer
in the second stage and there will be no free retailers in stage three.
Lemma 1 shows that neither retailer would profitably reject both exclusive
offers in the second stage and both will sign exclusively with one manufacturer.
The intuition is as follows: suppose one retailer sells only one product (say
product 1), the other retailer will never want to carry both products. By
selling both products, intra-brand competition drives down the price of good
1 to retailers’ cost of sales, and both retailers earn nothing by selling product
1 due to Bertrand competition. With a lower price of product 1, demand for
(and profit from) the other product also drops due to inter-brand competition
and substitutability of the two products. Thus both retailers prefer to sell
only one product so as to avoid intra-brand competition. It follows that a
free retailer can never be worse-off signing an exclusive contract in the second
stage, which allows it to earn the same profit as a free retailer and in addition
6All proofs are relegated to the Appendix A.
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to receive some compensation for exclusivity.
Following Lemma 1.1, in order to analyze the equilibria, it is sufficient to
focus on the cases in which both retailers have signed an exclusive contract.
Given the exclusive offers from both manufacturers (denoted by x1 and x2
respectively), and recalling that πi defines retailer i’s profit in equilibrium when
it sells manufacturer i’s products exclusively, retailers’ incentive compatibility
constraints require:
1. If x1 ≥ x2 + π2, both retailers sign exclusively with M1;
2. If x1 + π1 > x2 > x1 − π2, one retailer signs exclusively with M1 while
the other signs exclusively with M2;
3. If x2 ≥ x1 + π1, both retailers sign exclusively with M2.
When the exclusive offer from one manufacturer is sufficiently high as com-
pared to the rival’s offer, both retailers would jointly sign with the manufac-
turer who makes a higher offer. Since both retailers earn nothing (gross of the
exclusive offer) due to downstream competition, the difference between the
two exclusive offers must be no smaller than the profit of a retailer when it
is the single seller of the rival manufacturer’s products. On the other hand,
when these two offers are close, there exists a contracting externality between
retailers since one retailer’s decisions of signing with a manufacturer affects
16
the rival’s signing decisions. Specifically, given that one retailer has signed an
exclusive contract with a manufacturer, the rival always wants to sign with a
different manufacturer so as to remain a single seller of that manufacturer’s
products and to avoid intra-brand competition. Such a contracting external-
ity intensifies competition between manufacturers in the exclusive offers, which
are used for exclusion and monopolization.
Based on retailers’ incentive compatibility constraints, manufacturers com-
pete through exclusive offers so as to sign up retailers exclusively. According to
the existing literature on naked exclusion, two types of equilibria are of inter-
est: exclusion equilibria and entry equilibria. Since no manufacturer has any
first-mover advantage in this paper, entry equilibria are not relevant. Thus this
paper only focuses on the equilibria in which one manufacturer monopolizes,
which is referred to as monopoly equilibria. Since both manufacturers are in
the market and able to make exclusive offers, different monopoly equilibria
may arise where either of the manufacturers monopolizes.
1.3.1 Dominant-firm monopoly equilibrium
First consider the equilibrium in which the dominant manufacturer monopo-
lizes. I call this type of equilibrium “dominant-firm monopoly equilibrium”.
(The other equilibrium will be referred to as the “small-firm monopoly equi-
librium”.) Whenever the dominant manufacturer monopolizes, it signs up
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both retailers using exclusive offers. By charging a common price equal to the
monopoly price pM1 , it extracts all the industry surplus and earns the monopoly
profit of ΠM1 (gross of the exclusive offers). In equilibrium, retailers’ incentive
compatibility constraints must be satisfied,
x1 ≥ π2 + x2.
Given M1’s offer x1, due to the contracting externality between retailers,
M2 can adopt two possible strategies to avoid being excluded. First, M2 is
able to sign up both retailers and earn the monopoly profit of ΠM2 by offering
x1 + π1. Alternatively, M2 is able to sign up exactly one retailer and earn the
duopoly profit of Π2 by offering x1 − π2. In order to monopolize, M1 must
make a sufficiently high offer so that neither of the above strategies yields a




ΠM2 − π1, Π2 + π2},
which ensures M2 is foreclosed. This is also M1’s offer in equilibrium (if such
an equilibrium exists), since M1 has no incentive to further increase the offer.




1 − π1, the equilibrium offer from M1 makes either
retailer indifferent between signing with either manufacturer, given that the





It remains to determine possible conditions under which such an equilib-
rium exists. First, M1’s profit in equilibrium should be non-negative (other-
wise M1 can profitably deviate). This condition requires Π
e
1 ≥ 0. Second,
M1 should have no incentive to further deviate given M2’s equilibrium offer.
A possible deviation offer from M1 is x
′
1 = max{0, xe2 − π1}, which induces
exactly one retailer to sign with M1. Such a deviation strategy is unprofitable
if and only if
ΠM1 − 2xe1 ≥ Π1 −max{0, xe2 − π1}.
The first condition is referred to as the “non-negative profit condition” while
the second condition is referred to as the “no deviation condition”. Combining
these two together, the dominant-firm monopoly equilibrium exists if
ΠM1 − 2xe1 ≥ max{0, Π1 −max{0, xe2 − π1}}.
The following lemma summarizes the results
Lemma 1.2. There exists a dominant-firm monopoly equilibrium if upstream
competition is sufficiently strong.
The dominant manufacturer is able to make a sufficiently high offer to both
retailers, preventing its rival from competing. When upstream competition is
sufficiently strong, the dominant manufacturer can never be better-off sign-
ing up only one retailer provided its profit under competition is limited as
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compared to the monopoly profit.
1.3.2 Small-firm monopoly equilibrium
Following the same logic, if the small-firm monopoly equilibrium exists, M2’s





ΠM1 − π2, Π1 + π1
}
.
Both the non-negative profit condition and no deviation condition require
ΠM2 − 2xe2 ≥ max{0, Π2 −max{0, xe1 − π2}},
where xe1 = x
e
2 − π1. Following Lemma 1.2, the conditions under which a
small-firm monopoly equilibrium exists are provided in the following lemma.
Lemma 1.3. There exists a small-firm monopoly equilibrium if upstream com-
petition is sufficiently strong and manufacturers’ demand asymmetry is suffi-
ciently small.
Due to its demand disadvantage, the small manufacturer receives a lower
profit in the cases of monopoly and duopoly competition. In order to pre-
vent the rival from competing, the small manufacturer must earn a similar
monopoly profit as its rival’s, which occurs when demand asymmetry between
manufacturers is sufficiently small.
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1.3.3 Monopoly equilibria
Following Lemma 1.2 and Lemma 1.3, the conditions under which different
types of monopoly equilibria exist are summarized as follows.
Proposition 1.1. There exist different types of monopoly equilibria, which de-
pend on the level of upstream competition and manufacturers’ demand asym-
metry:
1. both dominant-firm monopoly equilibrium and small-firm monopoly equi-
librium exist when upstream competition is sufficiently strong and man-
ufacturers’ demand asymmetry is sufficiently small;
2. only dominant-firm monopoly equilibrium exists when upstream compe-
tition is sufficiently strong and the dominant manufacturer’s demand
advantage is sufficiently large.
Proposition 1.1 shows that monopoly equilibria arise when upstream com-
petition is sufficiently strong. As upstream competition becomes weaker, a
retailer earns a higher profit when it is the single seller of one manufacturer’s
products and thus is less willing to accept an exclusive offer. With a stronger
contracting externality between retailers, it becomes harder for the manufac-
turer who seeks the monopoly position to sign up both retailers. Moreover,
both manufacturers have a smaller incentive to monopolize since their profits
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under duopoly competition are higher. When upstream competition is weak,
a manufacturer’s gain from monopolization is lower than the costs incurred
for exclusion. Thus, monopoly equilibria no longer arise.
When upstream competition is sufficiently strong and manufacturers’ de-
mand asymmetry is sufficiently small, equilibria with exclusion arise where
one of the manufacturers monopolizes the market. Consider an extreme case
where demand asymmetry disappears so that both manufacturers are exactly
identical. Following Proposition 1.1, two symmetric equilibria arise, where ei-
ther of the manufacturers monopolizes if upstream competition is sufficiently
strong. The following corollary summarizes the results.
Corollary 1.1. When two manufacturers are symmetric, there exist two sym-
metric monopoly equilibria in which one of the manufacturers monopolizes if
upstream competition is sufficiently strong.
Even though demand asymmetry exists, multiple monopoly equilibria also
occur as both manufacturers have the ability and the incentive to use exclusive
contracts to sign up retailers. It may seem surprising that the small manufac-
turer is also able to monopolize even though the larger rival can make exclusive
offers. One might think that due to its demand advantage, the dominant man-
ufacturer can at least match the offer made by its rival thereby stealing retail-
ers and preventing it from being excluded. However, this logic does not apply
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because of the contracting externality between retailers. Retailers’ incentive
compatibility constraints imply that by exactly matching the offer from the
rival, the dominant manufacturer is not able to attract both retailers but only
one, resulting in it making a loss under competition. Despite its demand ad-
vantage, the dominant manufacturer is unable to profitably compete if it has to
counter a high offer from the rival. However, given the overall industry profit
is higher when the dominant manufacturer monopolizes, it may be reasonable
to focus only on the dominant-firm monopoly equilibrium. Furthermore, the
dominant manufacturer also enjoys an supra-advantage against the rival while
retailers would prefer the small manufacturer monopolizing the market.
Corollary 1.2. Whenever multiple monopoly equilibria exist, the dominant
manufacturer monopolizes at a lower cost and earns a higher profit than its
rival. However, retailers earn a higher profit in the small-firm monopoly equi-
librium.
Following Corollary 1.2, two effects can be easily identified by comparing
the two types of monopoly equilibria. First, when duopoly competition occurs,
a retailer who sells the small manufacturer’s products earns a lower profit
than the profit earned by its rival, who sells the dominant manufacturer’s
products. Thus, the dominant manufacturer can make a lower offer but still
sign up both retailers. Second, the dominant manufacturer enjoys a higher
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monopoly profit than its rival due to its demand advantage. Therefore, the
dominant manufacturer earns a higher equilibrium profit in the dominant-
firm monopoly equilibrium than does the small manufacturer in the small-firm
monopoly equilibrium. In contrast, retailers would jointly prefer the small-
firm monopoly equilibrium where they both earn a higher profit, given that
the small manufacturer has to make higher offers in equilibrium to prevent the
rival from competing.
If the demand asymmetry is sufficiently strong such that the small manu-
facturer’s monopoly profit relative to the dominant manufacturer’s monopoly
profit falls below a threshold level, the small manufacturer cannot sign up
both retailers. Therefore, the small-firm monopoly equilibrium does not arise.
As long as upstream competition is strong, the dominant manufacturer is still
able to monopolize. However, due to strategic effects, pure strategy equilib-
ria may not always exist. This is because the monopolist (particularly the
dominant manufacturer) might want to deviate by lowering its exclusive offers
when the rival’s offers are sufficiently high. Such a strategy can be profitable
if the deviating manufacturer earns a high profit under duopoly competition.
In general, the dominant-firm monopoly equilibrium may not exist, although
the dominant manufacturer is able to monopolize the market. However, un-
der some mild conditions on the relative division of channel profits between
24
the retailer and the manufacturer, it can be shown that the dominant-firm
monopoly equilibrium always exists whenever the small-firm monopoly equi-
librium exists. Thus the dominant manufacturer monopolizes within a wider
range. The following assumption on the equilibrium profits earned by firms is
a sufficient condition:
A3: The profits earned by the contracting retailer and the manufacturer




, i = 1, 2.
A3 implies the relative division of channel profits between the retailer and
the manufacturer is not too small (at least a half). The exclusion mechanism
requires a contracting externality between retailers. A3 further strengthens
this externality: being a single seller of one manufacturer’s products, a re-
tailer earns a positive profit which is at least half of the profit earned by the
manufacturer. In other words, the profit earned by a manufacturer under com-
petition is limited. This assumption is satisfied under both a linear demand
function and a Hotelling demand function with linear wholesale prices. Given
A3, the following corollary holds:
Corollary 1.3. If A3 holds, the dominant-firm monopoly equilibrium always
exists whenever the small-firm monopoly equilibrium exists.
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1.3.4 Market sharing equilibria
There may be another type of equilibria: market sharing equilibria, in which
two manufacturers are both making positive sales and sharing the market.
Such equilibria exist only when upstream competition is not sufficiently strong
and manufacturers’ demand asymmetry is sufficiently small. However, they
do not always exist. For example, in the example with linear demand dis-
cussed next, such equilibria never exist, regardless of upstream competition
and manufacturers’ demand asymmetry. Since this paper focuses on monopoly
equilibria, market sharing equilibria are not characterized further.
1.3.5 Linear demand example
To illustrate the conditions under which each type of equilibria arises, I use the
linear demand function. This example shows how the degree of upstream com-
petition and manufacturers’ demand asymmetry affect equilibrium outcomes.
Let Di(pi, pj) be the demand function for Mi,










< p1 < 1− γθ + γp2,










< p2 < θ − γ + γp1,
0 if p2 ≥ θ − γ + γp1.








The above linear demand function is captured by three parameters. γ is
a parameter between 0 and 1, measuring upstream competition. A larger γ
suggests stronger upstream competition. θ is a parameter between 0 and 1,
measuring manufacturers’ demand asymmetry. A larger θ suggests smaller
demand asymmetry between two manufacturers. β is a positive parameter
measuring the market size. A larger β suggests a larger market demand for
both manufacturers. The linear demand function satisfies A1-A3. Consider
how a range of parameter values affect the equilibrium outcomes.8 Two ex-
amples are given below to illustrate the case where two manufacturers are
asymmetric:
Example 1.1. Strong upstream competition and small demand asymmetry.
Suppose β = 1
400
, γ = 0.95 and θ = 0.95. The corresponding profits of man-
ufacturers are ΠM1 = 100, Π1 = 20.2, π1 = 10.1 and Π
M
2 = 90.2, Π2 = 10.2,
π2 = 5.1. There exist multiple monopoly equilibria:
1. Dominant-firm monopoly equilibrium:
xe1 = 35, x
e
2 = 29.9.
M1 earns an equilibrium profit of 30.
8The cost c is normalized to zero.
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2. Small-firm monopoly equilibrium:
xe2 = 44.9, x
e
1 = 34.8.
M2 earns an equilibrium profit of 0.4.
Comparing the two equilibria, M2’s equilibrium offer when it monopolizes
is larger than M1’s equilibrium offer when it monopolizes. Moreover, M1 earns
a higher profit than M2, whenever they monopolize.
Example 1.2. Strong upstream competition and large demand asymmetry.
Suppose β = 1
400
, γ = 0.95 and θ = 0.8. The corresponding profits of man-
ufacturers are ΠM1 = 100, Π1 = 37.4, π1 = 18.7 and Π
M
2 = 64, Π2 = 1.0,
π2 = 0.5.
Hence, only the dominant-firm monopoly equilibrium exists. The equilib-
rium offers are xe1 = 13.3 and x
e
2 = 12.8, and M1 earns an equilibrium profit
of 73.4.
The two examples above can be used to illustrate the main results from
Proposition 1.1 and Corollary 1.2. The following example considers a special
case where two manufacturers are symmetric, and thus explains Corollary 1.1.
Example 1.3. Symmetric manufacturers (θ = 1). Regardless of β, two sym-
metric monopoly equilibria exist if and only if γ ≥ 0.872.
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1.3.6 Examples of exclusive dealing
As predicted by the baseline model, equilibria with exclusion arise where one
of the manufacturers monopolizes, when upstream competition is sufficiently
strong and manufacturers’ demand asymmetry is sufficiently small. These re-
sults can be used to explain antitrust cases in which competing manufacturers
use exclusive contracts with buyers who are competing retailers.
1. Intel vs. AMD
One well-known example is Intel vs. AMD. As the two main competitors pro-
ducing micro-processors, Intel and AMD had market shares of approximately
86.5% and 13.5% in the market with x86 processors in the last quarter of 2013,
according to Mercury Research. Although Intel enjoys a dominant market po-
sition, there is still potentially quite strong competition between Intel and
AMD given their products are not very differentiated. Furthermore, these two
manufacturers sell products through many downstream retailers (OEMs), who
are competing intensively with each other. Therefore, the story of Intel fits the
situation where upstream and downstream competition is strong, and demand
asymmetry between the manufacturers is small. According to Proposition
1.1, either manufacturer is able to monopolize in equilibrium using exclusive
contracts. It is also possible for AMD to monopolize in equilibrium, if it of-
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fers enough compensations to sign up all OEMs. However, due to market
dominance. it is more likely for Intel to monopolize as a dominant manufac-
turer, which is also less costly. This result supports the fact that Intel was
able to exclude AMD through exclusive contracts. Moreover, if Intel’s mar-
ket dominance is strong enough, a unique outcome occurs in which only Intel
monopolizes. This further strengthens the argument for AMD’s exclusion by
Intel.
2. Dentsply
The Third Circuit in United States v. Dentsply International, Inc. provides
another evidence of exclusive dealing that may violate Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.9 Dentsply is a leading manufacturer that produces prefabricated artificial
teeth, with its market share about 75% to 80% of such teeth. Dentsply sold its
artificial teeth to more than twenty dental dealers, who in turn distributed the
teeth to dental laboratories for final use of creating dentures. Dentsply prohib-
ited its dealers from carrying the teeth of competitors through contractional
agreements. The story of Dentsply thus fits the setting in which a dominant
manufacturer sells products through retailers who compete intensively at the
downstream level. From the model’s prediction, Dentsply is able to monopolize
through exclusive contracts with buyers and almost monopolize the market.
9399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005).
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1.4 Extensions
This section considers several extensions. The main results from the baseline
model are robust to discriminatory offers by manufacturers, Nash bargaining
between contracting firms and competition among multiple retailers. The
exclusion mechanism above is affected if manufacturers move sequentially or
if they make two-part tariff pricing contracts to retailers.
1.4.1 Discriminatory offers to retailers
In the baseline model, both manufacturers are assumed to only make non-
discriminatory exclusive offers to retailers, so that neither manufacturer is
able to discriminate between retailers. One might expect a manufacturer to
make discriminatory offers to retailers, making exclusion easier. The following
proposition suggests otherwise.
Proposition 1.2. When manufacturers make discriminatory exclusive of-
fers to retailers, in any monopoly equilibria, a manufacturer who monopolizes
makes the same offers to both retailers.
Even though a manufacturer is able to make discriminatory offers to re-
tailers, it is never profitable to do so in equilibrium. The intuition is quite
straightforward. In order to fully exclude the rival and achieve a monopoly
position, a manufacturer has to offer sufficiently high compensations to both
31
retailers so that neither of them wants to reject. The rival who is foreclosed
always wants to compete and will try to prevent its foreclosure by attracting
at least one retailer, whenever it is profitable. Discriminatory offers make it
more difficult for a manufacturer to exclude the rival since it is easier for the
rival to compete by lobbying the retailer who receives a lower offer. Therefore,
it is always optimal for the manufacturer who monopolizes to make the same
offers to both retailers. Although either manufacturer are free to make differ-
ent offers, making exactly the same offer to both retailers is less costly and
thus more profitable. This result is in contrast to the finding in the traditional
literature on naked exclusion that an incumbent’ ability to use discriminatory
offers makes exclusion easier.
1.4.2 Sequential moves by manufacturers
Due to the contracting externality between retailers, multiple monopoly equi-
libria exist when manufacturers move simultaneously in making exclusive of-
fers, which creates a coordination failure between retailers. To see how the
assumption on the first-mover advantage is crucial, a parallel case is consid-
ered in which manufacturers move sequentially in making their offers. On
account of the sequentiality of exclusive offers, the manufacturer who makes
the first offers has a first-mover advantage. Sequential moves by manufacturers
result in a unique outcome, which is stated in the following proposition.
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Proposition 1.3. When manufacturers move sequentially in making exclu-
sive offers, if upstream competition is sufficiently strong and manufacturers’
demand asymmetry is sufficiently small, a unique monopoly equilibrium exists
in which the first-mover monopolizes.
By offering a sufficiently high compensation, the first mover is able to at-
tract both retailers and ensure the rival who makes offers later is not able to
profitably compete. Thus, the manufacturer who moves first enjoys an arti-
ficial advantage over the second mover (or the follower). Such an advantage
secures the monopoly position of the first mover, even if it is the small man-
ufacturer who moves first. Although sequential moves by manufacturers solve
the issue of equilibrium multiplicity, the mechanism that leads to exclusion is
different from the exclusion mechanism proposed in the naked exclusion liter-
ature. The existing literature assumes the incumbent (or the first mover) can
make exclusive offers to sign up enough buyers, while the rival does not want
to enter the market given its fixed costs cannot be covered by the remaining
buyers. In contrast, in this paper the rival is already in the market. There-




With linear wholesale prices, the double-marginalization problem limits the
joint profit of contracting firms. One way to eliminate the double-marginalization
problem is to replace the linear pricing contracts with Nash bargaining between
firms over profit shares. It is assumed that Nash bargaining occurs between
a retailer and a manufacturer if the retailer is the single seller of the manu-
facturer’s products. No bargaining occurs if both retailers buy from the same
manufacturer.10 When Nash bargaining occurs, the contracting firms jointly
seek to maximize the channel profit and the division of the channel profit be-
tween the two firms is determined by their relative bargaining powers. Denote
the retailer’s bargaining power by α and the manufacturer’s bargaining power
by 1− α, where α ∈ (0, 1).11 Denote the joint profit for Mi and its retailer by
ΠVi ,
12 where firms’ profits can thus be written as
Πi = (1− α)ΠVi , and πi = αΠVi .
Due to demand asymmetry, M1’s dominance implies
ΠV1 > Π
V
2 , Π1 > Π2, π1 > π2.
10In this case, the manufacturer is assumed to offer the same contracts to extract all the
profit from retailers. This is reasonable as there would be no incentive for the manufacturer
to renegotiate with either retailer if it is a monopolist in the market.
11This ensures the profit for each party under duopoly competition is positive, which was
assumed in the baseline model.
12The profit is given by the duopoly profit under Bertrand competition, where ΠVi =
maxpi(pi − c)Di(pi, pj), i 6= j.
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If the joint profit ΠVi is decreasing as upstream competition becomes stronger,
both assumptions A1 and A2 are satisfied. Therefore, the exclusion mechanism
in the baseline model also applies.
Proposition 1.4. When Nash bargaining occurs between a retailer and a man-
ufacturer,
1. multiple monopoly equilibria exist when upstream competition is suffi-
ciently strong and the manufacturers’ demand asymmetry is sufficiently
small;
2. a unique monopoly equilibrium exists in which the dominant firm monop-
olizes when upstream competition is sufficiently strong and the dominant
manufacturer’s demand advantage is sufficiently large.
Under Nash bargaining, the range of values for which different types of
monopoly equilibria exist could be different from the baseline model, as firms’
profits under duopoly competition are different. Similar to the baseline model,
if a retailer’ bargaining power is at least half of the manufacturer’s bargaining
power (i.e., α ≥ 1
3
), the result in Corollary 1.3 holds as well.
1.4.4 Two-part tariff
Under linear pricing contracts or Nash bargaining, multiple monopoly equi-
libria exist because of the contracting externality between retailers. When
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manufacturers can offer take-it-or-leave-it two-part tariff contracts to retail-
ers, the contracting externality between retailers no longer exists and therefore
the issue of equilibria multiplicity disappears.
Proposition 1.5. When manufacturers offer two-part tariff contracts, there
exists a unique equilibrium in which the dominant manufacturer monopolizes
the market.
Expecting all the retail profit (gross of exclusive offers) to be extracted,
each retailer will sign immediately with the manufacturer who makes a higher
exclusive offer in the first stage. Due to its demand advantage, the dominant
manufacturer is always able to match the highest offer made by the rival and
sign up both retailers. Thus, a unique equilibrium arises where the domi-
nant manufacturer monopolizes. Each retailer receives an equal proportion of
the monopoly profit which could be earned by the small manufacturer. The
dominant manufacturer who monopolizes earns an equilibrium profit equal to
the difference in the monopoly profit of the two manufacturers, reflecting its
demand advantage.
1.4.5 Multiple retailers
The baseline model can also be extended to a setting with multiple retailers.
Suppose there are N ≥ 2 retailers competing in the downstream market.
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Following the previous analysis, two types of contracts are considered: Nash
bargaining and two-part tariff contracts.13
Nash bargaining
Following Section 1.4.3, it is assumed that Nash bargaining occurs between a
manufacturer and a retailer if the retailer is the single seller of the manufac-
turer’s products. Otherwise, there is no bargaining among different firms and
the manufacturer captures the entire channel profit. The channel profit for Mi
and its contracting retailers is ΠVi , if duopoly competition occurs. Retailers’
incentive compatibility constraints require:
1. If x1 ≥ x2 + π2, all retailers sign exclusively with M1;
2. If x1 > x2 ≥ x1 − π2, one retailer signs exclusively with M2 while the
others sign with M1;
3. If x1 + π1 > x2 > x1, one retailer signs exclusively with M1 while the
others sign with M2;
4. If x2 ≥ x1 + π1, all retailers sign exclusively with M2.
Similar to the case with two retailers, all retailers will sign with the man-
ufacturer who makes a strictly higher exclusive offer. When exclusive offers
13The main results of simple linear pricing contracts will be similar to Nash bargaining,
and thus I focus on Nash bargaining which solves the double-marginalization problem.
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from both manufacturers are close, the contracting externality works: all but
one retailer will accept the higher offer, while exactly one retailer will remain
the single seller of the other manufacturer’s products. A retailer earns a profit
of πi = αΠ
V
i , if it is the single seller of Mi’s products. Mi earns Π
M
i if it signs
up all retailers exclusively, ΠVi if it signs up more than one retailer but does
not fully monopolize, and (1 − α)ΠVi if it signs up exactly one retailer.
With multiple retailers, one might expect partial exclusion to arise, where
each manufacturer signs up several retailers provided it is too costly to sign
up all. The following proposition shows that such a partial exclusion outcome
never arises in equilibrium.
Proposition 1.6. When there are multiple retailers and Nash bargaining oc-
curs, there never exists an asymmetric equilibrium in which one manufacturer
signs up all retailers but one.
When two manufacturers are competing, each manufacturer is able to
achieve its channel profit by signing up more than one retailer. With enough
signed retailers, neither manufacturer wants to pay higher exclusive compensa-
tions to sign up more unless it is able to monopolize. The strategic interaction
between manufacturers is so strong that no one ends up signing some retailers
(but not all). This result differs significantly from the findings in the existing
naked exclusion literature. Fumagalli and Motta (2006) argue that when only
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the incumbent offers exclusive contracts, all but one retailer will reject the
offer. Given the fixed fee for participation, all other retailers will choose to be
inactive. Thus, the free retailer is the single downstream buyer who will finally
purchase products from a more efficient entrant. Therefore, they conclude that
the incumbent cannot use exclusive contracts to deter entry. Wright (2008)
also finds that an equilibrium exists in which the incumbent signs up N − 1
retailers leaving one retailer for the entrant when product differentiation is
strong. Thus, exclusive dealing is used to limit intra-brand competition with
the rival’s products, rather than to fully exclude the rival. However, when
no manufacturer has the first-mover advantage, this model predicts that the
equilibrium in which a manufacturer signs up all retailers but one no longer
occurs. When both manufacturers are able to offer exclusive contracts, they
compete intensively using exclusive offers. As long as monopolization is not
profitable, both manufacturers try to lower the exclusive offers in order to sign
up fewer retailers and thus earn a higher profit. Therefore, exclusive contracts
eliminate the inefficient asymmetric outcome, from the manufacturers’ per-
spective, where one manufacturer signs up some retailers but is not able to
monopolize.
Now turn to the monopoly equilibria which are the main interest of this
paper. Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which Mi monopolizes, the
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In order to monopolize, Mi needs to make sure that there is no incentive for
the rival to compete by signing up all retailers, N − 1 retailers or exactly one
retailer. Mj is able to sign up N − 1 retailers by offering at most the entire
channel profit ΠVj . It can also sign up one retailer by offering at most its
share from Nash bargaining (1 − α)ΠVj , while leaving the single retailer its
corresponding share of αΠVj . Given the offer x
e
i made by Mi, Mj can never
profitably compete and therefore it is excluded. Following the same logic as
Proposition 1.6, attracting multiple retailers but not all is not profitable for





ΠMj − αΠVi , ΠVj
}
,
which is similar to the equilibrium offer in the case with two retailers. Com-
bining the two equilibrium conditions, the following proposition summarizes
the conditions under which exclusion occurs.
Proposition 1.7. When there are multiple retailers and Nash bargaining oc-
curs,
1. multiple monopoly equilibria exist in which one of the manufacturers mo-
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nopolizes when upstream competition is sufficiently strong and manufac-
turers’ demand asymmetry is sufficiently small;
2. a unique dominant-firm monopoly equilibrium exists when upstream com-
petition is sufficiently strong and manufacturers’ demand asymmetry is
sufficiently large.
The exclusion mechanism follows the baseline model. Corollary 1.2 and
1.3 also apply. Moreover, the dominant-firm monopoly might not exist, even
though the dominant manufacturer has the ability to monopolize. The follow-
ing assumption on retailer’s bargaining power is sufficient large to ensure the
existence of the equilibrium.
A3′: The retailer’s bargaining power satisfies α ≥ 1
N+1
.
Analogous to A3, under A3′, the relative profit of the contracting retailer
and manufacturer is not too small so that the contracting externality among
retailers is strong enough. In addition, a single retailer’s bargaining power
cannot be higher if there are more potential retailers who might want to sign
a contract with the manufacturer. Under A3′, a result similar to Corollary 3
is obtained in the following corollary.
Corollary 1.4. When there are multiple retailers and if A3′ holds, the dominant-
firm monopoly equilibrium always exists whenever the small-firm monopoly
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equilibrium exists.
When there are multiple retailers, the dominant manufacturer monopolizes
within a wider range whenever the retailer’s share from bargaining is not too
small and the contracting externality among retailers is significant. Moreover,
multiple retailers will make exclusion harder. The following corollary presents
the results.
Corollary 1.5. When there are multiple retailers and if A3′ holds, exclusion by
the dominant manufacturer is more easily sustained as the number of retailers
decreases.
Whenever the equilibrium offer from the dominant manufacturer for ex-
clusion is to prevent the rival from attracting all retailers, the dominant-firm
monopoly equilibrium always exists if the retailer’s share under bargaining is
not too small. If the equilibrium offer is to prevent the rival from attracting one
retailer, the offer is strictly lower as the number of retailers decreases. There-
fore, given the fixed monopoly profit, the dominant manufacturer monopolizes
more easily with fewer competing retailers.
Two-part tariff
Following the case with two retailers, two-part tariff contracts lead to a unique
equilibrium in which the dominant manufacturer monopolizes. The small man-
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ufacturer offers the highest amount of 1
N
ΠM2 , while the dominant manufacturer
exactly matches such an offer and signs up all retailers. As a result, all retailers
obtain an equal profit share 1
N
ΠM2 , while the dominant manufacturer earns the
difference in the monopoly profits of the two manufacturers (i.e. ΠM1 − ΠM2 ),
reflecting its demand advantage. The following proposition summarizes the
result.
Proposition 1.8. When there are multiple retailers and manufacturers offer
two-part tariff contracts, there exists a unique monopoly equilibrium in which
the dominant manufacturer monopolizes the market.
1.5 Conclusion
Whereas the existing literature on naked exclusion assumes the first-mover
advantage of the incumbent firm, this paper considers a framework where two
competing manufacturers are both present in the market and able to use exclu-
sive contracts with downstream retailers. In a model with imperfect upstream
competition and perfect downstream competition, I propose a mechanism that
explains how exclusion occurs and show the extent to which this holds under
different conditions.
When exclusive offers are non-discriminatory and pricing contracts are lin-
ear, multiple equilibria with exclusion arise under strong upstream competi-
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tion and small demand asymmetry — one where the dominant manufacturer
excludes and one where the small manufacturer excludes. Due to the contract-
ing externality among retailers, retailers always prefer to remain single sellers
of one manufacturer’s products whenever they receive similar exclusive offers
from both manufacturers. In order to exclusively sign up all retailers, the
manufacturer who aims to monopolize therefore needs to offer a sufficiently
high compensation, so that the rival cannot profitably compete. Due to its
supra-demand advantage, the dominant manufacturer can exclude its rival at
a lower cost and within a wider range. This mechanism of exclusion is ro-
bust to the manufacturers being able to make discriminatory exclusive offers,
Nash bargaining between contracting parties and multiple competing retailers.
The results of multiple equilibria, however, depend crucially on the contract-
ing externality among retailers and on manufacturers moving simultaneously.
If manufacturers move sequentially in making exclusive offers to retailers, a
unique equilibrium arises in which the first mover monopolizes, whenever it
exists. Two-part tariff contracts by manufacturers eliminate the contracting
externality among retailers, so that there is a unique equilibrium in which the
dominant manufacturer monopolizes and earns the difference in the monopoly
profit of the two manufacturers.
The current research leads to several natural extensions. First, consider
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extending the current model to a setting with imperfect downstream compe-
tition. When downstream competition is imperfect and upstream firms differ
in cost efficiencies, naked exclusion occurs where the incumbent uses exclusive
contracts to sign up all downstream firms, so that a more efficient entrant
is excluded. It remains an open question whether such inefficient exclusion
still arises when both upstream firms are present in the market. It would
be interesting to study how downstream competition affects the contracting
externality studied in this paper, and thus the equilibrium outcomes, and
whether the less efficient firm is still more likely to be excluded due to its cost
inefficiency.
This research also facilitates understanding partial foreclosure from exclu-
sive contracts. Partial foreclosure seems an important feature in markets with
multiple manufacturers.14 Since retailers may be heterogenous and each may
have some loyal consumers, a manufacturer that uses exclusive contracts may
only want to sign up some (larger) retailers. Such practices may lead to partial
exclusion. For example, consumers cannot buy Sony merchandise everywhere,
but just at some high quality retailers. If partial exclusion can be shown to
arise, it would also be interesting to investigate how the manufacturer strate-
gically decides which retailer(s) to sign up.
14This has previously been explained by DeGraba (2013) in a somewhat different setting.
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Finally, an expanded model could consider more complex exclusive con-
tracts. For example, one might allow manufacturers to offer exclusive contracts
that include a commitment to the wholesale prices they will charge signing re-
tailers.15 Such contracts would seem to impede exclusion because unlike the
setting considered in this paper, a manufacturer that aims to monopolize may
not be able to charge the monopoly price even if it has signed up all buyers
exclusively.
One might think that a dominant firm without a first-mover advantage
would be unable to use exclusive contracts to sign up all buyers who compete
intensively. After all, its competitors who are also in the market can make
similar counter offers to cater some buyers. My research suggests otherwise.
In particular, the dominant firm with a stronger market power has a better
chance to monopolize under more intensified competition. It suggests that
competitors, consumers and competition authorities should take another look
at markets with this structure.
15Such exclusive contracts are similar to the contracts with minimum share requirements
studied by Chen and Shaffer (2014), although their focus is on the case where exclusive






Many industries involve competing platforms that attract both sellers and buy-
ers. These markets are two-sided since both groups obtain values from inter-
acting with each other through the platforms (for example, operating systems,
video game consoles and search engines). The value created for each party via
interaction is widely referred to as network benefits or network effects. It is
usually observed that market dominance arises in two-sided markets, especially
when network effects are strong. Although there are usually several platforms
present in each market, competition among them always results in one or two
platforms dominating the markets. For example, operating systems’ markets
for desktops and laptops are almost monopolized by the largest platform Mi-
crosoft Windows, while two of its main competitors, Mac and Linux, capture
47
less than 10% of the total market share. As a dominant platform, Windows
attracts more sellers (software developers) and enjoys a larger market share
on the buyers’ side.1 Market dominance typically arises in two-sided markets,
while standard one-sided markets without network externality are more likely
to be highly segmented. A rich literature on two-sided markets studies plat-
forms pricing strategies in symmetric market structures, while a few recent
papers focus on asymmetric structures. However, the link between these two
is neglected.
This paper tries to fill a gap in the literature by focusing on the transi-
tion from symmetric market structures to asymmetric market structures. We
consider a two-sided market model where both sellers and platforms charge
buyers. When two symmetric platforms are competing, buyers who join the
platform will get additional surplus from purchasing sellers’ products. There-
fore, buyers are more willing to adopt the platform with a larger seller base.
When both sellers and buyers are single-homing, besides the symmetric equi-
librium, there exist asymmetric equilibria which involve a dominant platform
with larger market shares on both sides when network effects are not too small.
The dominant platform charges a higher fee on the buyers’ side and earns a
higher profit than the rival. Market dominance enlarges as network effects
1A similar pattern is observed in other two-sided markets, for example, video game
consoles, search engines, and web browsers.
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become stronger.
We further characterize the conditions under which different types of equi-
libria exist and study the stability of the equilibria. Though the symmetric
equilibrium always exists regardless of the magnitude of network effects, asym-
metric equilibria only arise when network effects are not too weak. Particularly,
asymmetric equilibria involve a single platform monopolizing the markets on
both sides, when network effects are strong enough. Though multiple equilib-
ria occur when network effects are not too weak, only asymmetric equilibria
(including monopoly equilibria) are stable. Therefore, we provide a bridge
between different equilibria and show that the set of stable equilibria changes
continuously from the unique symmetric equilibrium to asymmetric equilibria
and then to monopoly equilibria, as network effects become stronger. These
results can explain why market dominance or monopoly arises and persists in
two-sided markets which are mature markets with sufficiently strong network
effects.
We also conduct welfare analysis of different equilibria. Compared to the
symmetric equilibrium, in every asymmetric equilibrium, the dominant plat-
form and sellers earn a higher profit, while the small platform earns a lower
profit. Moreover, asymmetric equilibria (including monopoly equilibria) wel-
fare dominate the symmetric equilibrium. The social benefit from network
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effects outweighs the social cost from buyers’ heterogeneity. It suggests that
in the markets with strong network effects, standardization or monopoly could
be socially optimal. Therefore, competition authorities need to be cautious in
making policy interventions in markets where market dominance arises.
Policy implications such as the welfare effects of vertical integration among
platforms are also addressed. Though it is always profitable for a single plat-
form to backward integrate its sellers, when market dominance arises only one
platform wants to be vertically integrated. However, it is socially optimal if
all platforms are integrated.
The equilibrium results are robust to competition among multiple plat-
forms and multi-homing sellers. When there are multiple platforms competing,
asymmetric equilibria also arise where one dominant platform enjoys a larger
market share than its other competitors, when network effect are not too small.
The asymmetric equilibria also welfare-dominate the symmetric equilibrium.
When sellers can multi-home, asymmetric equilibria exist as well when the
multi-homing costs of some sellers are large. In equilibrium, some sellers are
single-homing to the dominant platform while others are multi-homing.
A large literature on two-sided markets studies symmetric market struc-
tures, most of which focuses on the optimal pricing structures of platforms
without modelling sellers’ pricing (Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006, Armstrong,
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2006, Armstrong, Wright, 2007, Weyl, 2010). Hagiu (2009) and Belleflamme
and Peitz (2010) are the few papers that model the micro-structure of the
interaction between sellers and buyers in two-sided markets. Since all these
papers are only interested in symmetric outcomes, they cannot explain how
market dominance occurs nor compare it with the symmetric market structure.
Another small literature focuses on asymmetric market structures. Ambrus
and Argenziano (2009) find that asymmetric networks coexist in two-sided
markets where one platform is larger on one side, while the other platform
is larger on the other side. Therefore, they do not exactly explain market
dominance and nor do they allow sellers to set price directly. Gabszewicz
and Wauthy (2014) consider a two-sided market where buyers and sellers pay
subscription fees to platforms, and they show that there exists an asymmetric
equilibrium where platforms vertically differentiate themselves such that more
sellers and buyers join one platform and they end up paying higher fees.
We connect both literatures by showing a dynamic link between the two
types of equilibria. Some earlier papers also compare different types of equilib-
ria in onesided markets. Katz and Shapiro (1985) predict market dominance
in a Cournot market with direct network effects where multiple firms are com-
peting. In a software-hardware framework, Church and Gandal (1992) charac-
terize the symmetric equilibrium and monopoly equilibria under the free entry
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condition in the software market. Without imposing the free entry condition,
sellers earn positive profits in equilibria and we further predict the existence of
asymmetric equilibria where market dominance arises. We further explore the
conditions under which market dominance arises and whether the asymmetric
equilibria are stable.
The current study also contributes to the small literature on multiple plat-
form competition. Calzada and Valletti (2008) focus on the telecommunication
markets with direct network effects, while Kodera (2010) analyzes platforms’
pricing in symmetric structures in two-sided markets. Neither paper discusses
the emergence of market dominance and thus differs from ours.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the basic
model with two competing platforms. Section 2.3 characterizes different types
of equilibria. Section 2.4 studies the stability of equilibria, while Section 2.5
further investigates the welfare implications of different types of equilibria.
Section 2.6 considers several extensions of the basic model, including policy
implications of vertical integration, multiple competing platforms and multi-
homing sellers. Section 2.7 concludes.
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2.2 The Model
In the model, there are a unit mass of sellers, a unit mass of buyers and two
platforms, i = {1, 2}.2 Sellers and buyers interact with each other through
the platform(s). In this basic model, we assume that both sellers and buyers
are “single-homing”(or they will adopt only one platform).3 Sellers view the
two platforms as homogeneous while buyers view them as heterogeneous in
the Hotelling manner.4 The two platforms are located at either end of a unit,
with platform 1 located at 0 while platform 2 located at 1. All buyers are
uniformly distributed along the line and a buyer located at x ∈ [0, 1] incurs
a transportation cost Ti(x) of joining platform i ∈ {1, 2}, where T1 = tx,
T2 = t(1 − x) and t is the per unit transportation cost. Each buyer has a
valuation v for either platform , where v is sufficiently large so that all buyers
want to join one platform. Each buyer purchases a unit of product from each
seller, and the willingness to pay for each product is b. All sellers in platform
i form a seller association i to coordinate on a common price pi.
5 Thus, each
2The setting with two platforms can be extended to multiple competing platforms, which
will be studied in the section 2.5.
3The assumption can be relaxed to a competitive bottleneck setting where sellers can
multi-home while buyers are single-homing. This case is analyzed in section 2.5.
4Usually producers care more about consumer bases than the platforms themselves (for
example, Armstrong and Wright 2007; Hagiu 2009). More software is written for Windows
because it is more popular among end users.
5If sellers set their prices independently and buyers purchase from almost all sellers in the
platform they join, the set of payoff-dominant equilibria where sellers in the same platform
choose the same price is equivalent to the set of equilibria with seller associations.
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buyer joining platform i enjoys a total surplus of v + bni, where ni is the
number of sellers in platform i.6 There is revenue-sharing between platform i
and the seller association i such that the total revenue earned by each seller
is shared with the platform, with each seller taking a share of 1 − α while
the platform taking a share of α, where α ∈ [0, 1) is the royalty rate that the
platform charges the sellers.7 Platform i also charges a fixed fee Fi to buyers
who adopt it. Therefore, platform i’s profit is Πi = αpinimi + Fimi, while the
profit of each seller in platform i is πi = (1− α)pimi, where mi is the number
of buyers joining platform i. Denote the total fee faced by a buyer joining
platform i by Pi ≡ pini + Fi.8 A buyer located at x derives a utility of Ui(x)
by joining platform i, where
Ui(x) = v + bni − Pi − Ti(x).
We consider a three-stage game. In the first stage, all sellers decide which
platform to join in. After joining a platform, sellers within the same platform
6To simply exposition, buyers receive no surplus if nothing is bought from sellers so that
buyers may still buy from sellers in platform i when pi > b. All results remain intact without
this assumption but there will be new asymmetric equilibria where all buyers in a platform
buy nothing from sellers, which seems less plausible.
7Royalty fees are very common in many two-sided markets. For example, video game
console platforms charge game developers royalties per game copy, shopping malls receive a
percentage of revenues from retail stores. For the tractability, α is treated as exogenous.
8When common price pi exceeds marginal surplus b, buyers are assumed to buy from
sellers because the seller association is able to bundle all sellers products, and buyers receive
no utility if nothing is bought from sellers. When these conditions are not satisfied, all
results still remain intact but there will be new asymmetric equilibria where all buyers in a
platform buy nothing from sellers, which seems less plausible.
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form a seller association. In the second stage, both platforms and the two
seller associations make their pricing decisions. Platform i chooses the fixed
fee Fi while seller association i determines the common seller price pi. In the
third stage, after observing the total fee Pi, buyers decide which platform to
adopt.9
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
We characterize the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria by backward induction.
In the third stage, the indifferent buyer xˉ is determined by
v + bn1 − P1 − txˉ = v + bn2 − P2 − t(1− xˉ),
where xˉ = (t+bn1−bn2−P1+P2)
2t
. If 0 < xˉ < 1, both platforms capture positive
market shares on the buyers’ side, where m1 = xˉ and m2 = 1− xˉ. Otherwise,
m1 = 0 if xˉ ≤ 0, and m1 = 1 if xˉ ≥ 1.
In the second stage, since the profit functions for the platforms and the
two seller associations are all concave in prices, the equilibrium fees can be
easily obtained by solving the following four FOCs simultaneously,
−2pini + t + bni − bnj + pjnj + Fj − Fi = 0,
−2Fi + t + bni − bnj − (1 + α)pini + pjnj + Fj = 0,
where i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j.
9The assumption that sellers join a platform before buyers captures the idea that sellers
and platforms typically sell complementary products to buyers, which are both available
before buyers decide which platform to go to and what kind of products to purchase.
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The equilibrium prices are
pi =
(5− 2α)t + bni − bnj
(5− 2α)ni , and Fi =
(1− α)[(5− 2α)t + bni − bnj]
5− 2α .
Let β ≡ b
(5−2α)t be a parameter that measures network effects: a larger β
suggests buyers’ stronger preference for sellers in a specific platform. As b
increases, buyers value sellers products more and thus are more willing to join
the platform with a larger seller base. On the other hand, as t increases, buyers
become more platform specific due to their heterogeneity and thus care less
about sellers in the same platform. Lastly, a larger α implies a higher royalty
rate and a larger proportion of sellers’ profit going to the platforms. Thus, the
competition between platforms become stronger and the platform with larger
seller base it more likely to attract buyers. If β < 1, the equilibrium prices are
all positive.
In the first stage, each seller is indifferent between joining either platform,
which implies
(1− α)p1m1 = (1− α)p2m2.
The above sellers’ indifference condition is equivalent to
[(5− 2α)t + bn1 − bn2]2
n1
=
[(5− 2α)t + bn2 − bn1]2
n2
.
Given n1 + n2 = 1 and β < 1, if β >
1
2













otherwise, there is a unique solution, n1 =
1
2
. Therefore, there are two types
of equilibria: (1) in a symmetric equilibrium, the two platforms share the
markets on both sides equally; (2) in an asymmetric equilibrium, the two
platforms have different market shares on at least one side. Particularly, a
monopoly equilibrium is a special case of an asymmetric equilibrium, where
one platform captures whole markets on both sides. We are interested in the
conditions under which different types of equilibria arise.
2.3.1 The symmetric equilibrium
The following lemma shows that the symmetric equilibrium always exists,
regardless of the magnitude of network effects.10
Lemma 2.1. A symmetric equilibrium always exists.
The symmetric equilibrium arises due to the ex-ante symmetry between
platforms and among sellers and buyers. The two platforms behave in the
same way by attracting an equal number of sellers, which further leads to
an equal market share on the buyers’ side. As a result, all sellers earn the
same profit of (1 − α)t, while both platforms earn the same profit of t
2
. The
symmetric equilibrium in two-sided markets is also predicted in other mar-
kets without network effects by different theoretical models (for example, the
standard Hotelling model and Cournot model).
10All proofs are relegated to Appendix B.
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2.3.2 Asymmetric equilibria
When network effects are weak, only the symmetric equilibrium exists where
both platforms share the markets equally. As network effects become stronger
(β being larger), there also exist asymmetric equilibria where market dom-
inance arises. The following proposition summarizes the conditions under
which asymmetric equilibria arise and it also characterizes the equilibrium
pricing strategies for platforms and sellers.11
Proposition 2.1. When network effects are medium ( 1
2
< β < 1), asym-
metric equilibria exist where both platforms capture positive market shares on
both sides. Market dominance arises where a dominant platform attracts more
sellers and buyers, charges a higher fee for buyers and earns a higher profit.
Buyers are paying higher total fees to join the dominant platform while sellers
are charging lower prices for their products.
When network effects are medium, besides the symmetric equilibrium,
there also exist asymmetric equilibria where market dominance arises. This re-
sult seems surprising since the asymmetric outcome occurs even though there
is no ex-ante asymmetry among sellers (or buyers) and between the two plat-
forms. With medium network effects, buyers are more willing to adopt the
11In this proposition, we consider the case where two platforms both have positive markets
shares. The monopoly equilibria will be discussed later separately and they behave similarly.
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platform with a larger seller base so as to enjoy a larger surplus from sellers’
products or a higher network benefit. The dominant platform, which is more
attractive, is able to charge a higher fee for buyers. Faced with lower demand,
sellers in the small platform are able to increase their profit margin by raising
the fees on the buyers’ side and they are also paying a higher royalty fee to
the small platform. As a result, one platform is able to attract more sellers
(and thus more buyers) by charging a lower royalty fee and it ends up being
a dominant platform. When sellers are making platform adoption decisions
in the first place, they are indifferent between joining either platform as they
are always able to enjoy the same profit. Therefore, market dominance arises
naturally with one platform being larger on both sides and earning a higher
profit.
To see how the magnitude of network effects influences platforms’ and sell-
ers’ behavior in the asymmetric equilibria, we can simply do the comparative
statics on the market structure, platforms and sellers’ pricing decisions and
their corresponding profits. Consider the asymmetric equilibrium where plat-
form 1 dominates the markets. Let nASi , m
AS
i be the number of sellers and





common fee charged by seller association i, the fixed fee charged by platform




profits earned by platform i and a seller in platform i, where the superscript
AS denotes the asymmetric equilibrium and i ∈ {1, 2}. Consider the asym-


























As network effects become stronger, market dominance is strengthened: the
dominant platform enjoys larger market shares on both sides and markets
are more concentrated with the dominant platform. The dominant platform
earns a higher profit though it behaves less aggressively by charging a higher
fixed fee on the buyers’ side. However, the opposite results hold for the small
platform. Since the network effect parameter (β) is positively correlated to
the royalty rate on the sellers’ side, which reflects platforms’ relative market
power, market dominance is more likely to occur when platforms have a larger
market power over sellers.
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< β < 1.
Different sellers adopt different pricing strategies. Sellers in the small platform
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tend to charge a higher common price to overcome the disadvantage from
weak network effects. However, sellers in the dominant platform charge a
non-monotone price, as network effects become stronger. Clearly, there is a
tradeoff between raising the price and lowering demand, which depends on the
price elasticity of demand. With weak network effects, demand tends to be
elastic and thus it is profitable to lower the price; while raising the price will
be profitable when demand becomes less elastic with stronger network effects.







Therefore, the profit for either type of sellers increases as network effects in-
crease. All sellers benefit from stronger network effects, though the market
structure tends to be more concentrated with one platform. Stronger net-
work effects favor the dominant platform as well as all sellers, but make the
small platform worse-off. We can summarize the main result in the following
corollary:
Corollary 2.1. In an asymmetric equilibrium, as network effects become stronger,
the dominant (small) platform’s seller base, market share on the buyers’ side,
fixed fee and profit increase (decrease). Sellers in the small platform charge
higher prices while sellers in the dominant platform change non-monotone
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prices (the prices first decrease and then increase), as network effects become
stronger.
When network effects are medium, both symmetric and asymmetric equi-
libria coexist. It would be interesting to compare these two types of equilibria













be the mass of sellers in platform i, platform i’s market share on the buyers’
side, the common price charged by sellers in platform i, the fixed fee charged
by platform i, the total fee paid by buyers joining platform i, the profit of sell-
ers in platform i and platform i’s profit in the symmetric equilibrium, where
the superscript S denotes the symmetric equilibrium and i ∈ {1, 2}. From
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where i ∈ {1, 2}. As compared to the symmetric equilibrium, in an asymmet-
ric equilibrium, the dominant platform’s seller base and market share on the
buyers’ side increase, while those for the small platform decrease. Meanwhile,
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the dominant platform charges a higher fixed fee and sellers charge a lower












where i ∈ {1, 2}. Clearly, all sellers earn a higher profit in asymmetric equi-
libria. There are mainly two effects: demand effect and pricing effect. Sellers
in the dominant platform gain a higher profit due to higher demand on the
buyers’ side, while sellers in the small platform also gain a higher profit due
to higher product prices. As a result, all sellers are better-off, regardless of
which platform they join. Moreover, the dominant platform also benefits. The
platform’s total profit is determined by two parts: fixed payments from buyers
and profits earned from revenue sharing. With a larger market share on the
buyers’ side and a higher fixed fee, the dominant platform enjoys a higher
profit from fixed payments. On the other hand, with a larger seller base, the
profits from revenue sharing also increase. Therefore, the total profit earned
by the dominant platform increases when network effects are not small. On
the contrary, the small platform is worse-off due to the opposite effects. Con-










It implies that the gains from network effects for the dominant platform indeed
outweigh the loss incurred by the small platform. The following corollary
summarizes these results.
Corollary 2.2. Compared to the symmetric equilibrium, in the asymmetric
equilibria, all sellers and the dominant platform earn higher profits, while the
small platform earns a lower profit.
2.3.3 Monopoly equilibria
Now we consider a special example of asymmetric equilibria, where one plat-
form monopolizes the markets on both the seller and buyer sides. Although the
symmetric equilibrium always exists, such monopoly equilibria arise when net-
work effects are strong enough (β ≥ 1). The following proposition summarizes
the results.
Proposition 2.2. When network effects are sufficiently strong (β ≥ 1), monopoly
equilibria exist. In the monopoly equilibrium where platform 1 monopolizes, the
equilibrium prices (pM1 , F
M
1 ) satisfy the following two conditions:
12
1. pM1 + F
M
1 = b− t;




12Here the superscript M denotes the monopoly equilibrium.
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When network effects are strong enough, market dominance leads to monopoly
equilibria where all sellers and buyers join a single platform. In an equilibrium
where platform 1 monopolizes, regardless of the prices charged by sellers and








1 = b− t.
Clearly, the joint profit will be higher than that in the symmetric equilibrium.
Based on the analysis above, we formally characterize the conditions under
which different types of equilibria arise in the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1. A symmetric equilibrium always exists. When network ef-
fects are not too weak (β > 1
2
), asymmetric equilibria also exist where market
dominance arises. When network effects are strong (β ≥ 1), the asymmetric
equilibria involve one platform monopolizing the markets on both sides.
Following Theorem 2.1, though the symmetric equilibrium always exists,
market dominance occurs in asymmetric equilibria when network effects are
not too weak. This result is similar to Katz and Shapiro (1985), where asym-
metric equilibria arise in a Cournot market with direct network effects. Dif-
ferent from their paper, we explicitly determine the conditions under which
different types of equilibria arise. Particularly, the symmetric equilibrium
arises naturally due to the ex-ante symmetry among firms, while asymmetric
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equilibria with market dominance only arise due to strong network effects.
The existence of a dominant platform is consistent with various examples in
two-sided markets, where network effects are strong (for example, Windows
in operating system markets, Google in search engine markets and IE browser
markets). All these markets are two-sided and highly concentrated to (or al-
most monopolized by) a single dominant platform. Such market dominance is
hardly observed in other markets without network effects.
2.4 Stability
When network effects are not weak, multiple equilibria coexist. Since mar-
ket dominance instead of market sharing is observed in two-sided markets
where network effects are large, it is interesting to study whether asymmetric
equilibria are stable. The results of multiple equilibria arise due to sellers’
coordination problems in the first stage, when they are deciding which plat-
form to adopt. In particular, the symmetric equilibrium relies on an equal
number of sellers joining both platforms, which seems less plausible when net-
work effects are strong. It is important to see if an equilibrium is restored
after some sellers deviate to the other platform. Let πi(ni, nj) be the profit
of a seller in platform i when n1 sellers join platform 1 and n2 sellers join
platform 2. An equilibrium is stable if for all i ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j, for all
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² ∈ (0, nj) such that πi(ni + ², nj − ²) > πj(nj , ni), there exists δ ∈ (0, ²) such
that πi(ni + ², nj − ²) < πj(nj − ² + δ, ni + ² − δ). Intuitively, an equilibrium
is stable if no sellers in the same platform want to jointly deviate by joining
the other platform, or if deviations occur, some of the deviating sellers want
to switch back to the original platform. Thus the stability of an equilibrium
captures the idea that no credible joint deviations by sellers ever occur start-
ing from the initial equilibrium. The following proposition summarizes the
stability results.
Proposition 2.3. When network effects are weak (β ≤ 1
2
), the unique symmet-
ric equilibrium is stable. When network effects are strong (β > 1
2
), asymmetric
equilibria (including monopoly equilibria) are the only stable equilibria.
Figure 2.1 shows sellers’ profits in the symmetric and asymmetric equilib-
rium. Figure 2.1(a) shows that the symmetric equilibrium is stable for small
network effect. If some sellers from platform i deviate to platform j, their
profit would be lower than the profit earned by sellers in platform i, and they
are willing to return to the original platform. However, Figure 2.1(b) shows
that for large network effects, deviating sellers are not willing to return in sym-
metric equilibrium while they will do so under the asymmetric equilibrium.
The results from Proposition 2.3 can explain the observations in many mar-
kets. In the industries without network effects (or with weak network effects),
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< β < 1
when there exists no ex-ante asymmetry among platforms, standard competi-
tion results in symmetric market division and market sharing is observed in
these markets. Though without ex-ante asymmetry, network effects lead to
market dominance in two-sided markets, which persists when network effects
are sufficiently strong.
2.5 Welfare Analysis
Though asymmetric market structures with market dominance are widely ob-
served in two-sided markets, the welfare implication is not quite clear. A
monopoly outcome always results in social inefficiency by creating deadweight
loss in most industries without network effects. What is the welfare implica-
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tion of market dominance in two-sided markets? Is it socially more efficient
to have a dominant platform that is a monopoly or near monopoly than to
have several symmetric platforms competing intensively? These issues may
particularly be of interest to competition authorities. We want to analyze the
welfare implications by comparing different types of equilibria.
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where ni, mi are the number of sellers and buyers joining platform i, pi, Fi
are the common fee charged by each seller within platform i and the fixed
fee charged by platform i. From Theorem 2.1, we can only focus on the case
where multiple equilibria coexist when network effects are not too weak. By
comparing the two types of equilibria, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2.4. Whenever asymmetric equilibria arise (β > 1
2
), consumer
surplus is higher in any asymmetric equilibrium than in the symmetric when
network effects are moderate, while producer surplus and social welfare are
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always higher in any asymmetric equilibrium.
Whenever multiple equilibria exist, producer surplus and social welfare
are always higher in asymmetric equilibria. This result is mainly driven by
network effects. Social welfare is determined by the allocation of sellers and
buyers which is affected by the relative magnitude of network effects. Thus
there are mainly two factors affecting total welfare: social benefit (which is
determined by network effects) and social cost (transportation cost on the
buyers’ side). When buyers’ valuation for sellers’ products is not too small so
that network effects dominate, social benefit will be larger than social cost if
asymmetric market structure occurs. Therefore, asymmetric equilibria always
improve social welfare as compared to the symmetric equilibrium. Moreover,
consumers may also benefit from market dominance as long as network effects
are not too strong. Otherwise, platforms and sellers would jointly charge
higher prices resulting in lower consumer surplus. However, the overall effect
on welfare is always positive as the gain by firms dominates the loss from
consumers.
The welfare results provide a theoretical foundation for real world cases of
natural monopolies. For example, the breakup of the Bell system and AT&T
divestiture in the 1980s is generally viewed as the most successful case of Ma-
jor Section 2 Decrees in the US. However, the welfare effect is predicted to
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be negative from our model to break down the monopoly power of AT&T
in the telecommunications industry, when strong network effects exist and
the platform is performing well by almost monopolizing the market. Though
competition effects become stronger when there exist multiple networks or
platforms, the loss from network benefits will be even larger, which eventually
harms consumers, the industry and society. Therefore, according to the find-




Competition authorities not only care about the welfare implications of market
dominance but also other antitrust issues in two-sided markets where market
dominance arises. One particular concern is vertical integration between firms
and platforms, which is widely observed in two-sided markets. For example,
Amazon made an announcement on acquiring Goodreads, an online tool for
book sharing and recommendations in March 2013. Google completed a $12.5
billion purchase of Motorola Mobility on March 2012. Similarly, Microsoft also
agreed on a deal to buy Nokia’s mobile phones on September 2013. Apple Inc.
is also considered as an example of vertical integration, since the hardware is
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typically outsourced to other manufacturers such as Foxconn while Apple retail
stores sell their own hardware, software and services to consumers. Though
vertical integration is generally profitable for the integrated parties as it in-
ternalizes the pricing incentives of them, the effect on social welfare is still
not quite clear, especially in two-sided markets. In particular, platforms’ inte-
gration decision will change buyers’ platform adoption decisions and therefore
affect the allocation on the two sides of the markets. In this section, we want
to analyze the welfare implications of vertical integration in two-sided markets.
It is natural to focus on the symmetric equilibrium when network effects
are weak and asymmetric equilibria when network effects are medium, though
we are mostly interested in the later case.13 We first study the case where
a vertical merger occurs between one platform and sellers. The following
proposition summarizes the results with small network effects:
Proposition 2.5. Whenever the symmetric equilibrium is the unique outcome
(β ≤ 1
2
), a vertical merger between one platform and sellers always reduces
welfare.
When network effects are weak, the symmetric equilibrium arises where
two platforms share the markets on both sides equally. The symmetric out-
come is socially efficient and market dominance harms efficiency since the loss
13It is consistent with the equilibrium refinement using stability criteria. And the issue
of vertical integration is only relevant when two platforms are sharing the markets.
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from social costs outweighs the gains from network benefits. However, ver-
tical integration by a platform leads to market dominance by distorting the
symmetry between platforms, and it allows the integrated platform to enjoy
superior market power by attracting more buyers. Therefore, social welfare is
lower after vertical integration.
The welfare implication of vertical integration will be different when net-
work effects are medium so that market dominance arises before a vertical
merger takes place.
Proposition 2.6. Whenever asymmetric equilibria arise where both platforms
have positive markets on both sides ( 1
2
< β < 1), if a vertical merger occurs
between one platform and sellers,
1. social welfare is improving if the dominant platform is vertically inte-
grated, when network effects are not too weak;
2. social welfare is decreasing if the small platform is vertically integrated.
When network effects are not too weak so that network effects dominate
the competition effect, it is welfare improving if the buyer base of the dominant
platform expands. This can be achieved by the dominant platform integrating
sellers, which internalizes the pricing incentive and lowers the total price to
buyers. However, the result will be reversed if the small platform vertically
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integrates sellers, which enlarges the distortion in the buyers’ market and
lowers social welfare.
Though it is always profitable for either platform to become vertically
integrated, the effects of vertical integration on social welfare do not only
depend on the magnitude of network effects but also depend on which platform
is vertically integrated. Moreover, with both platforms vertically integrated,
the competition effect between two channels will become even stronger. When
both platforms can strategically decide whether to integrate sellers, there exist
two types of equilibria where only one of the platforms chooses to be vertically
integrated. However, on the social welfare point of view, it is socially optimal
for both platforms to vertically integrate sellers. The results are summarized
in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.7. Whenever asymmetric equilibria arise where both platforms
have positive markets on both sides ( 1
2
< β < 1), if both platforms can choose
to vertically integrate sellers, there exist two equilibria where one platform
is vertically integrated. It is socially optimal if both platforms are vertically
integrated.
Individual rationality implies either platform wants to vertically integrate
sellers so as to enjoy more market power. Stronger competition after a vertical
merger tends to discourage platforms from integration. Thus vertical integra-
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tion by one platform is a natural result when both platforms strategically make
their decisions. This result is consistent with most of the observations in two-
sided markets, for example, Microsoft’s acquisition of Nokia. However, social
welfare will be improved if both platforms choose to be vertically integrated,
since intense competition between the platforms weakens the distortion in
consumers’ platform adoption decision towards the dominant platform. Since
insufficient integration is usually observed, if a third party is involved, possible
subsidies would be favorable to encourage vertical integration among platforms
and it further improves social welfare. Therefore, this suggests that competi-
tion authorities should encourage platforms’ integration strategies instead of
banning them.
2.6.2 Multiple platforms
Consistent with the existing literature on two-sided markets, we model com-
petition between two platforms in the basic model. Now we extend the basic
model to allow competition among multiple platforms. To measure direct and
intensive competition among all platforms, we construct a stylized “virtual
network” model.14 Suppose there are K platforms and a unit mass of buyers
14When there are only two platforms, the model is the same as a linear city Hotelling
model; when there are three platforms, it is the same as the Salop circular model. Though
the Salop circular model can also be used to study multiple platforms, it cannot measure
the direct competition between any two platforms. While this issue is not crucial for a
symmetric outcome, it will be quite important in asymmetric equilibria.
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who are evenly located between any two of the platforms so that there is a
mass of 2
K(K−1) buyers along the line between two platforms. Same as the
basic model, buyers incur a unit transportation cost t. Sellers are assumed to
view the platforms as homogenous. Platforms’ and sellers’ pricing decisions
and buyers’ joining decisions are the same as in the basic model. We find that
the main results still hold, which are summarized as follows:
Proposition 2.8. When there are multiple competing platforms, a symmetric
equilibrium always exists. When network effects are not too weak, asymmetric
equilibria also arise where market dominance arises. When network effects are
strong, asymmetric equilibria involve a platform monopolizing the markets on
both sides.
The main results from the two platform model are still robust when consid-
ering a multiple platform model. Asymmetric equilibria (including monopoly
equilibria) still exist when network effects are not too weak. In any asymmetric
equilibrium, the market share of the dominant platform and its profit increase
as network effects become stronger. With sufficiently strong network effects,
monopoly equilibria occur where a single platform monopolizes the markets
on both sides. The asymmetric equilibria also welfare dominate the symmetric
equilibrium. These results can explain why a dominant platform survives in
two-sided markets with multiple rivals competing (for example, Windows in
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the operating system market). It further suggests that market dominance (or
monopolization by a single platform) is socially more favorable, as compared
to the symmetric structure where multiple platforms are sharing the market,
when network effects are strong enough. Therefore, policy interventions are
not necessarily needed in the markets with strong network effects where market
dominance arises.
2.6.3 Multi-homing sellers
In the basic model, we assume that both sellers and buyers are single-homing.
In some cases sellers can multi-home to several platforms. For example, soft-
ware developers can write software for different operating systems, advertisers
can make advertisements on different yellow pages and game developers can
write game titles for different game consoles. We extend the basic model to a
competitive bottleneck setting where sellers can multi-home while buyers are
single-homing. Suppose sellers can multi-home by incurring a multi-homing
cost c, while there is no cost if sellers are single-homing. We assume that sell-
ers are heterogeneous in their multi-homing costs and the multi-homing cost
c follows a smooth distribution F (c), where c ∈ [0, cˉ].15 To focus on a more
interesting case where not all sellers want to be multi-homing, we assume the








We can characterize the equilibria as follows:
Proposition 2.9. When there are two platforms and sellers can multi-home,
there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in which some sellers are multi-homing
while others are single-homing. Market dominance occurs.
The results from the basic model are still robust if sellers can multi-home.
When some sellers have large multi-homing costs, there exists an asymmetric
equilibrium in which some sellers are multi-homing while others are single-
homing. The platform with a larger seller base enjoys a dominant market
position by attracting more buyers and earning a higher profit. The results
can also explain why some software is written on both Windows and Linux,
while more software is compatible with Windows than Linux.
2.6.4 Multiple platforms and multi-homing sellers
When there are multiple platforms and sellers can also multi-home, it will
be extremely hard to fully characterize the equilibria, especially when the
number of platforms is large. Particularly, when there are three platforms, we
are able to exactly pin down the equilibria, though they are very complicated.
16Otherwise there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which all sellers are multi-homing.
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With three platforms, we find a similar result as the basic model that market
dominance arises when network effects are not too small. Therefore, the main
rationale for the basic model can also apply to the case with many platforms
and multi-homing sellers.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a simple and tractable multi-platform competition
model in a two-sided market where sellers can directly charge prices to buyers
in the same platform. Our model predicts market dominance and provides
the link between symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. We show that when
network effects are not too weak, besides the symmetric equilibrium, there
exist asymmetric equilibria where a dominant platform captures larger mar-
ket shares on both sides, charges a higher fee on the buyers’ side and earns a
higher profit. Buyers who join the dominant platform pay higher total fees and
sellers in the dominant platform charge lower prices. Market dominance in-
creases as network effects become stronger and markets on both sides become
more concentrated with the dominant platform. When network effects are suf-
ficiently strong, the asymmetric equilibria involve one platform monopolizing
the markets on both sides. Though the symmetric equilibrium always exists,
asymmetric equilibria are the only stable equilibria. Moreover, the asymmet-
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ric equilibria welfare dominate the symmetric equilibrium. This suggests that
market dominance or natural monopoly in two-sided markets is not only stable
but socially efficient.
Policy implications such as the effects of vertical integration are also ad-
dressed. Due to coordination failure between two platforms, only one of them
chooses to be vertically integrated while it is socially more efficient if both
platforms are vertically integrated. Therefore, possible subsidies or transfers
from a third party would be beneficial in terms of improving social welfare. All
equilibrium results and welfare implications are robust to competition among
multiple platforms and multi-homing sellers.
There could be several possible extensions for future research. First, it
would be interesting to consider a more general model with seller competition.
Imperfect competition among sellers weakens sellers’ incentive of joining the
dominant platform and it may lead to weaker market dominance. Second,
platforms’ compatibility decisions can also be studied using the existing model.
Indeed platforms’ compatibility problem is quite related to horizontal merger
issues of the platforms, which also have some antitrust implications. Third,
the existing model can also be extended to a dynamic framework where buyers
(or sellers) face the lock-in problem when they decide to join a platform. In a






Due to the complexity of different products, buyers who purchase directly from
sellers may not be fully aware of the characteristics of products and therefore
don’t know which product best fits their needs. Intermediaries that special-
ize in these products may enjoy superior information about sellers’ products
and can help buyers find the best deal to suit their needs. Examples include
various types of insurance brokers and financial advisors. Therefore, inter-
mediaries can act as information gatekeepers by providing information about
sellers’ products to buyers. However, typically, such intermediaries will im-
pose a constraint on sellers to prevent them from charging more to buyers that
come through the intermediary. Brokers would not want to deal with a seller
that tries to charge its buyers more or which gives a discount for buyers that
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purchase directly. One example of informational intermediaries that impose
price coherence is global distribution systems (GDSs). A few large GDSs (e.g.
Amadeus, SABRE, and Travelport) connect hundreds of airlines to thousands
of travel agents (TAs), who serve travellers by providing airline information
and prices. The contracts between airlines and GDSs assure price coherence,
as the basic price of a ticket is the same whether the ticket is sold through the
airline itself or through TAs. Other related examples involving price coherence
are hotel booking systems, restaurant ordering services, insurance brokers and
real estate agents.
Edelman and Wright (2014) consider such constraints (known as “price
coherence” constraints) and show how they can lower consumer surplus and
social welfare. With price coherence, buyers pay the same price to sellers re-
gardless of whether they make a purchase directly or through the intermediary.
Therefore, they will never receive any signal on seller side fees charged by the
intermediary. Without such a signal, the intermediary is able to charge exces-
sively high fees on the seller side and therefore earn a high profit. The high fee
on the sellers’ side is passed back through to buyers and so ultimately results
in lower consumer surplus.
In Edelman and Wright (2014), buyers are able to find out the full match
information of available products (including their prices) by paying an ex-
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ogenous cost, which is assumed always to be better for them than buying
randomly. This means that intermediation is not necessary for competition
between sellers or for informed choices to be made. This paper extends the
matching setting of Edelman and Wright (2014) by removing this assumption,
so some buyers require the intermediary to provide information on sellers’
products and prices. The existence of the intermediary can therefore enhance
competition and buyer choice. This paper also uses a more general competition
framework than the one used in Edelman and Wright (2014).
When all buyers have the same cost of using the intermediary’s service, we
show that the intermediary always wants to impose price coherence on sellers.
Without facing any fee from sellers for using the intermediary’s service, buyers
are willing to pay a higher fee to the intermediary, when price coherence is
imposed. Sellers prefer to join the intermediary so as to attract the uninformed
buyers who also join the intermediary, provided that the fee charged by the
intermediary is not too high. Therefore, the intermediary charges a higher
joint fee and earns a higher profit with price coherence, which also lowers
consumer surplus. Price coherence has a neutral effect on welfare in this
setting as all uninformed buyers prefer to join the intermediary, regardless of
whether price coherence is imposed. Moreover, intermediation always raises
consumer surplus, as buyers’ expected net gain from information acquisition
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is zero given it is extracted by the intermediary through its fees, while the
gain from intensified seller competition dominates the loss from inflated fees
to sellers. Intermediation also improves welfare since the social benefit from
information provision dominates the cost of providing information.
We extend the model to the case with heterogeneous buyers who have dif-
ferent costs of joining the intermediary. We show the qualitative findings in
the case of homogenous buyers still hold, except that the effect on welfare is
generally ambiguous. Like the finding of Edelman and Wright, intermedia-
tion will sometimes lower welfare by inducing too many buyers to adopt the
intermediary’s information technology.
This paper fits into the burgeoning literature on multi-side platforms and
two-sided markets (following the seminal contributions of Caillaud and Jullien,
2003, Rochet and Tirole, 2003, and Armstrong, 2006). The existing literature
on two-sided markets focuses on platforms’ role as intermediaries by attract-
ing two groups of users and providing interaction benefits (or usually network
benefits) for them. While platforms play a vital role in determining prices and
affecting market structures, usually there is no payment between two interact-
ing parties (i.e. from buyers to sellers). Such frameworks cannot be used to
analyze platforms’ incentive to use price coherence. There are a few papers
studying micro-foundations of network benefits by considering sellers’ pricing
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problems, including Hagiu (2009) and Belleamme and Peitz (2010). They
assume that interaction through the intermediary is essential for trade and
buyers are not able to make a purchase directly from sellers. Similarly, Inderst
and Ottaviani (2012) study an intermediary’s role of providing information for
buyers in a setting where the intermediary gives advice or recommendations
for buyers by influencing buyers’ decision through commission and kickbacks.
However, buyers are assumed not to be able to purchase directly from sellers
and so price coherence cannot be studied. In this paper, we are able to study
the intermediary’s decision of imposing price coherence, by allowing buyers to
make a direct purchase from sellers.
There are several papers studying intermediaries’ role of providing infor-
mation for buyers and thus to act as information gatekeepers or match makers.
Baye and Morgan (2001) consider a framework where a monopoly information
gatekeeper is providing price information for buyers through its fee-setting de-
cisions in a homogeneous product market. Our paper differs since we allow for
differentiated products, so the intermediary provides both price and matching
information for buyers. Another paper to study the role of intermediaries as
matchmakers is Caillaud and Jullien (2001), but they do not allow for pricing
between the two sides being matched. Neither paper looks at the role of price
coherence.
85
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents a formal
model with a monopoly intermediary which might want to impose price co-
herence. Section 3.3 analyzes the equilibrium results in the benchmark model
where buyers have identical costs of joining the intermediary. Section 3.4 ex-
tends the basic model to a setting with heterogeneous buyers who differ in
their costs of using the intermediary. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
We consider a model with a single (monopoly) intermediary M , two symmetric
but differentiated sellers, and a unit mass of buyers. Each buyer wants to buy
one unit from one of the sellers. Buyers can buy directly from sellers or through
the intermediary M .
We model sellers’ competition using the discrete choice model developed
by Perloff and Salop (1985). Specially, if a buyer purchases a product from
seller i, it derives a utility of
Ui = ²i − pi, i ∈ {1, 2},
where pi is the price charged by seller i and ²i is the buyer’s match value of seller
i’s product. The match value ²i is i.i.d. and it follows a distribution F with
support [², ²ˉ]. We assume the density function f is continuously differentiable
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and log-concave.1 Also ² is assumed to be sufficiently large so that a buyer
would always make a purchase from one of the retailers, no matter whether
intermediation occurs or whether the intermediary imposes price coherence or
not. A buyer chooses her optimal product to maximize her utility. Thus, with
fully informed buyers, seller i’s demand is given by
Q(pi, pj) = Pr(²i − pi > ²j − pj) =
∫ ²ˉ
²
F (pj − pi + ²i)f(²i)d²i.
We also assume that ² is large enough so that a buyer always wants to make
a purchase. Each seller’s marginal cost of production is assumed to be c.
Within the unit mass of buyers, we assume there are two different types:
a fraction of α are informed buyers while a fraction of (1 − α) are uninformed
buyers. The informed buyers know both the prices and their realized match
values from both sellers, before they choose which seller to go to. However,
the uninformed buyers know neither the prices nor their match values before
they choose which seller to go to. In the absence of an intermediary, they will
choose the seller to go to randomly. After choosing a seller, they observe the
match value and price and decide whether to complete the purchase. They
cannot switch to buy from another seller at this point. The two types of buyers
captures the idea of buyers’ heterogeneity regarding to the awareness of sellers’
products. In reality, some buyers are better aware of products (for example,
1The log-concavity of f ensures that there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium by
Caplin and Nalebuff (1991).
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some loyal buyers who have patronized before), while other buyers may have
no information about sellers (probably those are new to sellers).
If sellers charge the same prices (as they do in equilibrium), the informed
buyer will buy from the seller which offers a better match value. Thus the
expected match value (expected gross surplus) for an informed buyer is



















We denote B = BI − BU , which is positive.2
As the information gatekeeper, the intermediary always observes the price
and match value with respect to each seller that joins it. Therefore, the inter-
mediary plays an important role of helping each buyer to find a suitable seller
through its recommendation. Since the informed buyers have full information,
there is no need for them to join the intermediary. However, the uninformed
buyers can obtain information by joining M , and they will receive recommen-






















²[1− F (²)]f(²)d² =
∫ ²ˉ
²
²f(²)d² = BU .
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dations from M . If both sellers join M and M recommends the seller which
offers a better net surplus, the expected gain from joining the intermediary is
B for the uninformed buyers. Thus we refer to B as the match benefit that
the intermediary provides to the buyers.
Since we do not require M to tell the truth, M cannot do better than
giving a simple recommendation to buyers of which seller to buy from. We
show that in equilibrium, each buyer follows M ’s advice. Following Edelman
and Wright (2014), we assume M maximizes its profit, but that for a given
level of profit, M prefers the allocation that gives its buyers the highest utility.
We assume that the cost to the intermediary of providing information to
buyers to be k per-transaction (or per-buyer). It is also assumed that buy-
ers need to incur a positive participation cost of s in order to join M . In
the benchmark model, we assume all buyers have the same cost while in the
extension we consider the case where buyers are heterogeneous in their costs
of joining the intermediary. We further assume that B > s + k, so that the
net benefit gained by a buyer of joining the intermediary is larger than the
costs to the intermediary and buyer s + k. Also we assume that k is not too
small so that k > 1−α
α





. This assumption ensures that
the intermediary will not want to offer rebates to buyers so as to attract both
sellers.
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The intermediary is able to restrict the prices charged by sellers, which
we refer to as price coherence. Without imposing price coherence, sellers who
join the intermediary are able to charge different prices to buyers who purchase
directly or purchase through the intermediary. However, with price coherence,
sellers are restricted to charge the same price to buyers, regardless of whether
they are purchasing directly or through the intermediary. Moreover, due to
the feature of unit demand and symmetric sellers, M cannot do better than to
charge a linear per-transaction fee on sellers, which is denoted as pS. M also
charges a linear fee on buyers, which is denoted as pB, and we require pB ≥ 0.3
We consider a four-stage game. In the first stage, the intermediary M
decides the fees pB and pS it charges to buyers and sellers, and whether to
impose price coherence on sellers (whether sellers must charge the same price
for buyers who purchase directly or through the intermediary).
In the second stage, both sellers and both types of buyers simultaneously
decide whether to join the intermediary. A buyer incurs a cost of s if it joins
M . Both sellers set prices for buyers who purchase directly or through the
intermediary. If M does not impose price coherence, a seller who joins M
is able to charge different prices for buyers who buy directly or through the
3The assumption on the non-negative buyer side fee is without loss of generality in the
case without price coherence. Under k > 1−αα φ, the intermediary also never wants to offer
rebates even with price coherence, in the setting with homogeneous buyers. Moreover, it
also rules out the possibility of rebates in the case with heterogeneous buyers, when price
coherence is imposed.
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intermediary. With price coherence imposed by M , a seller who joins M must
charge the same price for all buyers.
In the third stage, all informed buyers observe the prices and their match
values from both sellers, and they will decide which seller to purchase from. All
uninformed buyers who join M receive a recommendation from M of which
seller to buy from, and they decide whether to follow the recommendation.
All other uninformed buyers will select a seller randomly and make a purchase
directly.
In the fourth stage, given the choice of the selected seller, each buyer learns
the price and match value, and decides whether to make a purchase from the
selected seller. If the buyer and seller have both joined M , the transaction is
completed through M . All payoffs are realized.
The equilibrium concept we use is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Due to
the fixed cost of joining the intermediary, there are multiple equilibria in the
continuation game from stage 2, for any fees faced by sellers and buyers. There
always exists a trivial equilibrium in which M does not attract any buyers or
sellers if buyers do not expect any sellers to join the intermediary. With no
buyers, there is no incentive for sellers to join M . Following Edelman and
Wright (2014), to select among the equilibria, we assume that if there exist
equilibria in which one or both sellers join the intermediary, one of these will
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be selected. Otherwise, the trivial equilibrium where no buyers or sellers join
M is selected.
3.3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.3.1 The benchmark without the intermediary
First we consider the benchmark without the intermediary. With two types
of buyers, sellers’ competition result can be easily derived following the same
logic from Perloff and Salop model. Seller i’s demand is
Qi(pi, pj) = α
∫ ²ˉ
²
F (pj − pi + ²i)f(²i)d²i + 1− α
2
.
The demand from informed buyers is exactly the same as Perloff and Salop
model, while the uninformed buyers will make a purchase randomly.4 Thus












By solving each seller’s pricing problem and imposing the symmetry assump-
tion, the equilibrium prices charged by sellers are determined by
p1 = p2 = p




Sellers’ equilibrium profits are





4We also assume that the fraction of informed buyers α is not too small, so that the
sellers’ pricing equilibrium is well-defined: no seller wants to deviate by charging a price
sufficiently high so as to only sell through half of the uninformed buyers.
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Due to the existence of the uninformed buyers, sellers’ competition becomes
less intensive and each seller is able to charge a higher price as compared to
the standard Perloff and Salop model.
In the case without the intermediary, the consumer surplus and social wel-
fare are
CSNM = αBI + (1− α)BU − c− φ
α
= BI − (1− α)B − c− φ
α
,
WNM = αBI + (1− α)BU − c = BI − (1− α)B − c,
where the superscript NM denotes the case without intermediation. In this
case, uninformed buyers are not aware of their best product so they may not
make a purchase through a seller which provides the best match. Intermedia-
tion is able to solve the problem. Moreover, we will see that the intermediary
will also affect the degree of competition between sellers by reducing (or even
eliminating) the proportion of uninformed buyers.
3.3.2 Intermediation without price coherence
Now suppose there exists an intermediary which knows sellers’ information
(both prices and buyers’ match values). First, we consider the case where M
is operating and it does not impose price coherence on sellers. Since M is
efficient in providing matching information for buyers, M will want to charge
its fees (the joint fees on the buyers and sellers’ side) to the maximum amount,
which is equivalent to the net gain by the uninformed buyers of joining the
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intermediary. Therefore, M is able to attract all uninformed buyers and both
sellers, and therefore earn a positive profit. The following proposition formally
presents the equilibrium results:5
Proposition 3.1. Suppose M cannot impose price coherence. There exists an
equilibrium in which M sets the fees pB = B − s and pS = 0. All uninformed
buyers join M while all informed buyers do not join M . Both sellers join M ,
and they set the equilibrium price c + φ for buyers who purchase directly and
the equilibrium price c + φ + pS for buyers who purchase through M . The
intermediary recommends each buyer to buy from the seller that is best for the
buyer from among the sellers that joins M . Buyers that join M always follow
its advice.
Proposition 3.1 shows that without price coherence, sellers always want to
join the intermediary as they are able to fully pass through the fee charged
by the intermediary to buyers. An uninformed buyers is willing to join the
intermediary if and only if
B − s− (pS + pB) ≥ 0.
From buyers’ point of view, the fees pB and pS are interchangeable and only the
joint fee matters. Therefore, the intermediary is able to simply charge buyers
5All proofs are relegated to Appendix C.
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directly. Moreover, any fee structure with pB ≥ 0, pS ≥ 0 and pB + pS =
B − s yields the same outcome as the equilibrium proposed in Proposition
3.1. Such an equivalence result is also obtained in the model considered by
Edelman and Wright (2014). Since the fees on sellers’ side and buyers’ side are
interchangeable and sellers will always pass through their fees to buyers, buyers
who join the intermediary always observe the pricing signal on sellers’ fee.
Therefore, the maximum joint fee charged by the intermediary is exactly the
incremental amount of buyers’ expected net gain by joining the intermediary.
In equilibrium, all uninformed buyers will purchase through the intermediary
so that they are able to find out the best product that suits them.
3.3.3 Intermediation with price coherence
We now allow M to impose price coherence on sellers, so that sellers who join
M must charge the same prices for buyers who purchase directly or through
M . The following proposition summarizes the result with price coherence:
Proposition 3.2. Suppose M imposes price coherence. There exists an equi-
librium in which M charges pB = B − s and pS = pˉS, where pˉS is the unique
optimal fee charged by M which is implicitly defined in the proof, and which sat-
isfies φ < pˉS <
φ
α
. All uninformed buyers join M while all informed buyers do
not join M . Both sellers join M and set the equilibrium price c+φ+(1−α)pˉS.
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The intermediary recommends each buyer to buy from the seller that is best
for the buyer from among the sellers that joins M . Buyers that join M always
follow its advice.
If the intermediary imposes price coherence on sellers, buyers will face
the same price regardless of whether they purchase directly or through the
intermediary. An uniformed buyer is willing to join the intermediary if and
only if
B − s− pB ≥ 0.
Due to the expected gain from information acquisition, uninformed buyers
always want to join the intermediary as long as the fee charged directly to them
by the intermediary does not exceed the expected gain. Thus the maximum
fee that each uninformed buyer would pay to the intermediary is exactly the
incremental amount of buyers’ expected net gain by joining the intermediary,
as before. That is, the maximum fee on buyers’ side is the same as the total fee
charged by the intermediary without price coherence. Since the intermediary
is also now able to charge a positive fee on sellers’ side, the total fee faced
by buyers who join the intermediary is inflated as compared to the situation
without price coherence. Price coherence tends to raise the joint fee charged
by the intermediary and increases its profit. This can be achieved since buyers
face the same price and thus they don’t receive the signal of the higher fee
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charged on the sellers’ side. Expecting both sellers to join, all uninformed
buyers will individually join in order to find the best match. As a result, all
buyers who join the intermediary end up paying a higher price.
From the sellers’ perspective, they would like to join M so as to attract
half of the uninformed buyers that come through M , provided that the fee
charged by the intermediary is not too high. With a sufficiently high fee, a
seller prefers not to join the intermediary, since it is able to attract more direct
buyers by lowing the price and earn a higher profit. Therefore, the maximum
fee pˉS charged by M is constrained to a level so that such a deviation never
occurs. Although we can prove the optimal fee pˉS charged by M is unique, we
are not able to explicitly determine it for a general function of F .
To further illustrate the implications of Proposition 3.2, consider a partic-
ular example of uniform distribution of F . In this case the optimal fee can be
explicitly pinned down. The results derived from the example are summarized
in the following corollary:
Corollary 3.1. If F ∼ U [a, a + 1] or F (²) = ²− a, the optimal fee on sellers’
side pˉS is determined by the following equation
α
(
23− 4t2 + 4t + (2t− 1)
√




4t2 − 4t + 25
)
= 54
where t = (1− α)pˉS.
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Clearly the optimal fee depends on the parameter α. The following table
summarizes the results of the relationship between α and pˉS, and the corre-
sponding two bounds determined in Proposition 3.2:
Table 3.1: The equilibrium fee pˉS and two bounds
α 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.95 0.99
pˉS 0.862 0.750 0.664 0.597 0.544 0.510 0.504
φ 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
φ
α
1 0.833 0.714 0.625 0.556 0.526 0.505






, as claimed in Proposition 3.2. Moreover, we also see that the optimal fee
on sellers’ side is also decreasing in α (the number of informed buyers). With
more informed buyers, there will be a stronger incentive for a seller to deviate
by not joining the intermediary as it is able to attract more informed buyers
by lowering the price. In order to attract both sellers, M has to lower the
maximum fee on sellers’ side.
3.3.4 The impact of intermediation and price coherence
Due to the higher fees, the intermediary will always prefer to impose price co-
herence. Such a restriction on sellers’ pricing raises sellers’ prices and therefore
lowers consumer surplus. However, compared to the case without intermedi-
ation, buyers are better off due to the presence of the intermediary due to
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better matching and intensified price competition. The following proposition
formally presents the results:
Proposition 3.3. M always wants to impose price coherence, if it is able
to. As compared to the case without price coherence, imposing price coherence
raises final prices and thus lowers consumer surplus. However, intermedia-
tion (even with price coherence) always improves consumer surplus and social
welfare.
Without receiving any signal of the sellers’ fees, buyers are willing to pay
a higher fee to make a purchase through the intermediary, if price coherence
is imposed. Thus the intermediary is able to charge buyers exactly the same
amount that it would charge for buyers and sellers together in the case without
price coherence. It would also charge a positive amount for sellers and earn a
higher profit as a result of price coherence. Given sellers partially pass through
these fees to all buyers, buyers end up facing higher final prices and therefore
enjoy a lower surplus as a result of price coherence. Since all uninformed buyers
will use the intermediary regardless of whether price coherence is imposed,
total welfare is not affected in this setting with homogenous buyers. Price
coherence only transfers rents from buyers to the intermediary.
Moreover, Proposition 3.3 also implies that intermediation (even with price
coherence) always improves consumer surplus and social welfare compared to
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the case without intermediation. The positive gain on welfare is straight-
forward, as intermediation provides match benefits for buyers by eliminating
uninformed buyers who may not able to find out the best match. Since the
expected social gain from information provision B is higher than the overall
social cost c + k (buyers’ cost of using the intermediary plus intermediary’s
cost of providing the service), intermediation is favorable from the perspective
of total welfare.
From the buyers’ perspective, the effect of intermediation is more com-
plicated. From Proposition 3.3, since the intermediary always imposes price
coherence, intermediation increases consumer surplus by the amount of
ΔCSP = CSP − CSNM = φ
α




CSP = BI − c− φ− (1− α)pˉS − (1− α)B.
Here the superscript P denotes the case with price coherence. Thus, the in-
troduction of the intermediary turns out to be beneficial for consumers. There
are several different effects. The tradeoff between information provision and
joining costs still exist. These two effects cancel out in the sense that the inter-
mediary is just able to charge a price to buyers so that it extracts the buyers
net gain from acquiring the information. On top of this, price coherence leads
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to inflated sellers’ side fees which are passed through to buyers. On the other
hand, as a result of uninformed buyers joining M , the imperfect competition
between sellers becomes more intensified which leads to lower prices charged
by sellers. Though these two effects go in the opposite direction, the second
effect turns out to always dominate. The reason is that the maximum seller
side fee charged by the intermediary is always constrained to a level which
still makes it attractive for a seller not to give up the buyers who join the
intermediary. As a result, the final price faced by all buyers goes down as
a result of intermediation, even with price coherence. Therefore, buyers are
better off due to the existence of the intermediary. Indeed each buyer (either
informed or uninformed) enjoys a price decrease due to intermediation which
equals φ
α
− φ− (1− α)pˉS.
The result on consumer surplus differs from Edelman and Wright (2014).
The key difference is that in their model, the intensity of seller competition
does not change as a result of intermediation. Without such effects, consumers
are strictly worse-off after intermediation (with price coherence), due to the
effect of inflated prices.
3.3.5 No buyer fees
In this section, we consider the case where the intermediary is not able to
charge buyers any fees. Without price coherence, the fee on the buyers’ side
101
fee is not important since the intermediary is able to charge a fee to seller
directly, which can be passed back to buyers. M earns the same profit of
(1 − α)(B − s − k) as the case where buyer fees are allowed. However, with
price coherence, uninformed buyers always want to join the intermediary given
that the expected gain of matching information is larger than the cost of
joining. With all uninformed buyers joining M , the optimal seller fee remains
unchanged. Therefore, M ’s profit becomes (1 − α)(pˉS − k), which is strictly
lower than the profit earned in the case where buyer fees are allowed. Moreover,
M now prefers to impose price coherence if and only if pˉS > B − s.
Corollary 3.2. Suppose M is not able to charge buyer fees. Proposition 3.1
still holds except that M is not charging pB (or pB = 0) and pS is replaced by
B−s. Proposition 3.2 still holds except that M is not charging pB (or pB = 0).
Proposition 3.3 also holds if pˉS > B − s; otherwise, M never wants to impose
price coherence and the rest of Proposition 3.3 holds. Moreover, M is strictly
worse-off when buyer fees are not allowed.
Though buyer fees are not relevant without price coherence, buyer fees
increase the intermediary’s total profit without affecting the joining decisions
of sellers and buyers. Since price coherence is favorable, the intermediary




In the basic model, we assume that all buyers are homogenous in terms of their
joining cost s. Thus intermediation will have a symmetric effect on the same
type of buyers since the intermediary is always able to attract all uninformed
buyers due to its cost efficiency. In general, buyers may have different costs of
using the intermediary’s technology or service. For example, some people may
find it less costly to seek for the advice from professional brokers while others
may not be fully aware of these brokers and need to incur a high cost to use
the service. The heterogeneity among buyers (especially uninformed buyers
who need the intermediary to obtain matching information) creates additional
complexity for the intermediary to determine the optimal fees, as now it needs
to balance the trade-off between a higher profit margin and lower demand. In
this section, we extend the basic model to allow for buyers’ heterogeneity in
terms of their costs of joining the intermediary.
Suppose buyers have different joining costs and the cost s follows a dis-
tribution of G(s) with a support of [0, sˉ]. We assume G(s) is continuously
differentiable and log-concave. And we also assume sˉ > B so that not all
buyers will join the intermediary. Indeed, some high cost uninformed buyers
will never want to join the intermediary even if M imposes price coherence
and even if it charges zero fees for buyers. Therefore, the fees chosen by M
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will not only affect buyers’ decision of joining the intermediary but also affect
the number of buyers who decide to join. To ensure that the intermediary is
able to operate by attracting some buyers, we assume that B > k. Otherwise,
it is never efficient for the intermediary to operate. To focus on the more in-
teresting case where M essentially wants to target the uninformed buyers who
need information, we further assume that the cost k is not too small.6 Other
things remain the same as in the basic model. Following the basic model, we
also want to study the intermediary’s incentive of imposing price coherence
and the impact of price coherence on welfare.
3.4.1 Without price coherence
With heterogenous buyers, the intermediary is always able to attract some low
cost uninformed buyers due to its cost efficiency, though it is no longer able to
attract all uninformed buyers. There exists a tradeoff between a higher profit
margin and lower demand, as faced by a normal monopolist. We show that in
equilibrium M always wants to attract a fraction of uninformed buyers. The
following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 3.4. Suppose M is not able to impose price coherence. There ex-




6A sufficient condition is k > 1−αα φ.
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All uninformed buyers with s ≤ sNP join M , while all other buyers don’t join.7
Both sellers join M and charge the price c + φ + pNPS for buyers who purchase
through M and the price c+α+(1−α)(1−G(s
NP ))
α
φ for buyers who purchase directly.
The intermediary recommends each buyer to buy from the seller that is best
for the buyer from among the sellers that joins M . Buyers that join M always
follow its advice.
Since sellers can always pass through the fee pS to buyers who join M , the
fees on the seller and buyer sides are interchangeable. M can simply charge
sellers directly. This result is similar to the result in the basic model. M al-
ways finds it profitable to attract a fraction of uninformed buyers to join and
it optimally charges the fees so as to make the buyer with the highest joining
cost (sNP ) indifferent between purchasing directly or purchasing through the
intermediary. The optimal fee charged by M will be higher than the expected
information gain of the indifferent uninformed buyer, since sellers charge higher
prices (gross of the seller side fee) for buyers who come through the interme-
diary due to intensified seller competition within the intermediary. Without
7The superscript NP denotes the case without price coherence.
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fully eliminating uninformed buyers, sellers’ prices for direct buyers are higher
than the prices in the benchmark case with homogeneous buyers.
Now consider the impact on consumer surplus and social welfare, if M does
not impose price coherence. Without intermediation, consumer surplus and
social welfare is
CSNM =BI − (1− α)B − φ
α
− c,
WNM =BI − (1− α)B − c.
With M but without price coherence, consumer surplus and social welfare is








WNP =BI − (1− α)(1−G(sNP ))B − c− (1− α)
∫ sNP
0
sg(s)ds− (1− α)G(sNP )k.
Therefore, the change of consumer surplus and social welfare is












Clearly, the change of consumer surplus is always positive since
∫ sNP
0
sg(s)ds < G(sNP )sNP ,
while the impact on social welfare is ambiguous. Therefore, the following
proposition holds:
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Proposition 3.5. Without price coherence, M always increases consumer sur-
plus. M also increases welfare if and only if




The impact on consumer surplus is more complicated than the case with
homogenous buyers. First, (1 − α)G(sNP ) of uninformed buyers who join
the intermediary now enjoys an expected benefit of B, but are paying a higher
price, with the price increased by B− (1−α)G(sNP )
α
φ−sNP . They are on average
paying a fixed cost of joining the intermediary of (1−α) ∫ sNP
0
sg(s)ds. Thus the




(1−α)G(sNP )−(1−α) ∫ sNP
0
sg(s)ds, which is positive. Indeed, all uninformed
buyers who join M are better-off. To see why, consider the uninformed buyer
with a cost sNP who is indifferent between joining M and not joining. The
indifferent buyer enjoys an expected benefit of B and pays a total fee of c +
B − α+(1−α)(1−G(sNP ))
α
φ − sNP together with a fixed cost sNP of joining M .
Without M , this buyer is paying a fee of c + φ
α
to the seller from whom it




which is clearly positive. All other uninformed buyers who also join M clearly
earn a higher net surplus than the indifferent buyer.
On the other hand, all α + (1 − α)G(sNP ) buyers who don’t join M also
gain from the effect of intensified sellers’ competition, which leads to a lower
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which is exactly the same as the surplus earned by the uninformed buyers who
is indifferent between joining M and not joining. Therefore, intermediation
without price coherence benefits all buyers regardless of whether they are using
the intermediary’s service: buyers who purchase directly benefit due to the
effect of intensified sellers’ competition, while buyers who purchase through the
intermediary benefit because the expected gain from information acquisition
outweighs the cost of joining.
The welfare effect is ambiguous as the intermediary might attract too many
or too few buyers. The following corollary considers a special case with the
uniform distribution of G:














. In this case, M increases welfare if and only if B− k− sNP
2
> 0 or





Intermediation also improves social welfare if the expected gain of buyers
is sufficiently large as compared to the cost of providing matching information.
In this case, intermediation improves welfare as the social benefits outweigh
the social costs.
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3.4.2 With price coherence
Now suppose the intermediary is able to impose price coherence. The following
proposition summarizes the result:
Proposition 3.6. Suppose M imposes price coherence. There exists an equi-
librium in which M charges the optimal fee p∗B and p
∗
S to maximize the profit








uninformed buyers with s ≤ sP join M , while all other buyers don’t join,
where sP = B − p∗B. Both sellers join M and charge the equilibrium price
c +
φ+(1−α)G(B−p∗B)p∗S
α+(1−α)G(B−p∗B) . The intermediary recommends each buyer to buy from
the seller that is best for the buyer from among the sellers that joins M . Buyers
that join M always follow its advice.
With price coherence, buyers will pay the same price to sellers regardless of
whether they purchase directly or through the intermediary. Thus buyers will
not observe any signal if intermediary charges a higher fee on the sellers’ side.
This fee will be partially passed through to buyers eventually, which leads to a
higher price faced by buyers as compared to the case without price coherence.
3.4.3 The impact of intermediation and price coherence
Although we can not exactly pin down M ’s optimal fees when it imposes price
coherence, we are able to determine whether there is any incentive for M to
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impose price coherence. Similar to the benchmark case, M always wants to
impose price coherence, whenever it is allowed to. Moreover, intermediation
always improves consumer surplus, even though M imposes price coherence.
Proposition 3.7. M always wants to impose price coherence. Intermedia-
tion (even with price coherence) always improves consumer surplus and it also
improves proves social welfare if and only if




If G(s) = 1
sˉ
s, M improves welfare if and only if B − k − sP
2
> 0.
Price coherence does not reveal intermediary’s fee on the sellers’ side to
buyers who decide to use the intermediary’s service. By keeping the buyer
side fee the same, the intermediary is able to raise the seller side fee and in the
meantime attracting more buyers. Therefore, M earns a higher profit due to
a higher profit margin and larger demand. Intermediation also favors buyers,
even though the intermediary is imposing price coherence.
Intermediation with price coherence always contributes positively to con-
sumer surplus, as the expected gain from information acquisition and intensi-
fied sellers’ competition dominates the potential loss from inflated prices. The
welfare impact is ambiguous and it depends on the intermediary’s incentive of
how many buyers to attract.
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3.4.4 A numerical example
Now we use a specific numerical example to see the impact of intermedia-
tion and price coherence. Consider the case where F (²) follows the uniform
distribution U [a, a + 1] or F (²) = ² − a, and G(s) also follows the uniform
distribution U [0, 1] or G(s) = s where s ∈ [0, 1]. Let k = 0.13, α = 0.8 and
c = 0. Given F (²), φ = 0.5 and B = 0.167. Clearly, 1−α
α
φ < k < φ. Now
we can determine the equilibrium outcome with price coherence and without
price coherence.
First, if M does not impose price coherence, the equilibrium is characterized
in Proposition 3.4. Thus M is charging pB = 0 and pS is determined by
pS =





The joint fee charged by M for both sellers and buyers is simply PNP =
pB + pS = 0.211. The indifferent buyer who joins M has a cost of
sNP =







M ’s profit without price coherence is ΠNPm = 1.166× 10−3.
Second, if M imposes price coherence, we need to determine the optimal
fee p∗B and p
∗
S. Table 3.2 summarizes how the choice of pB affects the optimal
fee pS and thus M ’s profit. From Table 3.2, we will see clearly that the optimal
fee pS is extremely insensitive to the change of pB. When M considers the
111
tradeoff between a higher profit margin and lower demand, M will care more
about the change in demand.
Table 3.2: The threshold of equilibrium price and two estimated bounds
pB 0.167 0.147 0.127 0.107 0.087 0.067 0.047 0.027 0
G(B − pB) 0 0.2 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.167
pˉS 0.625 0.624 0.623 0.622 0.621 0.620 0.619 0.618 0.617
Πm 0 0.00254 0.00496 0.00713 0.00925 0.0111 0.0129 0.0144 0.0163
Figure 3.1 further illustrates the relationship between M ’s profit and the
fee on the buyers’ side. Since M ’s profit is strictly decreasing in pB, it is
optimal for M to set zero fee on the buyers’ side (pB = 0) so as to attract
the maximum number of buyers to join. The optimal fees are p∗B = 0 and
p∗S = 0.617. And the joint fee is P
P = 0.617. M ’s profit with price coherence
is ΠPm = 0.0163. The indifferent buyer who joins the intermediary has a cost
of sP = 0.167.
Comparing both cases, we have P P > P NP , sP > sNP and ΠPm > Π
NP
m .
With price coherence, the intermediary charges a higher total fee on both sides,
attracts more buyers to join and earns a higher profit than the case without
price coherence.
Consider the impact on consumer surplus and welfare, the result of which
is summarized in Table 3.3. Without price coherence, a buyer who joins M is






Figure 3.1: The relationship between M ’s profit and pB
0.616. With price coherence, all buyers are paying 0.6247 to sellers. Without
intermediation, all buyers are paying 0.625 to sellers. Thus all buyers are better
off with price coherence. Without price coherence, all direct buyers are clearly
better off. All buyers who join M are also better off since the gain from match
benefit 0.167 is always higher than the inflated price 0.086 plus the cost of
joining M , which is no larger than 0.072. Thus intermediation always improves
consumer surplus, regardless of whether price coherence is imposed or not.
However, price coherence tends to lower consumer surplus. On welfare point
of view, intermediation improves welfare if price coherence is not imposed,
while price coherence tends to lower social welfare. Therefore, eliminating
price coherence but not the intermediary will improve both consumer surplus
and social welfare.
Lastly, the allocation through intermediation is never optimal. Socially
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Table 3.3: Impact of intermediation and price coherence
pB pS Πm ΔCS ΔW
No Price Coherence 0 0.211 1.166× 10−3 9.5× 10−3 1.44× 10−5
With Price Coherence 0 0.617 0.0163 3.0× 10−3 −1.55× 10−3
optimal welfare is
W S = max
sˆ
((
α + (1− α)G(sˆ))BI + (1− α)(1−G(sˆ))BU − (1− α)G(sˆ)k













which is maximized when sˆ = B−k. Clearly, it is socially optimal for all buyers
with a cost lower than B − k to join M . In this case, the socially desirable
outcome is achieved by choosing sS = B − k = 0.037. The intermediary
ends up attracting too many buyers, regardless of whether it imposes price
coherence or not.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper studies a monopoly intermediary’ incentive to impose price restric-
tions on sellers, when it is able to provide matching information for buyers.
We show that the intermediary always wants to impose price coherence on
sellers, by restricting sellers from charging different prices for buyers who pur-
chase directly or through the intermediary. With price coherence, buyers do
not take into account the intermediary’s fee on the sellers’ side, as they would
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pay the same price even though they are purchasing through the intermediary.
Such price restriction incentivizes buyers to use the intermediary for acquiring
matching information and allows the intermediary to charge higher fees, and
it eventually raises final prices and lowers consumer surplus.
In general, intermediation has several effects on consumer surplus and wel-
fare. Firstly, by providing price and matching information for uninformed
buyers, the intermediary is creating social benefits or positive values which im-
prove consumer surplus and social welfare. Secondly, by reducing the number
of uninformed buyers (even though not fully eliminating them), intermediation
intensifies sellers’ competition and thereby lowers sellers’ prices to all buyers.
Such an intensified competition effect favors consumers as well. The expected
gain by buyers from these two effects dominates the potential loss from the
effect of inflated fees. Therefore intermediation (even with price coherence)
eventually improves consumer surplus.
There are several possible extensions following this paper. In the current
setting, the uninformed buyers are assumed to have no information about
sellers’ prices and their match values, and thus will make a purchase randomly.
This captures the idea of each seller as a focal monopolist for some uninformed
buyers. It would be straightforward to extend the current setting to allow
buyers to have some information about sellers’ products (probably the price
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and some of the product characteristics), but not all. And they will still use
the intermediary to find the optimal or best match. This idea clearly requires
a model with multiple dimensions on the characteristics of sellers’ products.
Another possible extension is to allow for competition between intermedi-
aries. A surprising result shown by Edelman and Wright (2014) is that com-
petition between intermediaries does not benefit consumers but makes them
even worse. Without sellers’ investment incentive, consumers are more likely
to gain from the competition between intermediaries who act as information
gatekeepers by revealing products’ information to buyers. It would be inter-
esting to see whether such effects exist and to what extent they contribute to
consumer surplus and social welfare.
Lastly, it would also be natural to consider a dynamic setting where inter-
mediaries strategically decide when and how to impose price coherence. With
a similar effect as vertical restraints (for example resale price maintenance
or RPM), price coherence is often employed by an intermediary that enjoys a
strong market power. One might ask whether market dominance leads to price
coherence and whether price coherence enables a dominant platform to main-
tain its dominant position or makes such market dominance even stronger.




exclusive dealing with loyalty
discounts
4.1 Introduction
Exclusive dealing involves a contract between an upstream firm and a buyer,
which requires one of the parties to deal with the other exclusively. An-
titrust authorities are often concerned about exclusive dealing due to its anti-
competitive effects. The existing literature argues that exclusive deals can be
used by a dominant firm with its buyers so as to foreclose its rivals from entry.
If the foreclosed rival is a more efficient firm, naked exclusion arises when there
are no efficiency gains associated with exclusive dealing.
Most studies in exclusive dealing literature focus on the exclusive contracts
with lump-sum payments which allow an upstream firm to offer a fixed com-
pensation to a buyer who accepts an exclusive agreement. Although many
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exclusive dealing cases involve lump-sum payments between parties, simple
loyalty discounts are often observed where a firm offers a rebate over the nor-
mal price to a buyer if it commits to purchase exclusively. A well known
antitrust case in exclusive dealing, Intel vs. AMD, involves exclusive deals
with loyalty discounts. As the two largest companies in microprocessor mar-
ket, Intel and AMD compete intensively by selling CPUs to to their original
equipment manufacturers(OEMs), such as Dell, HP and IBM. As the dom-
inant firm, Intel was accused of using its dominance advantage by engaging
in exclusive dealing and loyalty discount programs with its OEMs in order to
exclude its rival AMD, so that it is able to monopolize the market. Besides
the normal lump-sum payments to OEMs, Intel also offers loyalty discounts to
some OEMs who will enjoy a discount to the normal price over the units they
purchase from Intel.1 Although Intel uses both types of exclusive contracts, a
significant portion of the rebates that Intel offers Dell is lump-sum. It seems
that Intel prefers lump-sum payments to loyalty discounts in order to sign up
OEMs. However, it remains unclear what is the incentive for firms to offer
loyalty discounts and how such exclusive agreements differ from the normal
form with lump-sum payments.
1There are some other recent antitrust cases involving loyalty discounts, which include
Concord Boat Corp.v.Brunswick Corp, 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000), Le Page’s Inc.v.3M,
324 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2003), and Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883
(9th Cir. 2008).
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This paper considers a simple model in which two asymmetric manufac-
turers offer exclusive contracts with loyalty discounts to downstream buyers.
When buyers are independent retailers, exclusive deals with loyalty discounts
can lead to the dominant manufacturer foreclosing the rival. The dominant
manufacturer is able to commit through a large discount offer by only sell-
ing through the signed retailer even when competing with the rival. Due to
coordination failure between retailers, a retailer always wants to accept the
exclusive offer from the dominant manufacturer if it thinks the rival retailer
also accepts the same offer. Although competition outcome might also occur
where both retailers reject any offers, the coordination failure between retailers
leads to foreclosure. Since loyalty discounts do not involve actual payments
from the manufacturer to the retailers, the dominant manufacturer who signs
up both retailers is able to further raise the wholesale price so as to foreclose
the rival at no cost. In contrast, exclusive dealing with lump-sum payments
has a neutral effect on the competition outcome.
When there is almost perfect competition between retailers, exclusive deal-
ing with loyalty discounts leads to a unique outcome where the dominant
manufacturer forecloses the rival at no cost. Although exclusive contracts
with lump-sum payment leads to the same foreclosure outcome, the dominant
earns a strictly lower profit. The exclusion mechanism of loyalty discounts is
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robust to general degrees of downstream competition and multiple downstream
competitors.
This paper is closely related to the naked exclusion literature where a
dominant firm uses exclusive deals in terms of lump-sum payments to anti-
competitively exclude a more efficient rival from entry. Earlier studies focus on
exclusive dealing between firms and final consumers (Rasmusen, Ramseyer and
Wiley, 1991, Segal and Whinston, 2000). More recent papers study a different
setting where exclusive contracts are offered by manufacturers to downstream
competing firms (Fumagalli and Motta, 2006, Simpson and Wickelgren, 2007,
Abito and Wright, 2008, Wright, 2008, 2009). The application of these papers
is limited as they all rely on the assumption that only the incumbent firm is
able to offer exclusive deals while the rival firm is not present in the market.
These models cannot explain many real world antitrust cases where competing
firms are all present in the market and make similar exclusive deals. To the
best of my knowledge, DeGraba (2013) is the only recent paper that models
competition between firms who offer exclusive deals, when there is no first-
mover advantage of both firms. In addition, the first chapter of this thesis
also considers a model where two manufacturers offer exclusive deals in terms
of lump-sum payments in a somewhat different setting. However, all these
papers only study exclusive contracts with lump-sum payments instead of
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loyalty discounts. This paper tries to fill the gap in the literature by analyzing
the effect of exclusive dealing with loyalty discounts in a setting where no firm
has the first-mover advantage.
Exclusive deals with loyalty discounts in this paper are related to the liter-
ature on market share contracts (Calzolari and Denicolo, 2011, 2013, Inderst
and Shaffer, 2010). Inderst and Shaffer (2010) further argue that market share
contracts can be used by a dominant firm to dampen both intra- and inter-
brand competition so as to lead to an inefficient monopoly. However, market
share contracts differ from exclusive deals since the later involve buyers’ com-
mitment of not purchasing from the rival firm. Moreover, since they do not
allow for the strategic interactions between upstream suppliers, firms’ incentive
of offering market share contracts cannot be studied in their paper.
This paper is mostly related to Elhauge and Wickelgren (2012) who also
study the exclusion mechanism of loyalty discounts with buyers’ commitment.
They find that if loyalty discounts require buyers’ commitment, the incumbent
can use loyalty discounts to anti-competitively exclude a more efficient rival
from entry. Together with the existing literature, both exclusive deals with
lump-sum payments and loyalty discounts can result in exclusion or foreclo-
sure, when buyers are final consumers. It remains an open question whether
loyalty discounts have similar anti-competitive effects when there is no first-
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mover advantage of firms and when buyers are downstream competing retailers
instead of final consumers. This paper aims to address this question.
The rest of paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 sets up the baseline
model. Section 4.3 analyzes the benchmark case where downstream buyers are
independent retailers. Section 4.4 considers competition between downstream
retailers when competition is almost perfect. Section 4.5 extends the model to
allow for general degrees of downstream competition and multiple competing
retailers. Section 6 briefly concludes the paper.
4.2 The Model
In the model, there are two upstream firms (or manufacturers), denoted by
M1 and M2, which are present in the market. The two manufacturers sell
a homogeneous product through two retailers, denoted by R1 and R2. Two
manufacturers are asymmetric in their marginal cost ci(i = 1, 2) and c1 < c2,
where M1 is the dominant manufacturer with a cost advantage. The two
retailers buy products from one of the manufacturers and then sell them to
the final consumers. The two retailers are symmetric and engage in Bertrand
competition. In the benchmark case, we consider the case where both retailers
are independent firms or local monopolists. In the rest of the paper, we allow
imperfect competition between them.
122
The manufacturers can use exclusive contracts with retailers in exchange
for their commitments of not purchasing from the rival. Unlike the existing
literature, we consider exclusive contracts with loyalty discounts, which allow
a retailer who signs a contract exclusively to receive a rebate over the normal
wholesale price that is charged to those retailers who have not accepted the
offer. In some parts of the paper, we also allow the exclusive contracts to be
lump-sum so that we can compare the difference between these two types of
exclusive contracts.
We consider a four-stage game. In the first stage, both manufacturers
simultaneously make exclusive offers in terms of loyalty discounts to both
retailers, where di is the discount offer made by Mi. The offer will be the same
for both retailers.
In the second stage, after observing both exclusive offers, retailers decide
which offer (if any) to accept. Since the offer involves retailers’ commitment
of purchasing exclusively from the signed manufacturer, each retailer can at
most accept one offer.
In the third stage, given retailers’ acceptance decisions, the two manu-
facturers simultaneously decide which wholesale price to set. Let wi be the
wholesale price set by Mi. By the property of loyalty discounts, a retailer
without accepting the loyalty discount offer will receive a wholesale price wi if
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it purchases from Mi. For the retailer who has accepted the offer from Mi, it
will enjoy a loyalty discount of di over the normal price and thus will receive
a net wholesale price of wi − di.
In the fourth stage, observing the wholesale prices set by both manufac-
turers, retailers simultaneously decide which manufacturer to purchase from.
If one retailer has accepted an exclusive offer from one manufacturer, it is not
able to purchase from the rival manufacturer at this stage. Retailers also make
their pricing decisions at this stage. The market clears and the payoffs for all
parties are realized.
4.3 The Benchmark: Independent Retailers
We first consider the benchmark case where downstream buyers are indepen-
dent retailers (or local monopolists). Since retailers’ demand is independent,
there is no strategic competition between the two retailers when they are
making pricing decisions. This allows us to focus on the pure effect of loyalty
discounts on retailers’ decision to sign exclusive deals in the first place.
Suppose each retailer is faced with a downward sloping demand function
D(p), which satisfies the regular conditions, D′(p) < 0, D′′(p) ≤ 0. Consider
a vertical channel where the manufacturer Mi offers a wholesale price w to
a retailer who chooses an optimal price to maximize its profit. Given the
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wholesale price w, the retail price charged by the retailer is denoted by p(w),
where p(w) solves retailer’s optimization problem
(p− w)D′(p) + D(p) = 0.
Given the assumptions on the demand function, p(w) is clearly increasing
in w. We also denote the retailer’s profit by π(w) = [p(w)−w]D(p(w)), which
is decreasing in its cost w by the Envelop Theorem. Also denote Mi’s profit by
Πi(w) = (w − ci)D(p(w)) and the channel profit by Π˜i(w) = π(w) + Πi(w) =
(p(w)− ci)D(p(w)). Clearly the channel profit is maximized when w = ci and
p(w) = pmi , where p
m
i is the monopoly price determined by
(pmi − ci)D′(pmi ) + D(pmi ) = 0,
and pm2 > p
m
1 , following c2 > c1. We denote the optimal wholesale price that
maximizes Mi’s profit Πi(w) by w
m
i , which is clearly uniquely defined and




1 . Moreover, we assume that




1 > c2 > c1.
Based on the above setup, we are able to analyze the possible effect of
loyalty discounts on retailers’ decision to sign exclusive deals and thus on the
2Otherwise the dominant manufacturer will always charge a monopoly wholesale price,
since the existence of the high cost rival will not put any price pressure on the dominant
manufacturer’ pricing decisions.
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equilibrium outcomes. We are particularly interested in how exclusive deal-
ing with loyalty discounts leads to exclusion or foreclosure and thus mainly
focus on two types of pure strategy equilibria: foreclosure equilibria where
one of the manufacturers signs up both retailers exclusively and monopolizes
the market, and the competition equilibrium where neither manufacturer
signs up any retailer so that competitive outcome occurs. Since the com-
petition equilibrium involves both retailers remaining free, it is the same as
the case where no manufacturers are offering exclusive deals so that Bertrand
competition occurs in the upstream level.
The following lemma argues that it is never possible for the high cost
manufacturer to use loyalty discounts to exclude a more efficient rival.3
Lemma 4.1. When downstream buyers are independent retailers and man-
ufacturers make exclusive offers in terms of loyalty discounts, a foreclosure
equilibrium where the high cost manufacturer signs up both retailers never ex-
ists.
When exclusive dealing involves loyalty discounts, the high cost manufac-
turer is never able to sign up both retailers exclusively since each retailer would
always reject the exclusive offer from the high cost manufacturer so that it is
free to buy from the dominant manufacturer at a lower cost. Without receiv-
3All proofs are relegated to Appendix D.
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ing any real payments, neither retailer wants to sign with the less efficient
manufacturer at a higher cost.
Due to the cost efficiency, the dominant manufacturer, on the contrary, is
able to use loyalty discounts to sign up both retailers. The following proposi-
tion characterizes the possible equilibria:
Proposition 4.1. When downstream buyers are independent retailers and
manufacturers make exclusive offers in terms of loyalty discounts, there exist
1) a foreclosure equilibrium where the dominant manufacturer signs up both
retailers, and 2) the competition equilibrium where neither retailer accepts any
offer.
The dominant manufacturer who enjoys the cost advantage is always able
to sign up both retailers through exclusive deals with loyalty discounts. By
offering a sufficiently high amount offer with loyalty discounts, the manufac-
turer commits not to make sales to the free retailer if head-to-head competition
occurs in the upstream level. When a retailer accepts the offer from the domi-
nant manufacturer, the rival would become the single seller of the less efficient
manufacturer unless it signs with the dominant manufacturer as well. Without
signing up, the retailer has no choice but to purchase from the high cost man-
ufacturer at a high cost, which is unprofitable. Therefore, both retailers will
accept the discount offer in the first place and purchase exclusively from the
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dominant manufacturer. Since loyalty discounts do not require fixed payments
to buyers who sign up, with both retailers accepting the offer, the dominant
manufacturer is able to further raise the wholesale price and monopolize at
no cost. On the other hand, if either retailer thinks the rival will reject the
offer from the dominant manufacturer, neither will accept since both are able
to buy at a competitive price. Therefore, multiple equilibria arise due to the
coordination failure between retailers who would jointly earn a higher profit
in the competition equilibrium. This result is consistent with the existing
literature on naked exclusion where either exclusion equilibrium or entry equi-
librium arise, due to the coordination failure among buyers. Exclusive dealing
with loyalty discounts has anti-competitive effects since it dampens upstream
competition and further raises the final prices faced by consumers above the
competitive level.
According to the existing literature, exclusive dealing with lump-sum pay-
ments may be anti-competitive as it can be used by an incumbent firm to deter
a more efficient rival from entry. The first chapter also shows that even with-
out the first-mover advantage, exclusive dealing also leads to foreclosure when
upstream competition is imperfect and downstream competition is perfect. In
the current setting, it would also be interesting to restudy exclusive dealing
with lump-sum payments and how it differs from loyalty discounts.
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Following the existing literature, if the manufacturers make exclusive offers
in terms of lump-sum payments, Mi will pay a fixed amount of compensation
xi to buyers who want to sign exclusively. Unlike loyalty discounts which
involve a signed buyer enjoying a price discount, lump-sum payments with
real payments to buyers do not directly affect manufacturers’ pricing decisions
in the later stage. Following the same timing assumption, we also allow the
manufacturers to offer linear wholesale prices to retailers and the pricing offers
are publicly announced.4
Now we consider retailers’ decisions when the manufacturers make lump-
sum payment offers. Since retailers have independent demand, their decision
to sign with a manufacturer will also be independent. A retailer will earn a
profit of π(wmi ) + xi, if it signs with Mi exclusively; it will earn π(c2), if it
remains free. Therefore, a retailer’s incentive compatibility constraints are:
1. It will sign up with Mi exclusively if π(w
m
i ) + xi ≥ max{π(wmj ) +
xj, π(c2)};
2. It will remain free if π(c2) ≥ max{π(wmi ) + xi, π(wmj ) + xj}.
Following the above constraints, the equilibrium results under lump-sum
payment offers can be obtained as follows:
4This is consistent with the case of loyalty discounts.
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Proposition 4.2. When downstream buyers are independent retailers and
manufacturers make exclusive offers in terms of lump-sum payments, there
exists a unique competition equilibrium where no manufacturers offer exclu-
sive deals.
When downstream buyers are independent retailers, there is no incentive
for either manufacturer to offer exclusive deals with lump-sum payments to
sign up any retailers. The intuition is quite straightforward: since a retailer
is always able to purchase from the dominant manufacturer at a competitive
price when it remains as a free buyer, it will sign an exclusive contract only
if the exclusive offer is sufficiently attractive. However, neither manufacturer
is able to or is willing to make such a high amount of offer. First, the high
cost manufacturer is never profitable to induce either retailer to sign since the
profit earned by the manufacturer when it signs up a buyer exclusively is not
enough to compensate the lowest offer needed to sign up a retailer. Second,
the dominant manufacturer has no incentive to use exclusive deals. When the
cost advantage is not that strong, the dominant manufacturer faces the same
problem as the rival, and it is never able to sign up any retailers. When the
cost advantage is strong enough, the dominant manufacturer is able to sign
up both retailers, by offering a sufficiently high compensation. However, it
is not profitable for the manufacturer to do so, since the net profit left will
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be strictly lower than the profit it can extract without using exclusive deals.
Thus, regardless of the cost advantage, it is never optimal for the dominant
manufacturer to use exclusive deals. Given no manufacturers ever use exclusive
deals, the effect of exclusive dealing is neutral. This result is significantly
different from the existing literature on naked exclusion, which argues that
the dominant firm can use exclusive deals to anti-competitively foreclose a
more efficient entrant, therefore lowering the total welfare. It suggests that the
first-mover advantage of a firm plays an important role in leading to exclusion.
If we compare the two types of exclusive contracts on welfare, the following
corollary holds:
Corollary 4.1. Comparing loyalty discounts with lump-sum payments, ex-
clusive dealing with lump-sum payments has a neutral effect on welfare while
exclusive dealing with loyalty discounts can be anti-competitive.
Unlike lump-sum payments, exclusive dealing with loyalty discounts can be
anti-competitive as they will be used by the dominant manufacturer to lock in
all retailers so as to charge a monopoly wholesale price to all signed retailers.
The high cost faced by retailers will eventually raise final prices charged to
consumers, and therefore lower consumer surplus and social welfare. While
most of the antitrust authorities concern about the anti-competitive effect of
exclusive dealing, loyalty discounts might raise more attention as they are more
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likely to result in monopoly.
4.4 Almost Perfect Competition
When downstream buyers are independent retailers, loyalty discounts might
lead to inefficient monopolization due to buyers’ coordination failure. However,
such inefficient outcome would be eliminated if buyers are able to communi-
cate, since buyers would be jointly better-off in the competition equilibrium
which payoff-dominates the foreclosure equilibrium. The multiple equilibria
result crucially depends on the assumption of retailers’ independence so that
there are no strategic interactions between retailers when they are deciding
which exclusive contract to sign.
In this section, we allow for imperfect competition between retailers. We
consider a situation where retailers are engaged in intensive or almost perfect
competition (but not perfect). We take “almost perfect competition” to mean
that symmetric retailers are left with almost no profit if they compete head-to-
head. Specifically, if two retailers with the same marginal cost are competing,
they will charge the same price sufficiently close to (but still above) their
marginal cost and share the market equally. They both earn an arbitrarily
small amount of profit (but positive). If two retailers with asymmetric costs
are competing, the high cost firm will price down to its marginal cost while
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the low cost firm will charge a price sufficiently close to (but below) the rival’
cost so that it captures the whole market. In this case, the high cost firm
earns nothing while the low cost firm earns a positive amount. Therefore, the
market demand at downstream level can be denoted by D(p), where p is the
effective price of the market (the price charged by the low cost retailer).5 If
both retailers are symmetric, p is simply the common price charged by both
firms.
Now we want to show that under almost perfect competition, the competi-
tion equilibrium in which both retailers reject exclusive offers no longer exists.
A unique outcome involves the dominant manufacturer signing up both retail-
ers and monopolizing the market.
Proposition 4.3. When downstream competition is almost perfect and both
manufacturers make exclusive offers in terms of loyalty discounts, there exists
a unique foreclosure equilibrium where the dominant manufacturer signs up
both retailers.
When downstream competition is almost perfect, symmetric retailers will
share the market equally and earn almost no profits when they compete head-
to-head. When two asymmetric retailers are competing, the retailer with a
lower cost is able to capture the whole market and earn a higher profit. There-
5We also assume that D(p) satisfies the regular conditions, where D′(p) < 0 and D′′(p) ≤
0.
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fore, the dominant manufacturer who enjoys the cost efficiency is always able
to attract one retailer through its discount offer. Knowing that the rival will
always sign, it is optimal for both retailers to sign with the dominant manu-
facturer. Similar to the case with independent retailers, since exclusive deals
with loyalty discounts require no fixed payments to buyers, exclusion by the
dominant manufacturer involves no cost.
We can also show that a similar result holds when manufacturers compete
in lump-sum payments.
Proposition 4.4. When downstream competition is almost perfect and both
manufacturers offer exclusive deals in terms of lump-sum payments, there ex-
ists a unique foreclosure equilibrium where the dominant manufacturer signs
up both retailers.
Similar to loyalty discount offers, exclusive deals with lump-sum payments
also result in a unique foreclosure equilibrium. However, in order to mo-
nopolize, the dominant manufacturer need to offer sufficiently high lump-sum
payments so that the foreclosed rival is not able to attract both retailers. In
equilibrium, the dominant manufacturer earns a profit sufficiently close to the
difference in the monopoly profit of the two manufacturers, reflecting its de-
mand advantage. Since the dominant manufacturer is able to earn almost the
monopoly profit in the case with loyalty discounts, the dominant manufacturer
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earns a strictly lower profit when both manufacturers compete in lump-sum
payments.
Since exclusive deals with loyalty discounts involve no cost, the dominant
earn a higher profit than the case if exclusive dealing is banned. On the
contrary, exclusive deals with lump-sum payments would make the dominant
manufacturer worse-off instead. The result is formally summarized in the
following corollary:
Corollary 4.2. The dominant manufacturer earns a higher profit with loyalty
discounts than with lump-sum payments. Moreover, as compared to the case
without exclusive dealing, the dominant manufacturer’s profit is higher with
loyalty discounts and lower with lump-sum payments.
Whenever exclusive dealing is not banned, foreclosure occurs with the in-
dustry profit sufficiently close to the monopoly profit Πm1 . Exclusive dealing
raises final prices for consumer and therefore lowers consumer surplus and so-
cial welfare. Regardless of the types (loyalty discounts or lump-sum payments),
the effect of exclusive dealing is thus always anti-competitive. It would be so-
cially more desirable if exclusive dealing is banned.
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4.5 Extensions
4.5.1 General degrees of downstream competition
In the previous sections, loyalty discounts will lead to foreclosure. Though a
competitive outcome also arises when buyers are independent downstream re-
tailers, costless exclusion occurs uniquely under imperfect downstream compe-
tition for a general demand function. Intuitively, the anti-competitive effect of
loyalty discounts depends crucially on the degree of downstream competition.
In this section, we consider the case with imperfect downstream competition
by allowing for general degrees of downstream competition. To see the effect
of downstream competition, we use a linear demand function. Consider the
utility function of a representative consumer







Thus the inverse demand function is pi = 1 − qi − γqj. Given the inverse
demand, we can derive the following demand function D(pi, pj ; γ)
D(pi, pj ; γ) =






< pi ≤ 1− γ + γpj ,
0 if pi ≥ 1− γ + γpj .
The demand function is captured by a parameter γ ∈ [0, 1), which measures the
degree of downstream competition. A higher γ suggests stronger downstream
competition or higher substitutability of sellers’ products. Particularly, γ = 0
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implies that the two retailers are independent monopolists while γ → 1 implies
almost perfect competition between retailers. Moreover, we measure the cost
efficiency of M1 by θ ∈ (0, 1), where c2 = θwm1 + (1 − θ)c1 and wm1 is the
monopoly wholesale price charged by M1 if both retailers purchase from M1
exclusively (i.e., wm1 =
1+c1
2
). A higher θ implies a stronger cost efficiency of
M1. Clearly, M1 has no cost efficiency if θ = 0 while M1’s efficiency advantage
is just drastic if θ = 1. We further normalize the cost c1 to zero.
Clearly demand for both firms will only be positive when the two prices are
sufficiently close to each other, otherwise one firm with a higher cost will receive
zero demand. Suppose Ri buys from Mi at a wholesale price wi while Rj buys
from Mj at a wholesale price wj , by solving downstream price competition
problem, we can find the equilibrium prices and quantities
pi =
(1− γ)(2 + γ) + 2wi + γwj
(2− γ)(2 + γ) , and qi =
(1− wi)(2− γ2)− γ(1− wj)
(1 + γ)(1− γ)(2 + γ)(2− γ) .
When wi and wj are sufficiently close so that (2−γ2)wi < (1−γ)(2+γ)+γwj
holds for i = 1, 2, both retailers will earn positive profits, with the profit for
Ri being
πi =
[(1− γ)(2 + γ)− (2− γ2)wi + γwj ]2
(1 + γ)(1− γ)(2 + γ)2(2− γ)2 .
In this case, Mi earns
Πi = (wi − ci)(1− wi)(2− γ
2)− γ(1− wj)
(1 + γ)(1− γ)(2 + γ)(2− γ) .
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When (2 − γ2)wi ≥ (1 − γ)(2 + γ) + γwj , Ri will capture no market shares




. Demand for both retailers is qi = 0 and qj = 1 − pj . Ri earns






earns nothing while Mi earns Πi = (wi − ci) (1−wi)(2−γ
2)−γ(1−wj)
(1+γ)(1−γ)(2+γ)(2−γ) .
Similar to the previous sections, we are particularly interested in two types
of equilibria: the foreclosure equilibrium where one manufacturer signs up
both retailers, and the competition equilibrium where neither retailer accepts
any exclusive offers. First, we can show that the foreclosure equilibrium where
M2 signs up both retailers never exists in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. There never exists a foreclosure equilibrium where M2 signs up
both retailers.
As the less efficient manufacturer, M2 is unable to sign up both retailers
through loyalty discounts as there always exists a retailer who wants to individ-
ually sign with M1 regardless of the offers in order to enjoy a cost advantage.
This result is similar to the cases with independent retailers and almost perfect
competition between retailers. In contrast, the foreclosure equilibrium where
M1 signs up both retailers and the competition equilibrium where neither re-
tailer accepts any exclusive offers exist, the results of which depend on the
degree of downstream competition. The following proposition summarizes the
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results.
Proposition 4.5. There exists a foreclosure equilibrium where the dominant
manufacturer signs up both retailers exclusively if θ ≥ β, and there exists
a competition equilibrium where neither retailer accepts any exclusive offers if
θ ≤ δ, where β = γ(1−γ)(2+γ)(4−2γ2+γ)
[2(2−γ2)2−γ2](2−γ2) and δ =
2(1−γ)2(2+γ)2(4−2γ2+γ)
[(2−γ2)2γ+(1−γ)(2+γ)(4−2γ2+γ)(4−2γ2−γ)] .











Figure 4.1: Downstream competition, cost efficiency and equilibria
The foreclosure equilibrium exists when the dominant manufacturer’s cost
efficiency is strong so that it is able to sign up both retailers. Anticipating
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the rival retailer to sign exclusively with the dominant manufacturer, there is
no reason for a retailer to reject the exclusive offer from the dominant man-
ufacturer, since otherwise it has to purchase from the high cost manufacturer
at a higher price. On the contrary, the competition equilibrium exists when
the cost efficiency of the dominant manufacturer is sufficiently small as com-
pared to the degree of downstream competition. In this case, a retailer earns a
significantly amount of profit being the free retailer, whenever its rival also re-
mains free. The retailer cannot profitably deviate by signing exclusively with
the dominant manufacturer as it has to pay a higher price as comapred to
the competitive price. With strong downstream competition and a high cost
efficiency, there exists no competition equilibrium as the dominant manufac-
turer can at least attract one retailer through loyalty discounts. Therefore,
multiple equilibria exist when the dominant firm’s cost advantage is medium
(β < θ < δ), because of the coordination failure between retailers. With
sufficiently strong cost efficiency (θ > max{β, δ}), the foreclosure equilibrium
where both retailers sign exclusively with the dominant manufacturer arises
uniquely. These results capture the case with independent retailers (where
both types of equilibria arise) and the case with almost perfect competition
(where only the foreclosure equilibrium exists).
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4.5.2 Multiple downstream buyers
We can further extend the basic model to allow for competition among multiple
downstream retailers. To consider a general demand structure, we also focus
on the case where downstream competition is almost perfect. The equilibrium
results are summarized as follows:
Proposition 4.6. When there are multiple retailers and downstream compe-
tition is almost perfect, there exists a unique foreclosure equilibrium where the
dominant manufacturer signs up all retailers.
Similar to the two retailer case, a unique foreclosure equilibrium exists.
With almost perfect downstream competition, each retailer wants to buy from
the low cost manufacturer so as to capture a positive market share. Because of
the cost efficiency, the dominant manufacturer signs up all retailers exclusively
and charges a higher price eventually. Therefore, foreclosure by the dominant
manufacturer involves no cost.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper shows that when two manufacturers with different costs can both
offer exclusive deals in terms of loyalty discounts to downstream retailers, a
foreclosure equilibrium arises where the dominant manufacturer monopolizes
the market. Unlike the lump-sum payment offers, the dominant manufacturer
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no longer needs to pay any upfront fees to signed retailers and thus it forecloses
the rival at no cost. When downstream buyers are independent retailers, only
exclusive contracts with loyalty discounts can lead to foreclosure while lump-
sum payment exclusive offers have a neutral effect.
The equilibrium results with loyalty discounts depend on the dominant
manufacturer’ cost efficiency and downstream competition. When downstream
competition is sufficiently weak, there also exists a competition equilibrium
where no retailer signs any exclusive contracts. Although the coordination
failure among retailers might lead to foreclosure, retailers would strictly prefer
the competitive outcome in which case they jointly earn higher profits. When
downstream competition is strong and the dominant manufacturer’s cost ef-
ficiency is large, foreclosure arises uniquely. Therefore, antitrust authorities
should be more careful with exclusive dealing in situations where large manu-
facturers sell products to downstream markets with intensive competition.
There are several possible extensions for future research. First, it would be
interesting to consider a more general framework to model imperfect compe-
tition among retailers instead of using a linear demand structure. Moreover,
one can also consider another setting with imperfect upstream competition so
that manufacturers’ products are not perfect substitutes. In this new setting,
retailers may find it less attractive to accept a loyalty discount offer since it
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may have a stronger incentive to remain free so as to sell both brands. We can
also generalize the model to allow for imperfect competition in both upstream
and downstream level, though it could be more challenging.
Another possible extension is to study the two types of exclusive contracts
more generally. Although this paper has shown that loyalty discount offers
may have a stronger anti-competitive effect than lump-sum payment offers in
two specific settings, it remains an open question whether antitrust authorities
should always be concerned more about loyalty discounts. Another interesting
question is whether manufacturers would always use exclusive deals with loy-
alty discounts, if they can strategically choose different types of offers. We can
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Appendix A
Proofs of Chapter One
Proof of Lemma 1.1
We analyze the continuation equilibria of the possible sub-games in stage 3.
First, consider the sub-game where there exists only one free retailer. Without
loss of generality, we assume that R2 is the free retailer while R1 has signed
the exclusive contract with M1. The continuation equilibrium is that M1 offers
we1 to both retailers and M2 offers w
e
2 to the free retailer R2. And R1 accepts
M1’s offer and R2 only accept M2’s offer. The two retailers set prices p1 = p
e
1
and p2 = p
e
2 accordingly, where p
e
i is given by maxpi(pi−wei )Di(pi, pj). And wei
is chosen by Mi to maximize its profit, taking into account retailers’ pricing
decision. Such an equilibrium generates the profit πi for Ri and Πi for Mi,
where πi and Πi are defined in the model.
To show this outcome characterizes an equilibrium, we need to verify there
is no incentive for each party to deviate. Given the manufacturers’ offers,
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clearly R1 will not deviate by rejecting M1’s offer and p
e
1 maximizes its profit
by the definition of pe1. R1 is not allowed to buy from M2 as it accepts the
exclusive offer by M1. Consider R2’s incentive to deviate. Clearly, R2 will
not deviate by only accepting M1’s offer, as such deviation will generate zero
profit for R2 due to Bertrand competition. Suppose R2 deviates by accepting
both offers by M1 and M2. Intra-brand competition drives down the price of
good 1 to the marginal cost of the retailers (or the wholesale price charged
by M1), and thus p1 = w
e
1. Thus R2 earns zero profit of selling good 1. The
total profit earned by R2 can be written as π
dev
2 = maxp2(p2 − we2)D2(p2, we1),
which is strictly smaller than the equilibrium profit π2 = (p
e
2−we2)D2(pe2, pe1) =
maxp2(p2 − we2)D2(p2, pe1), given that pe1 > we1. Thus there is no incentive for
R2 to deviate by either accepting M1’s offer or accepting both offers from M1
and M2.
Consider the manufacturers’ decisions in the previous stage. Since M2 is
not able to sell products through R1 which has signed up exclusively with
M1, it is optimal for M2 to offer w
e
2 to R2. Consider M1’s decision. Suppose
M1 deviates by only charging a different price to R1, such deviation is not
profitable given the definition of we1. Suppose M1 deviates by changing the
price to R2 (might also change the price set to R1, which is not observed
by R2). Given R2’s belief which is assumed to be symmetric, whenever R2
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receives a different offer from M1, it believes the rival retailer also receives
the same offer. Based on the analysis above, R2 will never accept the offer
by M1 as it lowers the profit R2 could make if it purchases from M2 only.
Thus M1 is never profitable to deviate to attract R2. Therefore, the proposed
strategies characterize an equilibrium in the sub-game where there exists one
free retailer.
Second, consider the sub-game where both retailers are free. Following the
same logic above, the continuation equilibrium in this sub-game is: Mi offers
wei to both retailers. One retailer (say R1) accepts M1’s offer while the other
retailer (R2) accepts M2’s offer. Ri chooses the price p
e
i accordingly, where p
e
i
maximizes Ri’s profit (as defined above). Based on the arguments above, no
single party can profitably deviate.
Given the analysis above, the continuation equilibrium outcomes in the two
sub-games are exactly the same as the equilibrium in which both retailers sign
exclusively with a different manufacturer. Given the non-negative exclusive
offers and the tie-breaking rules, a free retailer always wants to sign up with a
manufacturer in the second stage. Therefore, in equilibrium there will be no
free retailers in stage three and both retailers will accept an exclusive offer in
stage two.
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Proof of Lemma 1.2
Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which M1 monopolizes. We need to
check the two equilibrium conditions are satisfied when upstream competition
is sufficiently strong. Suppose upstream competition is strong enough so that
1
2
ΠM2 − π1 > Π2 + π2. This is equivalent to ΠM2 > 2(π1 + Π2 + π2). Clearly,
given the assumptions on the profits, the LHS does not depend on upstream
competition level γ, while the RHS is decreasing in γ. Therefore, there exists
a threshold γˆ1, such that the above condition holds if and only if γ > γˆ1, where
γˆ1 satisfies Π
M
2 = 2(π1 + Π2 + π2).





ΠM2 − π1, xe2 = xe1 − π2.




To support such an equilibrium, two conditions need to hold:
First, the non-negative profit condition implies
Πe1 = Π
M
1 − ΠM2 + 2π1 > 0,
which is clearly satisfied given M1’ s demand asymmetry.
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Second, the no deviation condition implies
ΠM1 − ΠM2 + 2π1 ≥ Π1 −max{
1
2
ΠM2 − 2π1 − π2, 0}.
Sufficiently strong upstream competition implies 1
2
ΠM2 − 2π1 − π2 > 0. Thus




ΠM2 ≥ Π1 + π2.
A sufficient condition to support the above inequality is ΠM2 ≥ 2(Π1 + π2),
which is true under strong upstream competition. Clearly there exists a γˉ1,
such that ΠM2 = max{2(2π1+π2), 2(Π1+π2)}. Thus the no deviation condition
holds if γ ≥ γˉ1. Therefore, if γ > max{γˆ1, γˉ1}, both non-negative profit
condition and no deviation condition hold. Thus the dominant-firm monopoly
equilibrium exists when upstream competition is strong.
Proof of Lemma 1.3
Similar to Lemma 1.2, we need to show the two equilibrium conditions hold if
upstream competition is strong and the demand asymmetry is small. Suppose
upstream competition is strong enough so that 1
2
ΠM1 − π2 > Π1 + π1 holds.
This is true if and only if γ > γˆ2, where γˆ2 satisfies
ΠM1 = 2(Π1 + π1 + π2).
154




ΠM1 − π2, x1 = xe2 − π1,




The non-negative profit condition becomes
ΠM2 − ΠM1 + 2π2 ≥ 0.
The above condition holds as long as the demand asymmetry between two
firms is small enough so that ΠM2 is close to Π
M
1 .
To show the no deviation condition also holds, we need to check
ΠM2 − ΠM1 + 2π2 ≥ Π2 −max{0,
1
2
ΠM1 − 2π2 − π1}.
Since 1
2





ΠM1 ≥ Π2 + π1.
Since the LHS is independent of γ and is strictly positive as demand asymmetry
is small, while the RHS is decreasing in γ. Therefore, the above condition is
satisfied for a γ large enough or under sufficiently strong upstream competition.
As a result, when upstream competition is strong and the demand asym-
metry between two firms is small, the small-firm monopoly equilibrium exists.
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Proof of Corollary 1.1





M , Π1 = Π2 = Π, π1 = π2 = π.
The two types of monopoly equilibria become the same, and the equilibrium
conditions become
ΠM − 2xe ≥ {0, Π−max{xe − 2π}},
where xe = max{1
2
ΠM − π, Π + π}. Now consider two different cases which
depend on upstream competition level:
Case 1: 12Π
M − π > Π + π
Since ΠM is independent of γ while both Π and π are decreasing in γ, the
above condition holds if and only if γ > γˉ, where γˉ is defined as
ΠM = 2Π + 4π.





The equilibrium conditions become
2π ≥ max{0, Π−max{0, 1
2




If Π + 3π − 1
2
ΠM < 0, it clearly holds. Otherwise, the above condition is
equivalent to
2π ≥ Π + 3π − 1
2
ΠM ,
which is also satisfied given γ > γˉ.
Case 2: 12Π
M − π ≤ Π + π
This is case where γ ≤ γˉ. In such case, the equilibrium offer is
xe = Π + π.
And the equilibrium conditions now become
ΠM − 2(Π + π) ≥ π.
The above condition holds if and only if γˉ ≥ γ ≥ γ, where γ is a threshold
such that
ΠM = 2Π + 3π,
and clearly γˉ > γ.
Therefore, when two firms are symmetric, two symmetric monopoly equi-
libria exist in which one of the manufacturers monopolizes, if and only if
upstream competition is strong (γ ≥ γ).
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Proof of Corollary 1.2





ΠMj − πi, Πj + πj}, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Suppose there exists demand asymmetry and two firms are not exactly iden-
tical, given M1’s demand advantage,
ΠM1 > Π
M
2 , Π1 > Π2, π1 > π2.
Thus 1
2
ΠM1 − π2 > 12ΠM2 − π1 and Π1 + π1 > Π2 + π2. Therefore, xe2 > xe1.





and ΠM1 > Π
M
2 .
Proof of Corollary 1.3
Recall the equilibrium conditions under which Mi monopolizes are
ΠMi − 2xei ≥ max{0, Πi −max{0, xei − πj − πi}},
where xei = max{12ΠMj − πi, Πj + πj}.
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Suppose there exists a small-firm monopoly equilibrium so that the follow-
ing condition holds
ΠM2 − 2xe2 ≥ max{0, Π2 −max{0, xe2 − π1 − π2}}, (A.1)
where xe2 = max{12ΠM1 − π2, Π1 + π1}. We need to show
ΠM1 − 2xe1 ≥ max{0, Π1 −max{0, xe1 − π2 − π1}}, (A.2)




1 − π1 > Π2 + π2.
In this case xe1 =
1
2
ΠM2 − π1, and we need to show
ΠM1 − ΠM2 + 2π1 ≥ max{0, Π1 −max{0,
1
2
ΠM1 − 2π1 − π2}}, (A.3)
which clearly holds as 2π1 ≥ Π1.
Case 2: 12Π
M
2 − π1 ≤ Π2 + π2.
In this case xe1 = Π2 + π2, and we need to show
ΠM1 − 2(Π2 + π2) ≥ max{0, Π1 −max{0, Π2 − π1}} (A.4)





ΠM1 −π2 > Π1+π1 holds. This is true as upstream competition
is strong and it suggests ΠM1 > 2(Π1 +π1 +π2). Thus Π
M
1 −2(Π2 +π2) =
2(Π1 − Π2 + π1) > 2π1 ≥ Π1, given 2π1 ≥ Π1. Thus the LHS of (A.4) is




ΠM1 − π2 ≤ Π1 + π1, then (A.1) implies
ΠM2 − 2(Π1 + π1) ≥ max{0, Π2 + π2 − Π1}.
If Π2+π2−Π1 < 0, the above condition is equivalent to ΠM2 ≥ 2(Π1+π1).
Therefore, ΠM1 > Π
M
2 ≥ 2(Π2+π2)+2π1 ≥ 2(Π2+π2)+Π1, which clearly
implies (A.4). If Π2 + π2 − Π1 ≥ 0, then (A.1) is equivalent to
ΠM2 ≥ Π1 + Π2 + 2π1 + π2. (A.5)
If Π2 > π1, (A.4) becomes Π
M
1 ≥ Π1 +Π2 +2π2 +π1, which is clearly true
under (A.5) given π1 > π2. If Π2 ≤ π1, (A.4) becomes ΠM1 ≥ 2(Π2+π2)+
Π1, which is also true since (A.5) now implies Π
M
2 ≥ Π1+2Π2+π1+π2 ≥
2(Π2 + π2) + Π1, given π1 ≥ Π2 and π1 > π2.
Therefore, whenever there exists a small-firm monopoly equilibrium, there
also exists a dominant-firm monopoly equilibrium. Thus the dominant firm
always monopolizes within a wider range.
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Proof of Proposition 1.2
Suppose both manufacturers can make discriminatory exclusive offers to re-
tailers. If there exists an equilibrium in which M1 monopolizes,
1 let x1i be the
equilibrium offer that M1 makes to Ri. In this case, the equilibrium profit of
M1 is
ΠM1 − (x11 + x12).
And denote xe1 as the equilibrium offer that M1 makes for exclusion, if it is




ΠM1 − π2, Π2 + π2}.
We want to show the equilibrium profit of M1 can not be larger than the case
with non-discriminatory offers, which is equivalent to
x11 + x12 ≥ 2xe1.
We can prove by contradiction. Suppose x11 + x12 < 2x
e
1, thus we must
have min{x11, x12} < xe1. Without loss of generality, let x11 ≤ x12. There
always exists some possible deviation strategy by M2 to avoid being excluded.
Consider two different cases:




ΠM2 − π1 > Π2 + π2 and xe1 = 12ΠM2 − π1. M2 can profitably offer
x21 = x11 + π1 + ², x22 = x12 + π1 + ².
Given both offers, both retailers will sign up with M2, while M2’s profit will
be
ΠM2 − (x21 + x22) = ΠM2 − 2π1 − (x11 + x12)− 2² > 0.
Second, if 1
2
ΠM2 − π1 ≤ Π2 + π2 and xe1 = Π2 + π2. M2 can still deviate by
offering
x21 = x11 − π1 + ², x22 = 0,
which induces only R1 to sign. M2’s deviation profit will be
Π2 − x21 = Π2 + π2 − x11 − ² > 0,
given x11 < x
e
1 = Π2 + π2.
Therefore, in order to exclude the rival, the offers made by M1 must satisfy
x11 + x12 ≥ 2xe1. Indeed, any offers that satisfy x11 + x12 = 2xe1 will make M1
indifferent if 1
2
ΠM2 − π1 ≥ Π2 + π2. Thus in this case, discriminatory offers
will generate the same profit as non-discriminatory offers for M1. However, if
1
2
ΠM2 − π1 < Π2 + π2, any discriminatory offers that make M1 monopolized
should be x11+x12 > 2x
e
1. Thus discriminatory offers lower M1’s profit in order
to sign up both retailers. In sum, discriminatory offers will never raise profits
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for M1 (indeed M1 might be worse-off by engaging in price discrimination).
Thus it is always optimal for M1 offer the same exclusive deals to both retailers.
Proof of Proposition 1.5
When manufacturers can offer two-part tariff contracts, retailers’ profit (gross
of the exclusive deals) will always be zero. Therefore, retailers will sign up with
the manufacturer who makes a higher offer in stage one. Thus retailers’ signing
decision rule becomes much simpler: both retailers sign with M1 if x1 > x2;
both sign with M2 if x2 > x1; randomly choose between M1 and M2 if x1 = x2
(in this case, given the tie-breaking rule, we assume both retailers will sign
with the dominant firm M1). Given retailers’ decision rule, the maximum
amount M2 can offer is x2 =
1
2
ΠM2 , while M1 can exactly match this offer to
sign up both retailers. Therefore, there exists a unique equilibrium, where the







M1 ends up with a profit of Π
M





Proof of Proposition 1.6
We can show it by contradiction. Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which
M1 signs up N − 1 retailers while M2 signs up the remaining one.2 Given the
equilibrium offers (x1, x2), the retailers’ incentive compatibility constraints
must be satisfied
x2 + π2 ≥ x1 ≥ x2.
In this case, the manufacturers’ equilibrium profits are
Πe1 = Π
V
1 − (N − 1)x1, Πe2 = (1− α)ΠV2 − x2.
If x1 > x2, M1 can deviate by offering x1−², which still induces N−1 retailers
to sign but M1 now earns a higher profit. Thus we must have x1 = x2.
However, this can not be sustained as an equilibrium. If x1 = x2 > 0, M2
can deviate by offering min{0, x1 − π2 + ²}, which also guarantees that one
retailer wants to sign up but it earns a higher profit. If x1 = x2 = 0, then M2
can also deviate by offering ² > 0, which can induce N − 1 retailers to sign
and it now obtains a profit of ΠV2 − (N − 1)², which is strictly higher than
(1 − α)ΠV2 . Therefore, there does not exist such an equilibrium in which one
manufacturer signs up N − 1 retailers and leaves the remaining retailer to the
other manufacturer.
2The same logic applies to the other type of equilibrium where M1 signs up only one
retailer while M2 signs up the rest N − 1 retailers..
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Proof of Corollary 1.4
Recall the equilibrium conditions under which M1 monopolizes are
ΠM1 −ΠM2 +NαΠV1 ≥ max{0, (1−α)ΠV1 −max{0,
1
N
ΠM2 −αΠV2 −2αΠV1 }} (A.6)





ΠM1 −NΠV2 ≥ max{0, (1− α)ΠV1 −max{0, (1− α)ΠV2 − αΠV1 }} (A.7)
otherwise. There are two possible cases which depend on the corresponding
profits:





In this case, the equilibrium condition is implied by (A.6). Since the LHS of
(A.6) is larger than NαΠV1 , while the RHS is no larger than (1−α)ΠV1 . Given
α ≥ 1
N+1
, clearly the LHS is larger than the RHS. Thus the condition holds.
Case 2: ΠM2 ≤ NΠV2 + NαΠV1
The equilibrium condition becomes (A.7), which we need to show.
Since the small firm monopoly equilibrium exists, the following equilibrium
conditions must be satisfied
ΠM2 −ΠM1 +NαΠV2 ≥ max{0, (1−α)ΠV2 −max{0,
1
N
ΠM1 −αΠV1 −2αΠV2 }} (A.8)





ΠM2 −NΠV1 ≥ max{0, (1− α)ΠV2 −max{0, (1− α)ΠV1 − αΠV2 }} (A.9)
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otherwise. We consider two sub-cases:




2 , clearly it is equivalent to
ΠM1 −NΠV2 > (1−α)ΠV1 +(N −1+α)(ΠV1 −ΠV2 )+ [(N +1)α−1]ΠV2 . (A.10)
Clearly the RHS of (A.10) is larger than (1 − α)ΠV1 , given α ≥ 1N+1 and
ΠV1 > Π
V
2 . Thus Π
M
1 −NΠV2 > (1− α)ΠV1 holds, which implies (A.7).
Second, if ΠM1 ≤ NΠV1 + NαΠV2 , thus (A.9) holds, which implies ΠM2 −
NΠV1 ≥ 0. Together with ΠM2 ≤ NΠV2 + NαΠV1 , it implies (1 − α)ΠV1 ≤ ΠV2 .
Now consider two situations:
(1) If (1 − α)ΠV1 > αΠV2 , thus (A.9) becomes
ΠM2 −NΠV1 ≥ ΠV2 − (1− α)ΠV1 . (A.11)
Clearly (A.7) holds given (A.11) if (1 − α)ΠV2 − αΠV1 ≥ 0, as it becomes
ΠM1 −NΠV2 ≥ ΠV1 − (1− α)ΠV2 . If (1− α)ΠV2 − αΠV1 < 0, (A.11) implies
ΠM2 ≥ (N − 2 + α)ΠV1 + αΠV1 + ΠV2 + (1− α)ΠV1 > NΠV2 + (1− α)ΠV1 ,
which clearly implies (A.7).
(2) If (1 − α)ΠV1 ≤ αΠV2 , thus (A.9) becomes
ΠM2 −NΠV1 ≥ (1− α)ΠV2 . (A.12)
Since (1 − α)ΠV1 ≤ αΠV2 implies (1 − α)ΠV2 ≤ αΠV1 , (A.7) becomes
ΠM1 −NΠV2 ≥ (1− α)ΠV1 ,
166
which clearly holds under (A.12).
Therefore, whenever there exists a small-firm monopoly equilibrium, there
always exists a dominant-firm monopoly equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 1.5
To prove the proposition, we want to show if the dominant-firm monopoly
equilibrium exists when the number of retailers is N , it also exists when the
number of retailers is M , where M < N , given α ≥ 1
M+1
.
When the number of retailers is N , the equilibrium conditions under which
the dominant firm monopolizes are given by (A.6) and (A.7). Now we need
to show the equilibrium conditions also hold when we replace N by M , where
M < N . We consider two different cases.




1 , we need to show
ΠM1 − ΠM2 + MαΠV1 ≥ max{0, (1− α)ΠV1 −max{0,
1
M
ΠM2 − αΠV2 − 2αΠV1 }}.
(A.13)




, since the LHS is
larger than MαΠV1 while the RHS is no larger than (1−α)ΠD1 , and MαΠV1 ≥
(1− α)ΠV1 .
Second, if ΠM2 ≤ MΠD2 + MαΠV1 , it clearly implies ΠM2 ≤ NΠV2 + NαΠV1 .
Therefore, condition (A.7) holds given the equilibrium condition when the
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number of retailers is N . Now we need to show
ΠM1 −MΠV2 ≥ max{0, (1− α)ΠV1 −max{0, (1− α)ΠV2 − αΠV1 }}. (A.14)
Clearly, the above condition is true given (A.7), since M < N .
Therefore, exclusion by the dominant manufacturer is easier to occur as
the number of retailers decreases.
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Appendix B
Proofs of Chapter Two
Proof of Lemma 2.1
Recall sellers’ indifference condition is
[(5− 2α)t + bn1 − bn2]2
n1
=
[(5− 2α)t + bn2 − bn1]2
n2
,
which holds trivially when n1 = 1/2. Thus, the symmetric equilibrium exists





and platforms’ market shares on the





. Here the superscript S denotes the symmetric
equilibrium. The prices charged by sellers and platforms are
pS1 = p
S




2 = (1− α)t,
and sellers’ and platforms’ profits are
πS1 = π
S





Proof of Proposition 2.1
Following the arguments in the main text, when network effects are medium
(1
2
< β < 1), there exist asymmetric equilibria. Consider the asymmetric

















where nAS1 > n
AS
2 and the superscript AS denotes the asymmetric equilibrium.

























(1−√2β − 1) ,
FAS1 = (1− α)(1 +
√
2β − 1)t, and FAS2 = (1− α)(1−
√
2β − 1)t,
and the total fees are
PAS1 = 2t(1 +
√
2β − 1), and PAS2 = 2t(1−
√
2β − 1).





































Proof of Proposition 2.2
In a monopoly equilibrium where platform 1 monopolizes, we must have






2 = 0, and F
M
2 = 0,
and pM2 is not relevant since there are no sellers joining platform 2, where the
superscript M denotes the monopoly case. Clearly, platform 2 has no incentive
to raise FM2 (still attracting no buyers) or lower F
M
2 (attracting some buyers
but making a loss).




1 = b− t.
To show the second condition, given the equilibrium prices (pM1 , F
M
1 ), we






1 = (1− α)pM1 . To
support it as a monopoly equilibrium, we need to check there is no incentive
for either party to deviate.
Consider platform 1’s possible deviation strategy.1 By raising FM1 by dF1,






































Similarly, consider a seller in platform 1’s possible deviation strategy. By
raising pM1 by dp1, it will get


















= πe1 − (1− α)
pM1 − 2t
2t





Thus πdev1 ≤ πe1 if and only if
pM1 ≥ 2t.
Therefore, to support the equilibrium, the following two inequality condi-





Clearly, there exists a set of candidate equilibrium prices (pM1 , F
M
1 ) = (2t, b−
3t), which satisfies the two conditions above as well as the first equality. More-
over, since (2+α)t
α
> (5 − 2α)t, we can summarize the possible equilibrium
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prices generally in two different cases: (1) if 2t
α
≤ b− t or (2+α)t
α
≤ b, then any




1−α , b− 3t
]
will support the equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Since the profit of a seller in platform i is πi(ni, nj), when β < 1, we redefine
hi(ni) ≡ πi(ni, nj) = (1−α)t(1+2βni−β)22ni , where ni is the number of sellers in










Therefore, h′i(ni) < 0 when β ≤ 13 ; h′i(ni) < 0 if and only if ni < 12β − 12
when 1
3
















, where h′i(ni) > 0; (1− α)pˉi if ni > 12 + 12β , where pˉi is
the equilibrium price charged by sellers in platform i as defined in Proposition
2.2. Now we consider three different cases depending on the magnitude of β.
First, when network effects are weak (β < 1
2
), there exists a unique sym-
metric equilibrium. We want to show the symmetric equilibrium is stable.




i + ², n
S
j − ²) < πj(nSj , nSi ) for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j and
for all ² ∈ (0, nSj ), given h′i(ni) < 0. Thus, the deviation profit for any coalition
of sellers in either platform will be lower than the equilibrium profit. No sell-
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ers will jointly deviate from the symmetric equilibrium. When 1
3
< β < 1
2
, we
have πi(ni, nj) < πj(nj, ni) if and only if ni >
1
2
. In the symmetric equilibrium





and i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, suppose there exists a coalition ²
of sellers in platform j who want to deviate to platform i, where ² ∈ (0, nSj ),
we must have πi(n
S
i + ²) < πj(n
S
j − ²), which violates the definition of sta-
bility. Indeed the deviation is not convincing since some sellers in the ² set
who initially deviate by joining platform i want to deviate back to platform j.
Therefore, the symmetric equilibrium is stable when β < 1
2
.
Second, when network effects are medium ( 1
2
≤ β < 1), besides the sym-
metric equilibrium, there exist asymmetric equilibria where both platforms
have positive market shares on both sides. We still focus on the asymmet-




















∈ (0, nS1 ) such that π1(nS1 + ², nS2 − ²) > π2(nS2 , nS1 ), there is no





















the symmetric equilibrium, a set of sellers in either platform want to deviate
the other platform so as to achieve one asymmetric equilibrium. Therefore,
the symmetric equilibrium is not stable. Now starting from the asymmetric
equilibrium where platform 1 is the dominant platform, clearly joint deviations
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from sellers in platform 1 to platform 2 never occur. Now we need to show that
any joint deviation by sellers in platform 2 to platform 1 is also not convincing.
Clearly, for any subsect ² of sellers in platform 2 with ² ∈ (0, nAS2 ), there always
exist δ ∈ (0, ²) such that π1(nAS1 + ², nAS2 − ²) < π2(nAS2 − ² + δ, nAS1 + ²− δ),
since π2(n
AS
2 − ², nAS1 + ²) > π1(nAS1 + ², nAS2 − ²) and πi(ni, nj) is continuous
in ni (or nj). Thus any joint deviations from sellers in either platform is not
convincing, thus the asymmetric equilibrium is stable.
Third, when β ≥ 1, besides the symmetric equilibrium, there also exist
monopoly equilibria where one of the platforms monopolizes. We need to
show the monopoly equilibria are also stable. When β ≥ 1, the profit of a
seller in platform i is gi(ni) =
(1−α)t(1+2βni−β)2
2ni



















(5−2α)t+b . Consider the
monopoly equilibrium where platform 1 monopolizes the markets. Although
the equilibrium prices are not unique, there exists an equilibrium with the
price being pM1 =
b−3t
1−α if (5 − 2α)t < b < (2+α)tα , and pM1 = b − t if b ≥ (2+α)tα .
Now we want to show that the monopoly profit for sellers in platform 1 is
always higher than g2(n2) for all n2 ∈ (12 − 12β , 12 + 12β ), which has a maximum
value of g2(nˉ). Consider two different cases.
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If (5− 2α)t < b < (2+α)t
α
,
b− 3t− 4(1− α)bt
(5− 2α)t + b = b[b− 2(1− α)t]− 3(5− 2α)t
2
> 3bt− 3(5− 2α)t2
> 3(5− 2α)t2 − 3(5− 2α)t2
= 0,
given b > (5− 2α)t.
If b ≥ (2+α)t
α
,
(1− α)(b− t)− 4(1− α)bt
(5− 2α)t + b = (1− α)
b(b− 2αt)− (5− 2α)t2
b + (5− 2α)t
> (1− α)(5− 2α)tb− (1 + 2α)t
b + (5− 2α)t
> 0,




> (1 + 2α)t.
Therefore, the monopoly profit for the sellers in platform 1 is always higher
than any possible deviation profit. Starting from the monopoly equilibrium
where nM1 = 1, n
M





2 ). Therefore, the monopoly equilibria are stable.
Clearly the symmetric equilibrium is not stable as a mass of 1
2
sellers will
jointly deviate to one platform, resulting in the monopoly outcome.
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Proof of Proposition 2.4
In the symmetric equilibrium, consumer surplus, producer surplus and social
welfare are






PSS = (2− α)t,






where the superscript S denotes the symmetric equilibrium.
In asymmetric equilibria, consumer surplus, producer surplus and social
welfare are






PSAS = 2β(2− α)t,






where the superscript AS denotes the asymmetric equilibrium.
In monopoly equilibria, consumer surplus, producer surplus and social wel-
fare are




PSM = b− t,
WM = v + b− t
2
,
where the superscript M denotes the monopoly equilibria.
When network effects are medium ( 1
2
< β < 1), both the symmetric equi-
librium and asymmetric equilibria coexist. By comparing the two types of
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equilibria, we have




(2β − 1)(9− 4α)t = 2β − 1
4
t > 0,
PSAS − PSS = (2β − 1)(2− α)t > 0,
WAS −W S = (2β − 1)b
2β





(9− 4α)t > 0.
Therefore, for any β ∈ (1
2
, 1), consumer surplus, producer surplus and social
welfare are all higher in asymmetric equilibria than in the symmetric equilib-
rium.
When network effects are strong (β ≥ 1), both the symmetric equilibrium
and monopoly equilibria coexist. By comparing the two types of equilibria,
we find
CSM − CSS = 1
4
[(11− 4α)− β(10− 4α)]t > 0,
if and only if 1 < β < 11−4α
10−4α , and
PSM − PSS = b− (3− α)t = [β(5− 2α)− (3− α)]t > 0,








Consumer surplus is higher in monopoly equilibria only when network effects
are moderate, while producer surplus and social welfare are always higher in
the monopoly equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 2.5
Suppose platform 1 vertically integrates its sellers and we call the integrated
party as “firm 1”. Thus, firm 1 will optimally choose F1 and p1 while platform
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2 and sellers within platform 2 will choose F2 and p2 accordingly. The four
first-order conditions imply
−2p1n1 + t + bn1 − bn2 + p2n2 + F2 − 2F1 = 0,
−2p2n2 + t + bn2 − bn1 + p1n1 + F1 − F2 = 0,
−2F1 + t + bn1 − bn2 − 2p1n1 + p2n2 + F2 = 0,
−2F2 + t + bn2 − bn1 − (1 + α)p2n2 + p1n1 + F2 = 0.
The equilibrium prices are
P1 = F1 + p1n1 =
(5− 2α)t + bn1 − bn2
4− α ,
p2 =
3t + bn2 − bn1
(4− α)n2 , and F2 =
(1− α)(3t + bn2 − bn1)
4− α ,





(1− α)t + bn1 − bn2
2(4− α)t .
We can also calculate the corresponding profits
Π1 + n1π1 =
[(5− 2α)t + bn1 − bn2]2
2(4− α)2t ,
Π2 =
(3t + bn2 − bn1)2
2(4− α)2t , and π2 =
(1− α)(3t + bn2 − bn1)2
2(4− α)2tn2 .
Starting from the symmetric equilibrium where n1 = n2 =
1
2
, the profits for
different parties after vertical integration are
Π1 + n1π1 =
(5− 2α)2t
2(4− α) , Π2 =
9t









, it is profitable for platform 1 to integrate sellers. After
vertical integration, social welfare becomes




2 − 10α + 17)t
4(4− α)2 ,
where the superscript V I denotes vertical integration. Clearly, it is socially
inefficient if vertical integration occurs, since W V I < W S.
Proof of Proposition 2.6
Consider the asymmetric equilibrium where platform 1 dominates. We need to
study two cases depending on which platform vertically integrates its sellers.
First consider the case where platform 1 is vertically integrated. Following
the analysis from Proposition 2.5, in the asymmetric equilibrium,2 platforms’
and sellers’ profits are
Π1 + n1π1 =
(1 +
√
2β − 1)2(5− 2α)2t
2(4− α) ,
Π2 =
[3− (5− 2α)√2β − 1]2t
2(4− α)2 , π2 =
(1− α)β[3− (5− 2α)√2β − 1]2t
(4− α)2(β −√2β − 1) .
Clearly, there is an incentive for platform 1 to integrate its sellers.
2For the equilibrium to exist, we need
√







2. If it does not hold, we will have monopoly outcome, such that Π1 + n1π1 =
[(5− 2α)√2β − 1− 1]t.
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Social welfare after integration can be written as
W I1 =v +
[(14− 5α)β − (5− 2α) + (1− α)√2β − 1]b
2(4− α)β
− [(5− 2α)
2β − (1− α)(4− α) + (1− α)(5− 2α)√2β − 1]t
2(4− α)2 ,




(1− α)(2β − 1 +√2β − 1)b
2(4− α)β −
(1− α)[3(3− α)β − (4− α) + (5− 2α)√2β − 1]t
2(4− α)2
=
(1− α)[(4α2 − 23α + 31)β + (5− 2α)(3− α)√2β − 1− 2(α2 + 2α + 4)]t
2(4− α)2
=
(1− α)[(4α2 − 23α + 31)(2β − 1) + 2(5− 2α)(3− α)√2β − 1− (1− α)]t
4(4− α)2 .
Let f(k) = (4α2 − 23α + 31)k2 + 2(5 − 2α)(3 − α)k − (1 − α), where k =
√
2β − 1 ≥ 0. Clearly f(k) > 0 if and only if
t >
(1− α)
4α2 − 23α + 31 .




(4α2−23α+31)2 + 1]. Therefore,
vertical integration by platform 1 increases welfare when network effect is not
too small.
Second, consider the case where the small platform (platform 2) vertically
integrates. The integrated party is referred as “firm 2”. Similarly, the equilib-
rium prices after integration are
p1 =
3t + bn1 − bn2
(4− α)n1 , F2 =
(1− α)(3t + bn1 − bn2)
4− α ,
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F2 + p2n2 =
(5− 2α)t + bn2 − bn1
4− α ,
and the corresponding profits are
Π2 + n2π2 =
[(5− 2α)t + bn2 − bn1]2
2(4− α)2t ,
Π1 =
(3t + bn1 − bn2)2
2(4− α)2t , and π1 =
(1− α)(3t + bn1 − bn2)2
2(4− α)2tn1 .
Starting from the asymmetric equilibrium where platform 1 dominates the
markets, the profits after integration are3
Π2 + n2π2 =
(1−√2β − 1)2(5− 2α)2t
2(4− α) ,
Π1 =
[3 + (5− 2α)√2β − 1]2t
2(4− α)2 , and π1 =
(1− α)β[3 + (5− 2α)√2β − 1]2t
(4− α)2(β +√2β − 1) .
Social welfare after integration is
W I2 =v +
[(14− 5α)β − (5− 2α)− (1− α)√2β − 1]b
2(4− α)β
− [(5− 2α)
2β − (1− α)(4− α)− (1− α)(5− 2α)√2β − 1]t
2(4− α)2 ,
and the change of welfare is
W I2 −WAS
=
(1− α)[(4α2 − 23α + 31)β − (5− 2α)(3− α)√2β − 1− 2(α2 − 6α + 8)]
2(4− α)2
=
(1− α)[(4α2 − 23α + 31)(2β − 1)− 2(5− 2α)(3− α)√2β − 1− (1− α)]
4(4− α)2 ,
where the superscript I2 denotes integration by platform 2. Clearly, W I2 >
WAS if and only if
√
2β − 1 > 1, which is never satisfied. Therefore, W I2 <
3The equilibrium holds for 12 < β < 1.
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WAS. It is always welfare reducing if the small platform integrates with the
sellers.
Proof of Proposition 2.7
Suppose both platforms are vertically integrated, the model becomes similar
to the standard Hotelling model. Firm i charges the total fee Pi = Fi + pini





bni − bnj − Pi + Pj
2t
.
Therefore, the equilibrium prices are




and the equilibrium profits and market shares are













In the symmetric equilibrium where n1 = n2 =
1
2
, total industry profits
decrease. At the same time, since total welfare remains the same, consumers
are better-off.
In the asymmetric equilibrium where platform 1 dominates the markets,
we have

































(5− 2α)√2β − 1
6
.
Therefore, social welfare is
W II = v +
[3β + (5− 2α)(2β − 1)]b
6β




where the superscript denotes the case where both platforms vertical integrate
sellers. The change of welfare becomes
W II −WAS = (1− α)(2β − 1)b
3β
− (1− α)(4− α)(2β − 1)t
9
=
(1− α)(11− 5α)(2β − 1)t
9
> 0.
When both platforms vertically integrate, it is welfare enhancing.
Now consider platforms’ incentive to vertically integrate sellers. Starting
from the asymmetric equilibrium where platform 1 dominates the markets,
if platform 2 remains non-integrated, platform 1 strictly prefers to vertically
integrate its sellers, given that the joint profit after integration increases,
(1 +
√








2β − 1)(1− α)t.
However, if platform 2 chooses to vertically integrate its sellers, platform 1
would prefer not to integrate given
[3 + (5− 2α)√2β − 1]2t
18
<
[3 + (5− 2α)√2β − 1]2t
2(4− α)2 +
(1− α)[3 + (5 − 2α)√2β − 1]2t
2(4− α)2 .
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The same argument holds for platform 2. Therefore, either platform gains
from integration only when the rival platform remains non-integrated. When
two platforms can strategically decide whether to vertical integrate, there exist
two equilibria where only of the platforms is integrated, though it is socially
optimal for both of them to integrate.
Proof of Proposition 2.8
Suppose there are K platforms and a unit mass of buyers. Thus there exists
a mass of 2
K(K−1) buyers located between any two of the platforms. Consider
the competition between platform i and j. The demand for platform i is
mij =
1
K(K − 1) +
bni − bnj − pini + pjnj + Fj − Fi
2t
,
and demand for platform j is
mji =
2
K(K − 1) −mij .
The demand for platform i will be positive if 0 < mij <
2
K(K−1) , which is
equivalent to4
|bni − bnj − pini + pjnj + Fj − Fi| < 2t
K(K − 1) .
4If this condition is violated, either platform i or j will face zero demand. And we no
longer have interior solutions.
185









Kbni − b− (K − 1)pini +
∑K
j=1;j 6=i pjnj +
∑K
j=1;j 6=i Fj − (K − 1)Fi
2t
.
Solving the optimization problems of all platforms and sellers, we have the
following FOCs
2(K − 1)pini = 2t
K






Fj − (K − 1)Fi,
2(K − 1)Fi = 2t
K







where i = 1, 2, . . . , K . We can further rewrite the above conditions as
(2K − 1)pini = 2t
K
+ Kbni − b + pn + F −KFi,
(2K − 1)Fi = 2t
K
+ Kbni − b− [(K − 1)(1 + α) + 1]pini + pn + F,
where pn =
∑K
i=1 pini and F =
∑K





Kbni − b−Kpini + pn + F −KFi
2t
.
By summing up the K equations together, we have
pn =
2t
K − 1 , F =
2(1− α)t
K − 1 .
Plugging into each equation, we have
(2K − 1)pini = 2[(3− α)K − 1]t
K(K − 1) + Kbni − b−KFi,
(2K − 1)Fi = 2[(3− α)K − 1]t
K(K − 1) + Kbni − b− [(K − 1)(1 + α) + 1]pini.
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Solving them simultaneously, we find the prices
pi =
2[(3− α)K − 1]t + K(K − 1)(Kbni − b)
[(3− α)K − 1]K(K − 1)ni ,
Fi =
(1− α){2[(3− α)K − 1]t + K(K − 1)(Kbni − b)}





2[(3−α)K−1]t , the interior solution condition holds i
|(K − 1)b(ni − nj)
[(3− α)K − 1] | <
2t
K(K − 1)
or |b(ni − nj)| < 2[(3−α)K−1]tK(K−1)2 .
The sellers’ indifference conditions imply
{2[(3− α)K − 1]t + K(K − 1)(Kbni − b)}2
2[(3− α)K − 1]2K2(K − 1)tni = A,
where A is a constant number which implies the profit of each seller in equi-
librium, i = 1, 2, . . . , K and
∑K
i=1 ni = 1. Now we characterize the conditions





for all i = 1, 2, . . . , K is always a solution to the sellers’
indifference conditions, there always exists a symmetric equilibrium regard-







. The equilibrium prices are pi =
2t
(K−1) and Fi =
2(1−α)
K(K−1) for all
i = 1, 2, . . . , K . In equilibrium, the profits are πi =
2(1−α)t
K(K−1) and Πi =
2t
K2(K−1)
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , K .
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2. Asymmetric Equilibria
When network effects are not too weak, there also exist asymmetric equi-
libria. Indeed multiple asymmetric equilibria exist when there are multiple
platforms competing. Here we only focus on the equilibria with one dom-
inant platform and other symmetric fringe small platforms. Thus we have
ni = n, i = 1, . . . K, i 6= d, nd = 1 − (K − 1)n, where platform d is the
dominant platform and all other platforms are small fringe firms. By solving































where δ = K4(K−1)2b2−4(K−1){K(K−1)b−2[(3−α)K−1]t}2 and δ > 0,





K−1)K(K−1) . Since platform d is the dominant
platform, we have nd > n. Therefore, only the second solution is selected,
which implies an asymmetric equilibrium with one dominant platform.















The interior condition requires
b
[ (K − 2)






2[(3− α)K − 1]t
K(K − 1)2 ,
which is equivalent to
b <
2[(3− α)K − 1]t




K − 1[(3− α)K − 1]t
(K + 2
√
K − 1)K(K − 1) <
2[(3− α)K − 1]t
(K − 1)(3K − 4) .
Thus the sufficient condition for the asymmetric equilibrium to exist is
4
√
K − 1[(3− α)K − 1]t
(K + 2
√
K − 1)K(K − 1) < b <
2[(3− α)K − 1]t
(K − 1)(3K − 4) .
If we define βˆ = b
t
, which captures network effects.5 The sufficient condition




K − 1[(3− α)K − 1]
(K + 2
√
K − 1)K(K − 1) < βˆ <
2[(3− α)K − 1]
(K − 1)(3K − 4) = βˆ2.
Clearly, βˆ1 and βˆ2 are both decreasing in K. Given βˆ, we can rewrite the
distribution of sellers in equilibrium as
n =
N
2(K − 1) −
N
√
K4(K − 1)2βˆ2 − 4(K − 1){K(K − 1)βˆ − 2[(3− α)K − 1]}2







K4(K − 1)2βˆ2 − 4(K − 1){K(K − 1)βˆ − 2[(3− α)K − 1]}2
2K2(K − 1)βˆ .
5βˆ has similar interpretation as β in measuring network effects.
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The market shares on the buyers’ side are
m =
1
4[(3− α)K − 1]K(K − 1)
(
4[(3− α)K − 1](K − 1)−K(K − 1)(K − 2)βˆ
−
√





4[(3− α)K − 1]K
(
4[(3− α)K − 1] + K(K − 1)(K − 2)βˆ
+
√
K4(K − 1)2βˆ2 − 4(K − 1){K(K − 1)βˆ − 2[(3− α)K − 1]}2
)
.
Similarly, we can also calculate the profits for the dominant platform (Πd)
and small fringe firms (Π),
Πd =
t
8[(3− α)K − 1]2K2(K − 1)
(
4[(3− α)K − 1] + K(K − 1)(K − 2)βˆ
+
√





8[(3− α)K − 1]2K2(K − 1)3
(
(K − 1){4[(3− α)K − 1]−K(K − 2)βˆ}
−
√
K4(K − 1)2βˆ2 − 4(K − 1){K(K − 1)βˆ − 2[(3− α)K − 1]}2
)2
.
Clearly, nd > n, md > m and Πd > Π. Thus market dominance arises when
there are multiple platforms and when network effects are not too weak.



















Market dominance enlarges when network effect becomes stronger. Therefore,
all results are consistent with the case of two platforms.
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3. Monopoly Equilibria
When βˆ > 2[(3−α)K−1]
K(K−1) , there also exist monopoly equilibria, where one of
the platform monopolizes the market. Similar to the two platform case, the
equilibrium condition is
pM + FM = b− 2t
K(K − 1) .
We need the following two conditions to hold
pM ≥ 2t
K − 1 ,
αpM + FM ≥ 2t
K − 1 .
There is a candidate equilibrium with the equilibrium fees
(









In general, if βˆ ≥ 2(K+α)t
K(K−1)α , any F




in equilibrium; otherwise, only FM ∈ [2(K+α)t−αK(K−1)b
(1−α)K(K−1) , b − 2(K+1)tK(K−1) ] can be
supported in equilibrium. Regardless of βˆ, the following condition always
holds
pM + FM = b− 2t
K(K − 1) .
Therefore, the results are also consistent with the case of two platforms.
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Proof of Proposition 2.9
Suppose there exists an equilibrium where N sellers are multi-homing while n1
sellers are single-homing to platform 1, where N + n1 = 1. Thus there exists
c˜ such that sellers are multi-homing if c ≤ c˜, and single-homing otherwise.
Therefore, sellers’ indifference condition implies
(1− α)[(5− 2α)t + b− bN ]2
2(5− 2α)2t
=
(1− α)[(5− 2α)t + b− bN ]2
2(5− 2α)2t +
(1− α)[(5− 2α)t + bN − b]2
2(5− 2α)2tN − c˜,
which can be further simplified as
(1− α)[(5− 2α)t + bN − b]2
2(5− 2α)2tN = c˜ = F
−1(N),
where F−1(N) is the inverse function of F (N) and F (N) = c˜ which clearly
exists and is unique.
Let y(N) = (1−α)[(5−2α)t+bN−b]
2





< 0; if 1
2
< β < 1,
dy(N)
dN
< 0 if and only if N < (5−α)t−b
b





> 0. Following Intermediate Value Theorem, when β < 1 and cˉ > (1−α)t
2
,
there always exists a solution to y(N) = F−1(N), since y(0) − F−1(0) > 0
and y(1) − F−1(1) < 0. In equilibrium, N sellers are multi-homing while n1
sellers are single-homing to platform 1. However, when β ≥ 1, we no longer




Proofs of Chapter Three
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Suppose the fees charged by M are pB ≥ 0 and pS ≥ 0 in the first stage. We can
simply focus on the case where pS + pB > k, since otherwise the intermediary
can not make a positive profit. Consider the equilibrium strategies of buyers
and M in stage 3. We have: 3(i) all informed buyers select the seller which
offers the highest net utility; 3(ii) all uninformed buyers who join M follow M ’s
recommendations of which seller to purchase from; 3(iii) M recommends the
seller that provides the buyer with the highest net utility among the sellers
that join M . If there are no sellers joining M , M randomly select a seller
to recommend to buyers. Consider the equilibrium strategies of sellers and
buyers in stage 2. We have: 2(i) the informed buyers never join M ; 2(ii) the
uninformed buyers join M if and only if pB + pS ≤ B − s; 2(iii) both sellers
join M ; 2(iv) each seller charges the price pd = c + φ for buyers who purchase
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directly and the price pm = c + φ + pS for buyers who purchase through M .
To show why 3(i) to 3(iii) characterize an equilibrium in stage 3, first 3(i)
is trivial as informed buyers have full information and they will maximize the
utility. Since the informed buyers who join M are expecting both sellers to join
M and to set the symmetric equilibrium prices, they will follow M ’s recom-
mendations which choose the best, given M follows its equilibrium strategies.
Consider M ’s choice. Since buyers always follow M ’s recommendations, if
both sellers join M , M will receive pB + pS − k per buyer regardless of which
seller M recommends to buyers. M can not do better than just recommend
the seller that offers the highest net utility. If only one sellers joins M , M will
be strictly better-off recommending that seller so as to collect pB + pS − k per
buyer, rather than get nothing by recommending the seller that does not join.
If neither seller joins, M always receives nothing. So M can not do better
than just randomly recommend a seller.
To show why 2(i) to 2(iv) characterize an equilibrium in stage 2, firstly
note that a buyer always makes a purchase regardless of whether it purchases
directly or through M . Since an informed buyer has full information, it never
wants to join M by incurring a positive participation cost s and paying pB +
pS ≥ 0 more. Thus 2(i) holds. For an uninformed buyer, the net expected gain
by joining M is B−s, which is the expected match benefit less the joining cost.
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In the meantime, it pays pB + pS more by joining M than purchasing directly.
Therefore, an uninformed buyer will join M if and only if pB + pS ≤ B − s.
Thus 2(ii) holds.
Consider sellers’ pricing decision in equilibrium if they both join M . Since
buyers follow they equilibrium strategies and the rival seller j also follows the








F (²i − pdi + pd)f(²i)d²i(pdi − c)
+ (1− α)
∫
F (²i − pmi + pm)f(²i)d²i(pmi − pS − c)
)
.
Holding seller j’s equilibrium prices, the choice of pdi and p
m
i by seller i is
independent. Therefore, seller i would set the optimal prices pdi = c + φ and
pmi = c + φ + pS, which follow the equilibrium pattern. Both sellers obtain the
equilibrium profit of φ
2
. Thus sellers’ equilibrium prices are characterized by
2(iv) if they both join M .
To see why 2(iii) holds, suppose seller i deviates by not joining M , it will





F (²i − pdevi + pd)f(²i)d²i(pdevi − c).
The optimal deviation price thus will be the same as the equilibrium price
pdev = pd = c + φ, and the deviation profit is αφ
2
. Clearly, the deviation profit
is strictly smaller than the equilibrium profit, as the deviated seller will obtain
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the same profit from the buyers who do not join M but lose all buyers that
join M . Therefore, both sellers will indeed join and 2(iii) holds.
There is no equilibrium in stage 2 involving only one seller joining M , since
the other seller will always be better-off joining M by passing through the fee
to buyers and enjoying a higher profit by attracting some of the buyers who
join M . Given the equilibrium selection rules, only the trivial equilibrium
exists in stage 2. Therefore, the equilibrium characterized by 2(i) to 2(iv) will
be chosen by M , which generates a positive profit for M .
Now consider M ’s decision of choosing pB and pS in the first stage. M is
only able to attract the uninformed buyers if and only if pB + pS ≤ B − s and
in this case M ’s profit is
ΠNPm = (1− α)(pS + pB − k).
Therefore, to maximize the profit, M would choose the optimal (maximum)
fees such that pS + pB = B − s, and it earns a profit of
ΠNPm = (1− α)(B − s− k),
which is positive given B > s + k. Thus one possible choice of M is to set
pB = B − s and pS = 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3.2
Suppose the fees charged by M are pB ≥ 0 and pS ≥ 0 in the first stage. We can
simply focus on the case where pS + pB > k, since otherwise the intermediary
can not make a positive profit. Consider the equilibrium strategies of buyers
and M in stage 3. We have: 3(i) all informed buyers select the seller which
offers the highest net utility; 3(ii) all uninformed buyers who join M follow
M ’s recommendations of which seller to purchase from; 3(iii) M recommends
the seller that provides the buyer with the highest net utility among the sellers
that join M . If there are no sellers joining M , M randomly select a seller to
recommend to buyers. Consider buyers’ and sellers’ equilibrium strategies in
stage 2. We have 2(i) all informed buyers will never join M ; 2(ii) all uninformed

















and it satisfies φ < pˉS <
φ
α
; 2(iii) both sellers join M if pS ≤ pˉS and each seller
sets the equilibrium price pe = c + φ + (1− α)pS; 2(iv) neither seller joins M




3(i) to 3(iii) hold following the same proof of Proposition 3.1.
To see why 2(i) to 2(iv) characterizes an equilibrium in stage 2, first 2(i)
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follows the same arguments in Proposition 3.1. With price coherence, given
both sellers follow their equilibrium strategies, the expected gain by joining
M for an uninformed buyer is B − s, which is expected match benefit less the
cost of joining the intermediary. The uninformed buyer is also paying pB ≥ 0
more by joining M . Thus uninformed buyers will join M if pB ≤ B − s and
both sellers join. Therefore, given 2(iii) and 2(iv), 2(ii) holds.
Consider 2(iii) and 2(iv). Given all buyers and the other seller follow their







F (²i + p




F (²i + p
e − pi)f(²i)d²i(pi − pS − c)
)
,
if the seller keeps joining M , where pe = c + φ + (1 − α)pS. Thus seller i’s
optimization problem is implied by the following FOC∫ ²ˉ
²
F (²i + p









e − pi)f(²i)d²i(pi − pS − c) = 0
Symmetry implies
pi = p
e = c + φ + (1− α)pS.
And sellers’ equilibrium profit is πe = φ
2
.
As long as the fee pS is not too large, such an equilibrium exists and no
seller indeed wants to deviate by not joining M . Denote pˉS as maximum fee
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charged by M so that both sellers still want to join, we want to show that pˉS











F (²i + p
e − p′i)f(²i)d²i(p′i − c),
where p′i is the optimal deviation price that seller i would charge. If no seller
wants to deviate, the deviation profit must be no larger than the equilibrium
profit, which implies π′(pS) ≤ πe = φ2 . Since pe is strictly increasing in pS and
due to reveal preference theory, π′(pS) is strictly increasing in pe, it implies
that π′(pS) is strictly increasing in pS. Therefore the maximum fee pˉS charged










and pˉS is unique given the monotone function of π
′(pS). Though pˉS can not be
explicitly pined down, we are able to determine two bounds of the maximum
fee pˉS.
First, by joining M , each seller must earn a positive profit by selling
through the uninformed buyers who join M , otherwise at least one seller wants
to deviate by not joining M and charges an optimal price to direct buyers.
Therefore, the profit margin on the uninformed buyers should be positive,
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which suggests
φ + (1− α)pˉS − pˉS > 0.
The above condition is equivalent to pˉS <
φ
α
, which shows the upper bound of
pˉS.
Second, given pS, there is no incentive for either seller to deviate by not
joining M . In general, suppose the rival is charging a price of pj , the deviation






F (²i + pj − p′i)f(²i)d²(p′i − c),
and p′i is the optimal deviation price. Clearly, p
′
i is increasing in its own cost
c and increasing in the rival price pj . Now we consider two cases. First, if the
cost of seller i is c while the rival is charging a price c+φ, the optimal price of
seller i is c + φ. Second, if the cost of seller i is instead c + (1− α)pS and the
rival is charging a the equilibrium price c+φ+(1−α)pS, the optimal price of
seller i is also the equilibrium price c+φ+(1−α)pS. In equilibrium, the rival’s
price is larger than c + φ and the cost of seller i is smaller than c + (1− α)pS,
thus if seller i wants to deviate from the equilibrium by not joining M and
sets a deviation price p′i. The optimal deviation price p
′
i satisfies
c + φ < p′i < c + φ + (1− α)pS.
We denote p′i = c + φ + λ(1− α)pS, where 0 < λ < 1. Given p′i, we can write
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F (²i + p




F (²i + p




F (²i + p




A sufficient condition for the second inequality to hold is the profit margin on
the uninformed consumers should be non-negative, which suggests
φ + λ(1− α)pS − pS ≥ 0.
It is equivalent to
pS ≤ φ
1− λ(1− α) .
Since RHS is increasing in λ, thus the lower bound is φ when λ = 0. Therefore,
if pS = φ, it always ensures a seller’ the deviation profit is no larger than the
equilibrium profit so that no sellers want to deviate from the equilibrium. Thus





To see why 2(iv) holds, given pS > pˉS, there is no equilibrium in which both
sellers join M following the analysis above. There never exists an equilibrium
in which only one seller joins M . Since if buyers expect only one seller to join,
there is no reason for any buyers to join M . Uninformed buyers would know
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that M will always recommends the seller that joins, so they would not obtain
any additional information from joining. Thus all uninformed buyers would
choose a seller randomly. Thus the only possible equilibrium remaining is the
trivial equilibrium in which no buyers or sellers join M . Following the analysis




Consider M ’s problem in stage 1. M is able to attract both sellers and all
uninformed buyers if and only if pB ≤ B − s and pS ≤ pˉS. Since M ’s profit is
ΠPm = (1− α)(pS + pB − k),
the choice of pB and pS is separated. Therefore, it is optimal for M to set
pB = B − s and pS = pˉS. As a result, M earns a profit of
ΠPm = (1− α)(B + pˉS − s− k),
which is clearly positive given B > s + k.
Proof of Corollary 3.1








sellers’ equilibrium price and profit are pe = c + 1
2
+ (1− α)pS and πe = 14 .
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F (²i + p









(1− (pe − p′)2
2




1− (pe − p′)2
2
+ pe − p′ + (pe − p′ − 1)(p′ − c) = 0.
Thus
3(p′)2 + (4− 4pe − 2c)p′ + (pe)2 − 2pe − 1− 2(1− pe)c = 0.
Using pe = c + 1
2






4t2 − 4t + 25) + c,
where t = (1− α)pS. Clearly, p′ is increasing in c and pS, and p′ < pe.
Let δ = p − p′ = 1
6
(2t + 5 −√4t2 − 4t + 25), and δ2 = 1
18
(
4t2 + 8t + 25 −
(2t + 5)
√
4t2 − 4t + 25
)












[23− 4t2 + 4t + (2t− 1)
√
4t2 − 4t + 25](4t− 2 +
√
4t2 − 4t + 25).
The optimal fee pˉS satisfies π




23− 4t2 + 4t + (2t− 1)
√




4t2 − 4t + 25
)
= 54,
where t = (1− α)pˉS.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3
Compare Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 3.2, without price coherence, M
earns a profit of
ΠNPm = (1− α)(B − s− k),
while with price coherence M earns a profit of
ΠPm = (1− α)(B + pˉS − s− k).
Clearly ΠPm > Π
NP
m , given pˉS > φ. Therefore, M always wants to impose price
coherence.
Consider the impact of price coherence and intermediation on consumer
surplus and social welfare. Without price coherence, the consumer surplus is
CSNP = BI − c− φ− (1− α)B
and the social welfare is
WNP = BI − c− (1− α)(s + k).
With price coherence, the consumer surplus is
CSP = BI − c− φ− (1− α)pˉS − (1− α)B
and the social welfare is
W P = BI − c− (1− α)(s + k).
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Therefore, CSP < CSNP and W P = WN . Imposing price coherence lowers
consumer surplus but is neutral on social welfare.








. And the change of social welfare is
ΔW P = (1− α)(B − s− k) > 0
since B > s + k. Therefore, intermediation will always improve social welfare
and consumer surplus (even if the intermediary is imposing price coherence).
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Given the fees pB ≥ 0 and pS ≥ 0 set by M , we only need to focus on the
case where pB + pS > k. The equilibrium strategies of buyers and M in stage
2 are characterized by 3(i) all informed buyers select the seller which offers
the highest net utility; 3(ii) all uninformed buyers who join M follow M ’s
recommendations of which seller to purchase from; 3(iii)M recommends the
seller that provides the buyer with the highest net utility among the sellers
that join M . If there are no sellers joining M , M randomly select a seller
to recommend to buyers. The equilibrium strategies of sellers and buyers in
stage 2 are characterized by 2(i) all informed buyers never join M ; 2(ii) all
205
uninformed buyers with a cost s ≤ sˆ join M , while all uninformed buyers
with a cost s > sˆ don’t join M , where sˆ is determined uniquely by B −
pS − pB + (1−α)(1−G(sˆ))α φ = sˆ; 2(iii) both sellers join M ; 2(iv) each seller sets
the price pm = c + φ + pS to buyers who purchase through M and the price
pd = c + α+(1−α)(1−G(sˆ))
α
φ to buyers who purchase directly.
3(i) to 3(iii) hold following the same proof of Proposition 3.1.
To see why 2(i) to 2(iv) characterize an equilibrium in stage 2, first consider
the buyers’ joining decision. Since an informed buyer has full information on
match values and sellers’ prices, given sellers’ equilibrium strategies, the buyer
is paying pB + pS − (1−α)(1−G(sˆ))α φ + s more by joining M than purchasing
directly. Under pB + pS > k and k >
1−α
α
φ, the informed buyer with the
lowest cost (s = 0) prefers not to join M . Therefore, all informed buyers will
not join M . Thus 2(i) holds.
Consider uninformed buyers’ decision. An uninformed buyer with a cost
s will receive the expected match benefit B by joining M , and it also pays
pB + pS − (1−α)(1−G(s))α φ more to join M . Thus the uninformed buyer will
joining M if and only if the net gain is no smaller than the joining cost, which
implies




Denote the indifferent buyer as sˆ, where sˆ is determined by
B − pB − pS + (1− α)(1−G(sˆ))
α
φ = sˆ.
sˆ is uniquely defined by the above condition as the LHS is strictly decreasing
in sˆ while the RHS is strictly increasing in sˆ. Therefore, all uninformed buyers
join M if and only if s ≤ sˆ. Therefore, 2(ii) holds.
Consider sellers’ strategies. Given the equilibrium strategies of all buyers













F (²i − pmi + pm)f(²i)d²i(pmi − pS − c).
Given the choice of pdi and p
m
i is independent, it is optimal for seller i to set
pd1 = p
d = c + α+(1−α)(1−G(sˆ))
α
φ and pm1 = p
m = c + pS + φ. Thus 2(iv) holds.
And each seller earns an equilibrium profit of
πe =
(




















Clearly, the optimal deviation price would be p′i = p
d = c + α+(1−α)(1−G(sˆ))
α
φ.





φ, which is clearly
smaller than the equilibrium profit, as the deviated seller is no longer able
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to attract any buyers who join M . In other words, a seller always wants to
join M by passing through the fee to the buyers; otherwise, it will not be
recommended by M and will lose all buyers that join M . Therefore 2(iii)
holds.
Following the same logic in Proposition 3.1, there is no equilibrium in
which only one seller joins M . And the only other possible equilibrium is the
trivial equilibrium in which no sellers or buyers join M . Thus the equilibrium
characterized by 2(i) to 2(iv) will indeed chosen by M .
Now consider M ’ decision in stage 1. By choosing pB and pS, M is able to
attract G(sˆ) fraction of uninformed buyers to join, where sˆ is uniquely defined
as before. Since pB and pS are interchangeable, M can simply choose the joint
fee, which is defined as P = pB + pS, to maximize the profit
ΠNPm = (1− α)G(sˆ)(P − k).
Clearly, sˆ is strictly decreasing in P . Therefore, M is faced with a normal
tradeoff of raising the price and lowing the demand on buyers’ side. In order
to determine the optimal price, we focus on the range of P such that k <
P < P max, where Pmax is defined as Pmax = B + (1−α)φ
α
. Clearly, Pmax is the
maximum fee that M is able to charge so as to induce some uninformed buyers
to join. If the joint fee is higher than (or even equal to) Pmax, there will be
no buyers joining M . Given the range of P , the demand on buyers which can
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be characterized by the indifferent buyer has a range of 0 < sˆ < smax, where
smax is determined by




Clearly the maximum profit earned by M is positive since M can at least
charge a joint fee of P = B − k to attract some uninformed buyers to join.
Since sˆ is strictly decreasing in P , in order to determine the optimal fee
charged by M , we can rewrite M ’ profit function in terms of sˆ. Thus the profit
function of M is rewritten as








And we can simply focus on the range where 0 < sˆ < smax.
















Denote the optimal threshold as sNP , which is the solution to the above con-













the definition of smax. Now we need to show the existence and uniqueness of
sNP .
First, to see why sNP is a local maximum, we need to check that the second
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g′(sNP )G(sNP )− 2g2(sNP )
g(sNP )
< 0,
given that G(s) is log-concave so that g′(sNP )G(sNP ) − g2(sNP ) ≤ 0. There-
fore, there exists a sNP that is local maximum, where 0 < sNP < smax.
To see sNP maximizes the profit, we need to show it is also a global maxi-









< 0 if sNP < sˆ < smax. We rewrite the first derivative as
dΠNPm
dsˆ























, which is strictly
decreasing in sˆ ∈ [0, smax], given that G(sˆ) is log-concave and thus G(sˆ)
g(sˆ)
is in-
creasing in sˆ. And F (sNP ) = 0 is implied by the FOC. Thus F (sˆ) > 0 if
0 < sˆ < sNP and F (sˆ) > 0 if sNP < sˆ < smax. Therefore, sNP is also a global
maximum and it is unique sNP .
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Given the optimal choice of demand, the optimal price is




Clearly k < P NP < P max. Thus one possible choice of M is to set pB = 0 and
pS = P
NP .
Proof of Corollary 3.3
If G(s) = 1
sˉ
















+ 1) = 0.
And the optimal sNP is
sNP =
















clearly 0 < sNP < smax < sˉ. And thus
G(sNP ) =








































And clearly k < P NP < P max, where




M ’ contribution to welfare without price coherence is




If G(s) = 1
sˉ
s, the change of welfare becomes
ΔWNP = (1− α)s
NP
sˉ




which is positive if and only if




Proof of Proposition 3.6
Suppose the fees charged by M are pB ≥ 0 and pS ≥ 0 in the first stage. We
can simply focus on the case where pS + pB > k. Consider the equilibrium
strategies of buyers and M in stage 3. We have: 3(i) all informed buyers
select the seller which offers the highest net utility; 3(ii) all uninformed buyers
who join M follow M ’s recommendations of which seller to purchase from;
3(iii) M recommends the seller that provides the buyer with the highest net
utility among the sellers that join M . If there are no sellers joining M , M
randomly select a seller to recommend to buyers. Consider buyers’ and sellers’
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equilibrium strategies in stage 2. Consider buyers’ and sellers’ equilibrium
strategies in stage 2. We have 2(i) all informed buyers don’t join M ; 2(ii)












(p′i − c) = A,
where
A ≡ φ + (1− α)
2(1−G(B − pB))G(B − pB)pˉS
2
(





φ < pˉS <
φ
α
; otherwise uninformed buyers
don’t join M ; 2(iii) both sellers join M if and only if pS ≤ pˉS, and each seller
sets a price pe = c + φ+(1−α)G(B−pB)pS
α+(1−α)G(B−pB) ; 2(iv) neither seller joins M if pS > pˉS,
and each seller charges a price c + φ
α
.
3(i) to 3(iii) hold following the proof of Proposition 3.2.
All informed buyers will never want to join M since they are faced with
the same price from sellers and they need to pay pB +s more to join M . Given
pB ≥ 0, even the buyer with the lowest cost prefer not to join M . Thus 2(i)
holds. Uninformed buyers will join M if the expected net surplus B − s is
non-negative and if both sellers join M . Thus 2(ii) holds. (We will show the
part of pˉS later.)
Now consider sellers’ strategies. Given all buyers following their equilib-
rium strategies, a mass of G(B − pB) uninformed buyers will join M . For
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brevity, we denote GB ≡ G(B − pB). Given the other seller follows its equi-




F (²i + p







F (²i + p
e − pi)f(²i)d²i(pi − pS − c).
It is optimal for seller i to charge
pi = p
e = c +
φ + (1− α)GBpS
α + (1− α)GB .
Each seller earns an equilibrium profit of
πe =
φ + (1− α)2(1−GB)GBpS
2
(
α + (1− α)GB
) .
Now we need to determine the maximum fee pˉS and to show that it also
satisfies
α + (1− α)(1−GB)
α




Consider seller i who wants to deviate from the equilibrium. Since the seller
will never be recommended by M to the uninformed buyers who join M , the






F (²i + p





and the maximum fee of pS must make the seller indifferent, which implies
π′i = π
e. Thus pˉS is implicitly defined above.
214
To determine the two bounds of pˉS, first note that in equilibrium each
seller earns a positive profit on the buyers who purchase through M , which
implies
c +
φ + (1− α)GB pˉS
α + (1− α)GB − c− pˉS > 0.




Second, in order to show pˉS >
α+(1−α)(1−GB)
α
φ, note that the optimal profit












given the rival is charing pj. If pj = p
e, the above profit is the deviation profit
of seller i as defined before. Since the deviation profit is increasing in pj and
pj = p
e is increasing pS, π
′
i is thus increasing in pS. Now suppose M charges
a price pS =
α+(1−α)(1−GB)
α
φ, we want to show that with such a price the
deviation profit for seller i would be strictly lower than the equilibrium profit
πe. By charging the maximum fee pˉS, M must ensure each seller is indifferent
between joining or not joining, and thus π′i = π
e. Given π′i is increasing in pS,




Now consider seller i’ problem above, conditional on its own cost and the
rival’s price. Clearly, the optimal price p′i is increasing in c and increasing in

















the rival is charging the equilibrium price pe = c + φ+(1−α)GBpS
α+(1−α)GB , the optimal
price p′i would be the same as the equilibrium p
e. Now clearly c2 > c and
pe > p1, since
c2 − c = φ
α + (1− α)GB +
(1− α)GBpS
α + (1− α)GB −





α + (1− α)GB ×
α
α + (1− α)(1−GB)pS +
(1− α)GB
α + (1− α)GB pS − pS
>
α
α + (1− α)GB pS +
(1− α)GB
α + (1− α)GB pS − pS
= 0,
and
pe − p1 = c2 − c > 0.
Thus in equilibrium, when seller i’ cost is c and the rival is charging the
equilibrium price pe, the optimal deviation price satisfies
c +
α + (1− α)(1−GB)
α
φ < p′i < c +
φ
α + (1− α)GB +
(1− α)GBpS
α + (1− α)GB = p
e.




























F (²i + pj − p′i)f(²i)d²i
(




the inequality in the second line follows p′i − pS − c > 0. Therefore, M can at
least set a price pS to
α+(1−α)(1−GB)
α
φ, inducing both sellers to join. Since the
deviation profit for each seller is strictly lower, the maximum price charged by
M will be strictly higher than α+(1−α)(1−GB)
α
φ. Thus 2(iii) holds.
If pS > pˉS, there is no equilibrium in which both sellers join M based
on the analysis above. Following the same logic in Proposition 3.2, there
never exist any equilibrium involving only one seller joining M . Thus only the
trivial equilibrium rises, which is identical to the benchmark case without the




Now consider the intermediary’s problem in stage 1. For any fee pB, the
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φ + (1− α)2(1−GB)GB pˉS
2
(
α + (1− α)GB
) ,
with pe = c+ φ+(1−α)GB pˉS
α+(1−α)GB and GB = G(B−pB). And given the analysis above,
the optimal pˉS satisfies
α + (1− α)(1−GB)
α




The profit function of M is
Πm = (1− α)G(B − pB)(pB + pS − k).
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Clearly pB ≤ B and pB + pS > k. Thus M will choose the optimal fee p∗B
on buyers’ side, with the corresponding fee p∗S = pˉS(p
∗
B) on sellers’ side to
maximize the profit. Clearly M ’ maximum profit will be positive since M can
at least charge pB = B−φ and pS = φ, and earns a profit of (1−α)G(φ)(B−
k) > 0. Since φ < α+(1−α)(1−G)
α
φ < pˉS for any pB, the above fees are clearly
achievable.
Proof of Proposition 3.7
In order to see whether M wants to impose price coherence or not, we need to
compare M ’s profit with and without price coherence. Without price coher-
ence, M ’s profit is










while with price coherence, the profit is
ΠPm(pB) = max
pB
(1− α)G(B − pB)(pB + pˉS − k),
where pˉS depends on pB, and it satisfies
α + (1− α)(1−G(B − pB))
α




We can rewrite M ’s profit with price coherence by also allowing M to choose









where the pˉS now depends on sˆ. Denote the optimal choice of demand as s
NP
without price coherence and sP with price coherence. We can easily show that
ΠPm(s
P ) > ΠNPm (s
NP ). To see why,
ΠPm(s
P ) ≥ΠPm(sNP ) = (1− α)G(sNP )
(
B + pˉS(s











where the inequality in the second line follows
pˉS(s
NP ) >






Therefore, M always wants to impose price coherence.
Now consider the effect of intermediation (with price coherence) on con-
sumer surplus and welfare. Consumer surplus under price coherence is
CSP =BI − (1− α)B − c− φ + (1− α)G(s
P )pS
α + (1− α)G(sP )





W P = BI − (1− α)(1−G(sP ))B − c− (1− α)
∫ sP
0
sg(s)ds− (1− α)G(sP )k.
Due to intermediation, the change of consumer surplus is
ΔCSP =
(1− α)G(sP )(φ− αpS)
α + (1− α)G(sP ) +(1−α)G(s








. And the change of welfare is




If G(s) = 1
sˉ
s, the change of welfare is
ΔW P = (1− α)s
P
sˉ




which is positive if and only if




Therefore, this proposition holds.
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Appendix D
Proofs of Chapter Four
Proof of Lemma 4.1
This lemma can be easily proved by contradiction. Suppose there exists such
an equilibrium where M2 monopolizes. It must be the case where both retailers
accept M2’s discount offer and purchase exclusively from M2. Since if there
exists a free retailer, it always wants to purchase from M1 which is able to offer
a lower wholesale price. Let d2 be the discount offer made by M2. Since both
retailers commit to purchase from M2 exclusively by accepting the discount
offer, M2 will offer a wholesale w2 = w
m
2 + d2 in stage 3. Therefore, each
retailer receives a net wholesale price of wm2 and thus will set a price equal to
p(wm2 ), in the proposed equilibrium. Thus the proposed equilibrium profit for
each retailer is πe = π(wm2 ) = [p(w
m
2 )− wm2 ]D(p(wm2 )).
Clearly, one retailer wants to profitably deviate by signing with M1. Since




1 + d1 to the deviating retailer. Thus the deviating retailer receives a
net wholesale price of wm1 , and will earn a deviation profit of π
dev = π(wm1 ).
The deviation profit is clearly higher than the proposed equilibrium profit,
given π(w) is decreasing in w and wm2 > w
m
1 . Thus the foreclosure equilibrium
in which the high cost manufacturer signs up both retailers never exists.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Since M1 is free to choose the discount offer d1 to retailers, we can simply focus
on the offer which is sufficient large enough so that if there exists a free buyer
in stage 2, M1 will never want to compete by selling to that buyer. Given this,
we will show both types of equilibria exist.
Consider the foreclosure equilibrium in which both retailers sign with M1.
M1 will offer a wholesale price w
m
1 + d1 and both retailers will set the same
price p(wm1 ). The equilibrium profit for each retailer will be π(w
m
1 ). Now
consider two possible deviations from either retailer. If Ri deviates by signing
with M2, the deviation profit will be π(w
m
2 ) which is clearly smaller, given the
analysis in the previous lemma. If Ri deviates by remaining free, in stage 2
there will be one free retailer. Given d1 is sufficiently large, M1 will never want
to compete to sell through Ri and thus will still charge w
m
1 + d1 and in the
meantime M2 will also charge w
m
2 to attract R2. Thus the deviation profit for
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Ri will still be π(w
m
2 ), which is smaller than the equilibrium profit. Therefore
there will be no incentive for either retailer to unilaterally deviate.
Clearly, there also exists a competition equilibrium in which both retail-
ers remain free. As both retailers are free, normal Bertrand competition at
upstream level occurs and both manufacturers will charge the same wholesale
price w1 = w2 = c2. Due to the tie-breaking rule, the dominant manufacturer
captures the whole market. The equilibrium profit for both retailers is π(c2).
To see this is indeed an equilibrium, we need to show neither firm is able to
attract any retailer. Clearly, M2 is not able to attract any retailers, since the
best offer M2 can make is its marginal cost c2, otherwise M2 will make a loss.
Thus no retailer wants to deviate by signing up with M2. Since the discount
offer is sufficiently large, M1 cannot profitably deviate by attracting one re-
tailer, as the signed retailer will always have to buy from M1 at the monopoly
wholesale price wm1 and earn a strictly smaller profit than the proposed equi-
librium profit. As a result, the competition equilibrium where neither retailer
accepts any exclusive offer also exists.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
To show the competition equilibrium, we first need to show that there is no
incentive for either manufacturer to use exclusive deals in terms of lump-sum
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payments.
First, it is never profitable for M2 to use exclusive deals to sign up any
retailer. In order to sign up a retailer, M2 needs to at least offer xˉ2 = π(c2)−
π(wm2 ) > 0. However, the profit for M2 from selling through that retailer
would always be negative, given that
Π2(w
m
2 )− x2 = π(wm2 ) + Π2(wm2 )− π(c2)
= [p(wm2 )− c2]D(p(wm2 ))− π(c2) < 0,
the inequality in the second line follows the definition of π(c2), since p(c2) is
the maximizer of the profit.
Second, consider M1’s decision. In order to sign up a retailer, M1 needs to
at least offer xˉ1 = π(c2)−π(wm1 ) > 0. Clearly, M1 is never able to sign up any
retailer when its cost advantage is not strong enough,
Π1(w
m
1 ) < π(c2)− π(wm1 ).
If the cost advantage is strong enough, M1 offers such an amount so that both
retailers will sign, given M2 always wants to offer nothing. Thus the profit




To see whether M1 wants to make such an offer to sign up both retailers, we
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need to see M1’s profit gain, which is given by
Π1(w
m
1 ) + π(w
m
1 )− π(c2)− Π1(c2)




Since the profit function Π˜1(w) is concave and is maximized at w = c1, and
given wm1 > c2 > c1, Π˜1(w
m
1 )− Π˜1(c2) < 0. Therefore, it is never profitable for
M1 to use exclusive deals.
Given the analysis above, neither manufacturer wants to make exclusive
offers, or equivalently x1 = x2 = 0. This will be exactly the case as if exclusive
dealing is banned so that both manufacturers are engaged in Bertrand com-
petition in the upstream level. Therefore, Bertrand result suggests that both
manufacturers will offer the same wholesale price equal to c2. Both retailers
will remain free and purchase from M1 at the competitive price c2, and each
earns a profit of Π1(c2), where
Π1(c2) = (p(c2)− c2)D(p(c2)).
Thus a unique equilibrium arises which involves exactly the same outcome
as if exclusive dealing is banned.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3
First we want to show that there never exists a competition equilibrium where
both retailers remain free. We show it by contradiction. Suppose there exists
such an equilibrium, the proposed equilibrium strategies must follow: both
manufacturers charge the same wholesale price equal to c2, and both retailers
buy from M1. The two retailers with the same cost will set the same price
sufficiently close to (but above) c2 and share the market equally. Both retailers
earn an arbitrarily small amount (but positive) of profit. In this case, M2 earns
nothing while M1 earns a profit of Π1 → (c2− c1)D(c2). Clearly, M1 is able to
offer a sufficiently high amount of discount d1 to induce at least one retailer to
sign. Suppose one retailer (say R1) deviates by signing with M1, the strategies
by all parties in the continuation equilibrium are as follows: M2 offers c2 to
R2, while M1 offers a common wholesale price w1 + d1, where w1 is sufficiently
close to (but below) c2. R1 accepts M1’s offer and receives a net price of w1
while R2 accepts M2’s offer and receives a price of c2, since w1 + d1 > c2
given d1 is large enough. Therefore, R2 will price down to c2 while R1 charges
a price above w1 but below c2. Clearly R1’s deviation profit is higher than
the proposed equilibrium profit, as now R1 has a lower cost while the cost of
the rival remains the same. Indeed R1’s profit almost doubles, as the market
share doubles while the profit margin is almost the same. Thus the dominant
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manufacturer is always able to sign up at least one retailer.
Now we need to show that the foreclosure equilibrium exists where the
dominant manufacturer signs up both retailers. Consider the following equi-
librium strategies: M1 offers a discount of d1 high enough, and both retailers
sign exclusively with M1. M1 charge a common wholesale price w sufficiently
close to pm1 + d1, where p
m
1 is the monopoly price that maximize (p− c1)D(p).
Both retailers set the same price sufficiently close to (but above) w − d1 and
they will share the market equally and earn an arbitrarily small amount (but
still positive) of profit. M1 earns a profit of Π1 → Πm1 = (pm1 − c1)D(pm1 ).
Clearly, there is no incentive for either retailer to deviate. Suppose one re-
tailer (say R2) deviates by signing up with M2 or remaining free, it has no
choice but to make a purchase through M2, given the sufficiently high amount
of discount offer d1 by M1. The continuation equilibrium after the deviation
is characterized as follows: M2 sets the wholesale price equal to its marginal
cost c2, while M1 sets a common wholesale price w1 + d1, where w1 is slightly
below but sufficiently close to c2. R1 sets a price slightly above w1 but below
c2, while R2 sets a price equal to its cost c2. With almost perfect competition
and asymmetric costs, R2 captures no market share and thus earns nothing
by its deviation. Thus the deviation is clearly not profitable and no one wants
to deviate. Following retailers’ strategies, M2 can never sign up any retailer
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through loyalty discounts.
Proof of Proposition 4.4
Consider different cases which depend on retailers’ decision of which manufac-
turer to sign with. If both retailers sign with Mi, Mi monopolizes and charges a
common wholesale price wi which is sufficiently close to p
m
i from below, where
pmi maximizes (p − ci)D(p). Both retailers charge the same price sufficiently
close to (but above) wi. In this case, Mi earns a profit of Πi → Πmi , while both
retailers will earn an arbitrarily small amount of profit (but positive). If both
retailers remain free, both M1 and M2 will charge the same price equal to c2
and both retailers will buy from M1. Both retailers will charge the same price
sufficiently close to (but above) c2. M1 earns a profit of Π1 → (c2 − c1)D(c2),
while both retailers will earn an arbitrarily small amount of profit (but pos-
itive) and M2 earns nothing. If only one retailer signs with a manufacturer,
or if both retailers sign with a different manufacturer, the result will be the
same: M1 will charge a price w2 sufficiently close to (but below) c2 while M2
charges a price w2 equal to c2. A free retailer will purchase through M1. The
retailer (say R1) who purchases through M1 will set a price slightly above
w1 but below c2. The retailer (say R2) who purchases through M2 will set a
price equal to c2. R1 captures the whole market and earns a positive profit
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(but sufficiently close to zero), while R2 earns nothing. M1 earns a profit of
Π1 → (c2 − c1)D(c2) and M2 earns nothing.
Since M2 can never receive a positive profit unless it signs up both retailers,
M2 thus will offer the maximum amount of x2 → 12Πm2 to both retailers. Given
M2’s offer, M1 is able to make a similar offer so that it is able to attract both
retailers. M2 can not profitably deviate by further raising the offer since it
will make a loss otherwise. Thus there exists a unique foreclosure equilibrium
where both retailers will sign exclusively with M1. In equilibrium, each retailer
receives a profit of π → 1
2
Πm2 while M1 obtains a profit of Π1 → Πm1 − Πm2 .
Proof of Corollary 4.2
Recall that the dominant manufacturer earns ΠLD1 → Πm1 with loyalty dis-
counts and ΠLP1 → Πm1 −Πm2 with lump-sum payments, where the superscript
LD denotes the exclusive dealing with loyalty discounts and LP denotes the
exclusive dealing with lump-sum payments. Clearly, M1 earns a higher profit
with loyalty discounts.
To see whether the dominant manufacturer gains from exclusive dealing,
we also need to study the case where exclusive dealing is banned. Without
exclusive dealing, both manufacturers will engage in Bertrand competition in
the upstream level so that they will price down to c2. The low cost manufac-
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turer M1 will attract both retailers. Since retailers are faced with the same
cost, they both will charge a price sufficiently close to (but above) c2 and each
earns an arbitrarily small amount (but positive) of profit. M1 will earn a profit
of ΠNE1 → (c2− c1)D(c2), where the superscript NE denotes the case without
exclusive dealing.
First, clearly ΠLP1 > Π
NE
1 since
(pm1 − c1)D(pm1 ) > (c2 − c1)D(c2)
by the definition of pm1 , which maximize (p− c1)D(p). Therefore, M1 earns a
higher profit with loyalty discounts than without exclusive dealing.
Second, by comparing ΠLP1 with Π
NE
1 , we have
ΠLP1 − ΠNE1 →Πm1 − Πm2 − (c2 − c1)D(c2)
=(pm1 − c1)D(pm1 )− (pm2 − c2)D(pm2 )− (c2 − c1)D(c2)
<(pm1 − c1)D(pm1 )− (pm2 − c2)D(pm2 )− (c2 − c1)D(pm1 )
=(pm1 − c2)D(pm1 )− (pm2 − c2)D(pm2 )
<0,
where the inequality in the third lines follows the condition that c2 < p
m
1 and
D(p) is decreasing in p, while the inequality in the last line follows that pm2
maximizes (p− c2)D(p) and pm1 < pm2 . Therefore, M1 is always worse-off with
lump-sum payments.
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Proof of Lemma 4.2
To prove this lemma, we first need to characterize different equilibria in sub-
games starting from stage 3. Consider the case where both retailers sign with
M1. As a monopoly manufacturer, M1 charges the optimal wholesale prices
(w1, w2) to both retailers to as to maximize the profit
max
w1,w2
(w1 − c1)D1(p1(w1, w2), p2(w2, w1)) + (w2 − c1)D2(p2(w2, w1), p1(w1, w2)),
where pi(w1, w2) is optimal price set by Ri which is defined before. Therefore,
M1 will charge the monopoly wholesale price w
m




and equilibrium retail prices are
p1 = p2 =





2(1 + γ)(2− γ) ,
while two retailers earn
π1 = π2 = π
11 =
(1− γ)(1− c1)2
4(1 + γ)(2− γ)2 ,
where πij is the profit earned by a retailer if it signs with Mi while the rival
signs with Mj . If the retailer remains free, i = 0.
Similarly, if both retailers sign exclusively with M2, M2 charges the monopoly
wholesale price wm2 =
1+c2
2
to both retailers who will set the retail prices at
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p1 = p2 =
2(1−γ)+1+c2
2(2−γ) . In this case, M2 earns
Πm2 =
(1− c2)2
2(1 + γ)(2− γ) =
(2− θ)2(1− c1)2
8(1 + γ)(2− γ) ,
and both retailers earn
π1 = π2 = π
22 =
(1− γ)(1− c2)2
4(1 + γ)(2− γ)2 =
(1− γ)(2− θ)2(1− c1)2
16(1 + γ)(2− γ)2 .
If both retailers are free, upstream competition result in both manufactur-
ers charging c2 to both retailers who will buy from M1. Both retailers will
charge
p1 = p2 =





(1 + γ)(2− γ)2 .
M2 earns nothing while M1 earns
Π001 =
2(c2 − c1)(1− c2)
(1 + γ)(2− γ) .
Suppose both retailers sign with a different manufacturer (say Ri signs
with Mi while Rj signs with Mj). Mi will set the optimal wholesale price wi
to maximize its profit
max
wi
(wi − ci)Di(pi(wi, wj), pj(wj, wi)),
given that Mj charges wj and retailers set retail prices optimally. When both
manufacturers have similar costs, both will capture positive market shares.
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Thus the reaction function for Mi is,
wi(wj) =
(1− γ)(2 + γ) + γwj + (2− γ2)ci
2(2− γ2) .
The equilibrium wholesale price for Mi is then determined as
wi =
(1− γ)(2 + γ)(4− 2γ2 + γ) + (2− γ2)[2(2− γ2)ci + γcj ]
(4− 2γ2 − γ)(4− 2γ2 + γ)
and the retail price by Ri is
pi =
1
(2− γ)(2 + γ)(4− 2γ2 − γ)(4− 2γ2 + γ)
(
(2− γ2)(8− 3γ2)ci






(1 + γ)(1− γ)(2 + γ)2(2− γ)2(4− 2γ2 + γ)2(4− 2γ2 − γ)2
×
{
(1− γ)(2 + γ)(4− 2γ2 + γ)− [2(2− γ2)2 − γ2]ci + (2− γ2)γcj
}2
,
where i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. And Mi earns
Πi =
(2− γ2)2
(1 + γ)(1− γ)(2 + γ)(2− γ)(4− 2γ2 + γ)2(4− 2γ2 − γ)2
×
{
(1− γ)(2 + γ)(4− 2γ2 + γ)− [2(2− γ2)2 − γ2]ci + (2− γ2)γcj
}2
.
This is the case when c2 < α, where α ≡ (1−γ)(2+γ)(4−2γ2+γ)2(2−γ2)2−γ2 ∈ [0, 1] and recall
c1 = 0. When c2 ≥ α, only M1 is able to capture positive markets share so
that M1 charges w1 =
(2−γ2)c2−(1−γ)(2+γ)
γ
and M2 charges w2 = c2. The retail
prices are p1 =
−1+γ+c2
γ
and p2 = c2. In this case both M2 and R2 earn nothing











Now we can prove this lemma by contradiction. Suppose there exists an
equilibrium where both retailers sign with M2 given the discount offer d2.
M2 will charge w1 = w2 = w
m
2 + d2 to both retailers who will get the profit
π1 = π2 = π
22 = (1−γ)(1−c2)
2
4(1+γ)(2−γ)2 . Clearly, one retailer wants to deviate by signing
exclusively with M1, given the rival has signed with M2. The deviation profit
for the retailer is
π12 =
(2− γ2)2{(1− γ)(2 + γ)(4− 2γ2 + γ) + (2− γ2)γc2}2
(1 + γ)(1− γ)(2 + γ)2(2− γ)2(4− 2γ2 + γ)2(4− 2γ2 − γ)2




otherwise. We can check that π12 > π22
regardless of γ and c2.




4(2− γ2)2((1− γ)(2 + γ)(4− 2γ2 + γ) + (2− γ2)γc2)2
(1− γ)2(2 + γ)2(4− 2γ2 + γ)2(4− 2γ2 − γ)2(1− c2)2
=
(
2(2− γ2)((1− γ)(2 + γ)(4− 2γ2 + γ) + (2− γ2)γc2)









(1− c2)2 > 1.




4(1 + γ)(2− γ)2
γ2
> 1.
Therefore, there never exists an equilibrium where both retailers sign exclu-
sively with M2.
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Proof of Proposition 4.5
Consider the foreclosure equilibrium where both retailers sign exclusively with
M1, given the loyalty discount d1. We can simply focus on the case where d1
is sufficiently large so that M1 commits not to sell through the free retailer,
if it deviates in the later stage. Since both retailers sign exclusively, M1 will
offer d1 +w
m
1 to both of them and earn a profit of Π
m
1 , while retailers earn π
11.
Suppose one retailer deviates by remaining free or signing exclusively with
M2. Such deviation results in competition between two channels, where each
manufacturer sells through a single retailer. Therefore, the deviation profit for
the retailer is π21. In order for a retailer not to deviate, we need π11 ≥ π21.
There are two cases to be considered. First, if c2 < α, both channels capture
positive market shares and we have
(1− γ)(1− c1)2
4(1 + γ)(2− γ)2
≥(2− γ
2)2{(1− γ)(2 + γ)(4− 2γ2 + γ)− [2(2− γ2)2 − γ2]c2}2
(1 + γ)(1− γ)(2 + γ)2(2− γ)2(4− 2γ2 + γ)2(4− 2γ2 − γ)2 .
The above condition is equivalent to
c2 ≥ γ(1− γ)(2 + γ)(4− 2γ
2 + γ)
2(2− γ2)[2(2− γ2)2 − γ2] =
γ
2(2− γ2)α.
If c2 ≥ α, M2 will capture no market shares and thus π21 = 0. Therefore, the
condition always holds. If we define β ≡ γ
(2−γ2)α and given c2 = θw
m
1 +(1−θ)c1,
no retailer wants to deviate if θ ≥ β.
235
There also exists a competition equilibrium where both retailers remain
free. The equilibrium condition is π00 ≥ π12, so that no retailer wants to
deviate by signing with M1. If c2 < α, we need
(1− γ)(1− c2)2
(1 + γ)(2− γ)2
≥ (2− γ
2)2[(1− γ)(2 + γ)(4− 2γ2 + γ) + (2− γ2)γc2]2
(1 + γ)(1− γ)(2 + γ)2(2− γ)2(4− 2γ2 + γ)2(4− 2γ2 − γ)2 ,
which is equivalent to
c2 ≤ (1− γ)
2(2 + γ)2(4− 2γ2 + γ)
[(2− γ2)2γ + (1− γ)(2 + γ)(4− 2γ2 + γ)(4− 2γ2 − γ)] .
If c2 ≥ α, we need
(1− γ)(1− c2)2




which is equivalent to
2− γ2 ≤ 0.
The above inequality can never hold regardless of c2 and γ. Therefore, the
competition equilibrium exists if θ ≤ δ, where
δ ≡ 2(1− γ)
2(2 + γ)2(4− 2γ2 + γ)
[(2− γ2)2γ + (1− γ)(2 + γ)(4− 2γ2 + γ)(4− 2γ2 − γ)] ,
and δ ≤ α.
As a result, when θ > max{β, δ}, the foreclosure equilibrium is the unique
outcome.
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Proof of Proposition 4.6
Suppose there are some retailers who sign exclusively with M1 while others
are free or sign with M2. M2 just prices down to its marginal cost c2 while M1
would charge a price sufficiently close to c2 from below. All retailers who do
not sign with M2 would earn nothing by setting the price equal to c2, while
only those who sign sign with M1 earn positive profits (though sufficiently
small). Therefore, there exists no equilibrium where only some retailers sign
exclusively with M1. Also there is no equilibrium where no retailers sign with
M1, since at least one retailer wants to deviate by signing with M1 so that it
becomes a monopolist in the downstream market.
Thus it remains to show that the foreclosure equilibrium where all retailers
sign with M1 exists. The equilibrium strategies follow: M1 makes a sufficiently
high discount offer d1 and all retailers sign with M1. M1 charges a wholesale
price w1 sufficiently close to the monopoly price plus the discount p
m
1 +d1 from
below, and all retailers charge the same price sufficiently close to w1 − d1 and
earn an arbitrarily small amount of (but positive) profit. Suppose one retailer
deviates by rejecting M1’s offer, the continuation equilibrium is: M2 offers c2
to the deviating retailer and M1 offers w1 + d1 to all N − 1 signed retailers,
where w1 is sufficiently close to c2 but below. The deviating retailer charges a
price equal to c2 while all other retailers charge a price slightly above w1 (but
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below c2). Thus all signed retailers share the market equally with a positive
profit (but sufficiently small), while the deviating retailer captures no market
shares and earns no profit. Therefore, there is no incentive for any retailer to
deviate.
Therefore, the equilibrium is unique since there never exists any other
equilibrium where some retailers remain free or sign up exclusively with the
high cost manufacturer. It follows that all retailers that do not sign with M1
always earn a zero profit.
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